Showing posts with label Russian Federation. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Russian Federation. Show all posts

Thursday, 1 November 2007

Russian Spetsnaz hand-to-hand combat system - Systema

Systema is a term derived from the original Russian Systema of Hand-to-Hand Combat. More recently, as this style has become exported to western nations, it has become synonymous with Systema or Russian System of Martial Arts.

Systema was developed by the early Cossacks, a highly trained paramilitary society, more than a thousand years ago, and historical record of this fighting style can be dated back to 948 A.D. For Centuries Russia had to repel invaders from the north, south, east and west, each of which brought to bear the peculiar martial skills, physical abilities and weapons of its culture. As a result, the need arose for a fighting style based on adaptability, instinct and ease of learning.

From ancient ages the martial art of Russian warriors deserved worldwide recognition. Even then the Russian close fight inspired fear in the enemies. Ancient Russians were strong in the close fight and won even when all military rules said they could not win. Russian Plastoon Cossacks showed their exclusive art of close fight in the First World War.After the revolution in Russia, emigrating Russian officers brought the Russian martial art to the West. It was the Russian Style that was the basis for training the US sea-soldiers. In Russia the martial art perfected for ages was hidden into secret special schools for training diversionists. The Russian Style is a part of the combat sambo (Russian self-defence without weapon) generated by Spiridono, Kadochnikov. However, the today’s Russian Style standard was created by (who trained at a diversion school) Vadim Starov (who systemised and generalised the knowledge). As a result they created a universal survival system based on the historical battle experience and up-to-date developments in technologies and sciences such as mechanics, physics, medicine, geography, psychology, pathology, etc. Eventually, the System became the life system and world outlook of Slavonic people.

The study and practice of this discipline involves a complete system of physical and spiritual health, relaxation, and courage in the face of all forms of adversity. But most of all, it involves a philosophy of life, peace and decency seldom seen. It disciplines its students to relax while striking, rather than focus to generate maximum power, allowing you to strike at unusual and unexpected angles, to smile in combat rather than adopt a fierce visage or announce your intentions with a blood curdling yell. There are no fixed training patterns or combinations of movements, all training is based on the reality that unexpected things happen in combat.

The purpose of this discipline is not merely to prepare for violence, but to gain a positive and strong mental state, to have a healthier and more limber body, to be more relaxed in a stressful society and to live a decent and peaceful life.

The Russian System of Hand-to-Hand Combat, developed from this need. When the Communists came to power after the October Revolution of 1917, the practice of these fighting skills was prohibited, except by the elite units of the Soviet Special Forces, known as Spetsnaz. These groups had unique training and capabilities for working on the highest risk missions within KGB, and other government agencies. It is only since 1991, with the end of the Communist era, that these martial traditions and styles have become available to the West.

Russia. A new millennium eve. A wild outburst of organised criminals, terrorism, separatism, third powers’ aggression in disguise of mercenaries, hot spot wars. This is the reality of our days. It’s grieving to confess that - in some battles against bandit units - up to ninety percent of Russian soldiers died from wounds made with cold steel. The analysis of the military actions of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Defence Ministry special teams showed that the close fight role constantly grows in both bandit unit aggression repulse and criminal group suppression. The close fight techniques serve a single aim: saving lives in the extreme conditions of a true Combat.

What is the Russian Style? What is it’s secret hidden in? The secrets of the style should be looked for in regular physics, mechanics, biology, anatomy and psychology manuals rather than in any mystic ciphered treatises. The enemy’s attacks are received softly, in the same plane, by turning the arm or weapon. You should use the enemy’s inertia, add your acceleration, shift his centre of gravity - and the enemy can’t withstand it. By the way -never use your force to oppose the attacking force. Do always feel thedistance. Keeping the contact at the point of touch as a weapon/enemy rotation axis centre allows you to control the enemy by using a system of levers rather than a brute force. Do it easily, spending just a quarter of your physical strength. Having his reserve strength, the close fighter can see and evaluate the whole situation. The close fighter is effective in any age, in any state of health. And - which is important - he can use anything he can reach: a submachine gun, knife, digging tool, even pen or pencil. Moreover, his arms are his weapons too.

Continue reading

Wednesday, 17 October 2007

Lithuanian intelligence agencies helped KGB’s Mitrokhin to escape to Great Britain

Naxal Watch at his blog writes:
The former archivist of the KGB of the USSR, Vasily Mitrokhin, left for the West on November 7, 1992 with his family through Lithuania from Riga, as it was reported earlier, and those Lithuanian intelligence agencies that helped him, Vilnius-based newspaper Lietuvos zinios reports. This information was confirmed also by the former Lithuanian Minister Audrius Butkevicius, who refused to expand on the details.
"Intelligence agencies of Lithuania did participate in the operation of transfer of Mitrokhin and his archive to Great Britain, this became one of most sensible impacts on the KGB during all the history of this most secret organization," the newspaper is quoting the former intelligence chief of the Ministry of Defense of Lithuania, colonel Virginius Cesnuliavicius as saying.
News agency Interfax cites Cesnuliavicius that the Lithuanian security services engaged the operation under the initiative of the British MIS intelligence agents early in 1992. According to Cesnuliavicius, Mitrokhin with his family arrived to Lithuania under a pretext of rest in Druskininkai, a popular Lithuanian sea-resort. Continue reading...

Wednesday, 18 July 2007

Weapons and equipment of Russian Spetsnaz

From Viktor Suvorov, "Spetsnaz. The Story Behind the Soviet SAS" (Source)

The standard issue of weapons to a spetsnaz is a sub-machine gun, 400 rounds of ammunition, a knife, and six hand grenades or a light single-action grenade-launcher. During a drop by parachute the sub-machine gun is carried in such a way as not to interfere with the main (or the reserve) parachute opening correctly and promptly, and not to injure the parachute on landing. But the large number of fastenings make it impossible for the parachutist to use the gun immediately after landing. So he should not be left defenceless at that moment, the parachutist also carries a P-6 silent pistol. After my escape to the West I described this pistol to Western experts and was met with a certain scepticism. Today a great deal that I told the experts has been confirmed, and examples of the silent pistol have been found in Afghanistan. (Jane's Defence Weekly has published some excellent photographs and a description of this unusual weapon.) For noiseless shooting over big distances PBS silencers are used and some soldiers carry them on their submachine guns.

Officers, radio-operators and cypher clerks have a smaller set of weapons: a short-barrelled sub-machine gun (AKR) of 160 rounds, a pistol and a knife.

Apart from personal weapons a spetsnaz group carries collective weapons in the form of RPG-16D grenade-launchers, Strela-2 ground-to-air missiles, mines for various purposes, plastic explosive, snipers' rifles and other weapons. The unit learns how to handle group weapons but does not keep them permanently with it: group weapons are held in the spetsnaz stores, and the quantity needed by the unit is determined before each operation. Operations can often be carried out simply with each man's personal weapons.

A group which sets out on an operation with only personal weapons can receive the group weapons it needs later, normally by parachute. And in case of pursuit a group may abandon not only the group weapons but some of their personal weapons as well. For most soldiers, to lose their weapons is an offence punished by a stretch in a penal battalion. But spetsnaz, which enjoys special trust and operates in quite unusual conditions, has the privilege of resolving the dilemma for itself although every case is, of course, later investigated. The commander and his deputy have to demonstrate that the situation really was critical.

Unlike the airborne and the air assault forces, spetsnaz does not have any heavy weapons like artillery, mortars or BMD fighting vehicles. But 'does not have' does not mean 'does not use'.

On landing in enemy territory a group may begin its operation by capturing a car or armoured troop-carrier belonging to the enemy. Any vehicle, including one with a red cross on it, is fair game for spetsnaz. It can be used for a variety of purposes: for getting quickly away from the drop zone, for example, or for transporting the group's mobile base, or even for mounting the assault on an especially important target. In the course of exercises on Soviet territory spetsnaz groups have frequently captured tanks and used them for attacking targets. An ideal situation is considered to be when the enemy uses tanks to guard especially important installations, and spetsnaz captures one or several of them and immediately attacks the target. In that case there is no need for a clumsy slow-moving tank to make the long trip to its target.

Many other types of enemy weapons, including mortars and artillery, can be used as heavy armament. The situation may arise in the course of a war where a spetsnaz group operating on its own territory will obtain the enemy's heavy weapons captured in battle, then get through to enemy territory and operate in his rear in the guise of genuine fighting units. This trick was widely used by the Red Army in the Civil War.

The Soviet high command even takes steps to acquire foreign weapons in peacetime. In April 1985 four businessmen were arrested in the USA. Their business was officially dealing in arms. Their illegal business was also dealing in arms, and they had tried to ship 500 American automatic rifles, 100,000 rounds of ammunition and 400 night-vision sights to countries of the Soviet bloc.

Why should the Soviet Union need American weapons in such quantities? To help the national liberation armies which it sponsors? For that purpose the leadership has no hesitation in providing Kalashnikov automatics, simpler and cheaper, with no problems of ammunition supply. Perhaps the 500 American rifles were for studying and copying? But the Soviet Union has captured M-16 rifles from many sources, Vietnam for one. They have already been studied down to the last detail. And there is no point in copying them since, in the opinion of the Soviet high command, the Kalashnikov meets all its requirements.

It is difficult to think of any other reason for such a deal than that they were for equipping spetsnaz groups. Not for all of them, of course, but for the groups of professional athletes, especially those who will be operating where the M-16 rifle is widely used and where consequently there will be plenty of ammunition for it to be found.

The quantity of rifles, sights and rounds of ammunition is easy to explain: 100 groups of five men each, in which everybody except the radio-operator has a night-sight (four to a group); for each rifle half a day's requirements (200 rounds), the rest to be taken from the enemy. American sights are used mainly because batteries and other essential spares can be obtained from the enemy.

This is clearly not the only channel through which standard American arms and ammunition are obtained. We know about the businessmen who have been arrested. There are no doubt others who have not been arrested yet.

The weapons issued to spetsnaz are very varied, covering a wide range, from the guitar string (used for strangling someone in an attack from behind) to small portable nuclear changes with a TNT equivalent of anything from 800 to 2000 tons. The spetsnaz arsenal includes swiftly acting poisons, chemicals and bacteria. At the same time the mine remains the favourite weapon of spetsnaz. It is not by chance that the predecessors of the modern spetsnaz men bore the proud title of guards minelayers. Mines are employed at all stages of a group's operations. Immediately after a landing, mines may be laid where the parachutes are hidden and later the group will lay mines along the roads and paths by which they get away from the enemy. The mines very widely employed by spetsnaz in the 1960s and 1970s were the MON-50, MON-100, MON-200 and the MON-300. The MON is a directional anti-personnel mine, and the figure indicates the distance the fragments fly. They do not fly in different directions but in a close bunch in the direction the minelayer aims them. It is a terrible weapon, very effective in a variety of situations. For example, if a missile installation is discovered and it is not possible to get close to it, a MON-300 can be used to blow it up. They are at their most effective if the explosion is aimed down a street, road, forest path, ravine, gorge or valley. MON mines are often laid so that the target is covered by cross fire from two or more directions.

There are many other kinds of mines used by spetsnaz, each of which has been developed for a special purpose: to blow up a railway bridge, to destroy an oil storage tank (and at the same time ignite the contents), and to blow up constructions of cement, steel, wood, stone and other materials. It is a whole science and a real art. The spetsnaz soldier has a perfect command of it and knows how to blow up very complicated objects with the minimal use of explosive. In case of need he knows how to make explosives from material lying around. I have seen a spetsnaz officer make several kilograms of a sticky brown paste out of the most inoffensive and apparently non-explosive materials in about an hour. He also made the detonator himself out of the most ordinary things that a spetsnaz soldier carries with him — an electric torch, a razor blade which he made into a spring, a box of matches and finally the bullet from a tracer cartridge. The resulting mechanism worked perfectly. In some cases simpler and more accessible things can be used -gas and oxygen balloons of paraffin with the addition of filings of light metals. A veteran of this business, Colonel Starinov, recalls in his memoirs making a detonator out of one matchbox.

On the subject of mines, we must mention a terrible spetsnaz weapon known as the Strela-Blok. This weapon was used in the second half of the 1960s and the first half of the 1970s. It is quite possible that by now it has been very substantially improved. In a sense it can be described as an anti-aircraft mine, because it operates on the same principle as the mine laid at the side of a road which acts against a passing vehicle. It is related to mines which are based on portable grenade-launchers which fire at the side of a tank or an armoured personnel carrier.

The Strela-Blok is an ordinary Soviet Strela-2 portable missile (a very exact copy of the American Red Eye). A spetsnaz group carries one or several of these missiles with it. In the area of a major airfield the launch tube is attached to a tall tree (or the roof of a building, a tall mast, a hayrick) and camouflaged. The missile is usually installed at a short distance from the end of the runway. That done, the group leaves the area. The missile is launched automatically. A clockwork mechanism operates first, allowing the group to retire to a safe distance, then, when the set time has run out (it could be anything from an hour to several days) a very simple sound detector is switched on which reacts to the noise of an aircraft engine of a particular power. So long as the engine noise is increasing nothing happens (it means the aircraft is coming nearer), but as soon as the noise decreases the mechanism fires. The infra-red warhead reacts to the heat radiated by the engine, follows the aircraft and catches up with it.

Imagine yourself to be the officer commanding an aircraft base. One plane (perhaps with a nuclear bomb on board) is shot down by a missile as it takes off. You cancel all flights and despatch your people to find the culprits. They of course find nobody. Flights are resumed and your next plane is shot down on take-off. What will you do then? What will you do if the group has set up five Strela-Blok missiles around the base and anti-infantry mines on the approaches to them? How do you know that there are only five missiles?

Another very effective spetsnaz weapon is the RPO-A flamethrower. It weighs eleven kilograms and has a single action. Developed in the first half of the 1970s, it is substantially superior to any flame-throwers produced at that time in any other country. The principal difference lies in the fact that the foreign models of the time threw a stream of fire at a range of about thirty metres, and a considerable part of the fuel was burnt up in the trajectory.

The RPO-A, however, fires not a stream but a capsule, projected out of a lightweight barrel by a powder charge. The inflammable mixture flies to the target in a capsule and bursts into flame only when it strikes the target. The RPO-A has a range of more than 400 metres, and the effectiveness of one shot is equal to that of the explosion of a 122 mm howitzer shell. It can be used with special effectiveness against targets vulnerable to fire — fuel stores, ammunition dumps, and missiles and aircraft standing on the ground.

A more powerful spetsnaz weapon is the GRAD-V multiple rocket-launcher, a system of firing in salvos developed for the airborne forces. There the weapon can be mounted on the chassis of a GAZ-66 truck. It has 12 launching tubes which fire jet-propelled shells. But apart from the vehicle-mounted version, GRAD-V is produced in a portable version. In case of need the airborne units are issued with separate tubes and the shells to go with them. The tube is set up on the ground in the simplest of bases. It is aimed in the right direction and fired. Several separate tubes are usually aimed at one target and fired at practically the same time. Fired from a vehicle its accuracy is very considerable, but from the ground it is not so great. But in either case the effect is very considerable. The GRAD-V is largely a weapon for firing to cover a wide area and its main targets are: communications centres, missile batteries, aircraft parks and other very vulnerable targets.

The airborne forces use both versions of the GRAD-V. Spetsnaz uses only the second, portable version. Sometimes, to attack a very important target, for example a submarine in its berth, a major spetsnaz unit may fire GRAD-V shells simultaneously from several dozen or even hundreds of tubes.

In spetsnaz the most up-to-date weapons exist side by side with a weapon which has long been forgotten in all other armies or relegated to army museums. One such weapon is the crossbow. However amusing the reader may find this, the crossbow is in fact a terrible weapon which can put an arrow right through a man at a great distance and with great accuracy. Specialists believe that, at the time when the crossbow was competing with the musket, the musket came off best only because it made such a deafening noise that this had a greater effect on the enemy than the soft whistle of an arrow from a crossbow. But in speed of firing, accuracy and reliability the crossbow was superior to the musket, smaller in size and weight, and killed people just as surely as the musket. Because it made no noise when fired it did not have the same effect as a simultaneous salvo from a thousand muskets.

But that noiseless action is exactly what spetsnaz needs today. The modern crossbow is, of course, very different in appearance and construction from the crossbows of previous centuries. It has been developed using the latest technology. It is aimed by means of optical and thermal sights of a similar quality to those used on modern snipers' rifles. The arrows are made with the benefit of the latest research in ballistics and aerodynamics. The bow itself is a very elegant affair, light, reliable and convenient. To make it easy to carry it folds up.

The crossbow is not a standard weapon in spetsnaz, although enormous attention is given in the athletic training units to training men to handle the weapon. In case of necessity a spetsnaz group may be issued with one or two crossbows to carry out some special mission in which a man has to be killed without making any noise at all and in darkness at a distance of several dozen metres. It is true that the crossbow can in no way be considered a rival to the sniper's rifle. The Dragunov sniper's rifle is a marvellous standard spetsnaz weapon. But if you fit a silencer to a sniper's rifle it greatly reduces its accuracy and range. For shooting accurately and noiselessly, sniper's rifles have been built with a 'heavy barrel', in which the silencer is an organic part of the weapon. This is a wonderful and a reliable weapon. Nevertheless the officers commanding the GRU consider that a spetsnaz commander must have a very wide collection of weapons from which he can choose for a particular situation. It is possible, indeed certain, that special situations will arise, in which the commander preparing for an operation will want to choose a rather unusual weapon.

The most frightening, demoralising opponent of the spetsnaz soldier has always been and always will be the dog. No electronic devices and no enemy firepower has such an effect on his morale as the appearance of dogs. The enemy's dogs always appear at the most awkward moment, when a group exhausted by a long trek is enjoying a brief uneasy sleep, when their legs are totally worn out and their ammunition is used up.

Surveys conducted among soldiers, sergeants and officers in spetsnaz produce the same answer again and again: the last thing they want to come up against is the enemy's dogs.

The heads of the GRU have conducted some far-reaching researches into this question and come to the conclusion that the best way to deal with dogs is to use dogs oneself. On the southeastern outskirts of Moscow there is the Central Red Star school of military dog training, equipped with enormous kennels.

The Central Military school trains specialists and rears and trains dogs for many different purposes in the Soviet Army, including spetsnaz. The history of using dogs in the Red Army is a rich and very varied one. In the Second World War the Red Army used 60,000 of its own dogs in the fighting. This was possible, of course, only because of the existence of the Gulag, the enormous system of concentration camps in which the rearing and training of dogs had been organised on an exceptionally high level in terms of both quantity and quality.

To the figure of 60,000 army dogs had to be added an unknown, but certainly enormous, number of transport dogs. Transport dogs were used in winter time (and throughout the year in the north) for delivering ammunition supplies to the front line, evacuating the wounded and similar purposes. The service dogs included only those which worked, not in a pack but as individuals, carrying out different, precisely defined functions for which each one had been trained. The Red Army's dogs had respected military trades: razvedka; searching for wounded on the battle field; delivery of official messages. The dogs were used by the airborne troops and by the guards minelayers (now spetsnaz) for security purposes. But the trades in which the Red Army's dogs were used on the largest scale were mine detection and destroying tanks.

Even as early as 1941 special service units (Spets sluzhba) started to be formed for combating the enemy's tanks. Each unit consisted of four companies with 126 dogs in each company, making 504 dogs in each unit. Altogether during the war there were two special service regiments formed and 168 independent units, battalions, companies and platoons.

The dogs selected for the special service units were strong and healthy and possessed plenty of stamina. Their training was very simple. First, they were not fed for several days, and then they began to receive food near some tanks: the meat was given to them from the tank's lower hatch. So the dog learned to go beneath the tank to be fed. The training sessions quickly became more elaborate. The dogs were unleashed in the face of tanks approaching from quite considerable distances and taught to get under the tank, not from the front but from the rear. As soon as the dog was under the tank, it stopped and the dog was fed. Before a battle the dog would not be fed. Instead, an explosive charge of between 4 and 4.6 kg with a pin detonator was attached to it. It was then sent under the enemy tanks.

Anti-tank dogs were employed in the biggest battles, before Moscow, before Stalingrad, and at Kursk. The dogs destroyed a sufficient number of tanks for the survivors to be considered worthy of the honour of taking part in the victory parade in the Red Square.

The war experience was carefully analysed and taken into account. The dog as a faithful servant of man in war has not lost its importance, and spetsnaz realises that a lot better than any other branch of the Soviet Army. Dogs perform a lot of tasks in the modern spetsnaz. There is plenty of evidence that spetsnaz has used them in Afghanistan to carry out their traditional tasks -protecting groups from surprise attack, seeking out the enemy, detecting mines, and helping in the interrogation of captured Afghan resistance fighters. They are just as mobile as the men themselves, since they can be dropped by parachute in special soft containers.

In the course of a war in Europe spetsnaz will use dogs very extensively for carrying out the same functions, and for one other task of exceptional importance — destroying the enemy's nuclear weapons. It is a great deal easier to teach a dog to get up to a missile or an aircraft unnoticed than it is to get it to go under a roaring, thundering tank. As before, the dog would carry a charge weighing about 4 kg, but charges of that weight are today much more powerful than they were in the last war, and the detonators are incomparably more sophisticated and foolproof than they were then. Detonators have been developed for this kind of charge which detonate only on contact with metal but do not go off on accidental contact with long grass, branches or other objects. The dog is an exceptionally intelligent animal which with proper training quickly becomes capable of learning to seek out, identify correctly and attack important targets. Such targets include complicated electronic equipment, aerials, missiles, aircraft, staff cars, cars carrying VIPs, and occasionally individuals. All of this makes the spetsnaz dog a frightening and dangerous enemy.

Apart from everything else, the presence of dogs with a spetsnaz group appreciably raises the morale of the officers and the men. Some especially powerful and vicious dogs are trained for one purpose alone — to guard the group and to destroy the enemy's dogs if they appear.

In discussing spetsnaz weapons we must mention also the 'invisible weapon' — sambo. Sambo is a kind of fighting without rules which was originated in the Soviet Union in the 1930s and has since been substantially developed and improved.

The originator of sambo was B. S. Oshchepkov, an outstanding Russian sportsman. Before the Revolution he visited Japan where he learnt judo. Oshchepkov became a black belt and was a personal friend of the greatest master of this form of fighting, Jigaro Kano, and others. During the Revolution Oshchepkov returned to Russia and worked as a trainer in special Red Army units.

After the Civil War Oshchepkov was made senior instructor in the Red Army in various forms of unarmed combat. He worked out a series of ways in which a man could attack or defend himself against one or several opponents armed with a variety of weapons. The new system was based on karate and judo, but Oshchepkov moved further and further away from the traditions of the Japanese and Chinese masters and created new tricks and combinations of his own.

Oshchepkov took the view that one had to get rid of all artificial limitations and rules. In real combat nobody observes any rules, so why introduce them artifically at training sessions and so penalise the sportsmen? Oshchepkov firmly rejected all the noble rules of chivalry and permitted his pupils to employ any tricks and rules. In order that a training session should not become a bloodbath Oshchepkov instructed his pupils only to imitate some of the more violent holds although in real combat they were permitted. Oshchepkov brought his system of unarmed combat up to date. He invented ways of fighting opponents who were armed, not with Japanese bamboo sticks, but with more familiar weapons — knives, revolvers, knuckle-dusters, rifles with and without bayonets, metal bars and spades. He also perfected responses to various combat combinations — one with a long spade, the other with a short one; one with a spade, the other with a gun; one with a metal bar, the other with a piece of rope; one with an axe, three unarmed; and so forth.

As a result of its rapid development the new style of combat won the right to independent existence and its own name — sambo — which is an abbreviation of the Russian for 'self-defence without weapons' (samooborona bez oruzhiya). The reader should not be misled by the word 'defence'. In the Soviet Union the word 'defence' has always been understood in a rather special way. Pravda formulated the idea succinctly before the Second World War: 'The best form of defence is rapid attack until the enemy is completely destroyed.' (Pravda, 14 August 1939)

Today sambo is one of the compulsory features in the training of every spetsnaz fighting man. It is one of the most popular spectator sports in the Soviet Army. It is not only in the Army, of course, that they engage in sambo, but the Soviet Army always comes out on top. Take, for example, the championship for the prize awarded by the magazine Sovetsky Voin in 1985. This is a very important championship in which sportsmen from many different clubs compete. But as early as the quarter finals, of the eight men left in the contest one was from the Dinamo club (an MVD lieutenant), one from the mysterious Zenit club, and the rest were from ZSKA, the Soviet Army club.

The words 'without weapons' in the name sambo should not mislead the reader. Sambo permits the use of any objects that can be used in a fight, up to revolvers and sub-machine-guns. It may be said that a hammer is not a weapon, and that is true if the hammer is in the hands of an inexperienced person. But in the hands of a master it becomes a terrible weapon. An even more frightful weapon is a spade in the hands of a skilled fighter. It was with the Soviet Army spade that we began this book. Ways of using it are one of the dramatic elements of sambo. A spetsnaz soldier can kill people with a spade at a distance of several metres as easily, freely and silently as with a P-6 gun.

There are two sides to sambo: sporting sambo and battle sambo. Sambo as a sport is just two men without weapons, restricted by set rules. Battle sambo is what we have described above. There is plenty of evidence that many of the holds in battle sambo are not so much secret as of limited application. Only in special teaching institutions, like the Dinamo Army and Zenit clubs, are these holds taught. They are needed only by those directly involved in actions connected with the defence and consolidation of the regime.

The spetsnaz naval brigades are much better equipped technically than those operating on land, for good reasons. A fleet always had and always will have much more horsepower per man than an army. A man can move over the earth simply using his muscles, but he will not get far swimming in the sea with his muscles alone. Consequently, even at the level of the ordinary fighting man there is a difference in the equipment of naval units and ground forces. An ordinary rank and file swimmer in the spetsnaz may be issued with a relatively small apparatus enabling him to swim under the water at a speed of up to 15 kilometres an hour for several hours at a time. Apart from such individual sets there is also apparatus for two or three men, built on the pattern of an ordinary torpedo. The swimmers sit on it as if on horseback. And in addition to this light underwater apparatus, extensive use is made of midget submarines.

The Soviet Union began intensive research into the development of midget submarines in the middle of the 1930s. As usual, the same task was presented to several groups of designers at the same time, and there was keen competition between them. In 1936 a government commission studied four submissions: the Moskito, the Blokha, and the APSS and Pigmei. All four could be transported by small freighters or naval vessels. At that time the Soviet Union had completed development work on its K-class submarines, and there was a plan that each K-class submarine should be able to carry one light aircraft or one midget submarine. At the same time experiments were also being carried out for the purpose of assessing the possibility of transporting another design of midget submarine (similar to the APSS) in a heavy bomber.

In 1939 the Soviet Union put into production the M-400 midget submarine designed by the designer of the 'Flea' prototype. The M-400 was a mixture of a submarine and a torpedo boat. It could stay for a long time under water, then surface and attack an enemy at very high speed like a fast torpedo boat. The intention was also to use it in another way, closing in on the enemy at great speed like a torpedo boat, then submerging and attacking at close quarters like an ordinary submarine.

Among the trophies of war were the Germans' own midget submarines and plans for the future, all of which were very widely used by Soviet designers. Interest in German projects has not declined. In 1976 there were reports concerning a project for a German submarine of only 90 tons displacement. Soviet military intelligence then started a hunt for the plans of this vessel and for information about the people who had designed them.

It should never be thought that interest in foreign weapons is dictated by the Soviet Union's technical backwardness. The Soviet Union has many talented designers who have often performed genuine technical miracles. It is simply that the West always uses its own technical ideas, while Soviet engineers use their own and other people's. In the Soviet Union in recent years remarkable types of weapons have been developed, including midget submarines with crews of from one to five men. The spetsnaz naval brigades have several dozen midget submarines, which may not seem to be very many, but it is more than all other countries have between them. Side by side with the usual projects intensive work is being done on the creation of hybrid equipment which will combine the qualities of a submarine and an underwater tractor. The transportation of midget submarines is carried out by submarines of larger displacement, fighting ships and also ships from the fishing fleet. In the 1960s in the Caspian Sea the trials took place of a heavy glider for transporting a midget submarine. The result of the trial is not known. If such a glider has been built then in the event of war we can expect to see midget submarines appear in the most unexpected places, for example in the Persian Gulf, which is so vital to the West, even before the arrival of Soviet troops and the Navy. In the 1970s the Soviet Union was developing a hydroplane which, after landing on water, could be submerged several metres below water. I do not know the results of this work.

Naval spetsnaz can be very dangerous. Even in peacetime it is much more active than the spetsnaz brigades in the land forces. This is understandable, because spetsnaz in the land forces can operate only in the territory of the Soviet Union and its satellites and in Afghanistan, while the naval brigades have an enormous field of operations in the international waters of the world's oceans and sometimes in the territorial waters of sovereign states.

In the conduct of military operations the midget submarine can be a very unpleasant weapon for the enemy. It is capable of penetrating into places in which the ordinary ship cannot operate. The construction of several midget submarines may be cheaper than the construction of one medium-sized submarine, while the detection of several midget submarines and their destruction can be a very much more difficult task for an enemy than the hunt for the destruction of one medium-sized submarine.

The midget submarine is a sort of mobile base for divers. The submarine and the divers become a single weapons system which can be used with success against both seaborne and land targets.
The spetsnaz seaborne brigades can in a number of cases be an irreplaceable weapon for the Soviet high command. Firstly, they can be used for clearing the way for a whole Soviet fleet, destroying or putting out of action minefields and acoustic and other detection systems of the enemy. Secondly, they can be used against powerful shore-based enemy defences. Some countries -Sweden and Norway for example — have built excellent coastal shelters for their ships. In those shelters the ships are in no danger from many kinds of Soviet weapon, including some nuclear ones. To discover and put out of action such shelters will be one of spetsnaz's, most important tasks. Seaborne spetsnaz can also be used against bridges, docks, ports and underwater tunnels of the enemy. Even more dangerous may be spetsnaz operations against the most expensive and valuable ships — the aircraft carriers, cruisers, nuclear submarines, floating bases for submarines, ships carrying missiles and nuclear warheads, and against command ships.

In the course of a war many communications satellites will be destroyed and radio links will be broken off through the explosion of nuclear weapons in outer space. In that case an enormous number of messages will have to be transmitted by underground and underwater cable. These cables are a very tempting target for spetsnaz. Spetsnaz can either destroy or make use of the enemy's underwater cables, passively (i.e. listening in on them) or actively (breaking into the cable and transmitting false messages). In order to be able to do this during a war the naval brigades of spetsnaz are busy in peacetime seeking out underwater cables in international waters in many parts of the world.

The presence of Soviet midget submarines has been recorded in recent years in the Baltic, Black, Mediterranean, Tyrrhenian and Caribbean seas. They have been operating in the Atlantic not far from Gibraltar. It is interesting to note that for this 'scientific' work the Soviet Navy used not only the manned submarines of the Argus class but also the automatic unmanned submarines of the Zvuk class.

Unmanned submarines are the weapon of the future, although they are already in use in spetsnaz units today. An unmanned submarine can be of very small dimensions, because modern technology makes it possible to reduce considerably the size and weight of the necessary electronic equipment. Equally, an unmanned submarine does not need a supply of air and can have any number of bulkheads for greater stability and can raise its internal pressure to any level, so that it can operate at any depths. Finally, the loss of such a vessel does not affect people's morale, and therefore greater risks can be taken with it in peace and war. It can penetrate into places where the captain of an ordinary ship would never dare to go. Even the capture of such a submarine by an enemy does not involve such major political consequences as would the seizure of a Soviet manned submarine in the territorial waters of another state. At present, Soviet unmanned automatic submarines and other underwater equipment operate in conjunction with manned surface ships and submarines. It is quite possible that for the foreseeable future these tactics will be continued, because there has to be a man somewhere nearby. Even so, the unmanned automatic submarines make it possible substantially to increase the spetsnaz potential. It is perfectly easy for a Soviet ship with a crew to remain innocently in international waters while an unmanned submarine under its control is penetrating into an enemy's territorial waters.

Apart from manned and unmanned submarines spetsnaz has for some decades now been paying enormous attention to 'live submarines' — dolphins. The Soviet Union has an enormous scientific centre on the Black Sea for studying the behaviour of dolphins. Much of the centre's work is wrapped in the thick shroud of official secrecy.

From ancient times the dolphin has delighted man by its quite extraordinary abilities. A dolphin can easily dive to a depth of 300 metres; its hearing range is seventy times that of a human being; its brain is surprisingly well developed and similar to the human brain. Dolphins are very easy to tame and train.

The use of dolphins by spetsnaz could widen their operations even further, using them to accompany swimmers in action and warning them of danger; guarding units from an enemy's underwater commandos; hunting for all kinds of objects under water -enemy submarines, mines, underwater cables and pipelines; and the dolphin could be used to carry out independent acts of terrorism: attacking important targets with an explosive charge attached to it, or destroying enemy personnel with the aid of knives, needles or more complicated weapons attached to its body.

Thursday, 28 June 2007

Delfin - training of Russian commando frogmen.

Members of the PDSS groups are recruited from the marines on a voluntary basis, under the recommendations of the commanders. Recruit should be emotionally counterbalanced, not be afraid of darkness, loneliness, closed space, should well transfer physical loadings, immersing in the large depths and differences of pressure.

After the recruit passes the psychological tests and medical commission, he becomes the cadet. Base preparation (26 weeks) begins further and it consists of 3 stages:

1st stage - 7 weeks (educational day - 15 hours). The cadets run very long distances, swim, and have to beat an obstacle course. Every second day the requirements are increased and training becomes more difficult. The instructors make even more problems, by spilling water, setting fire, blowing up charges near the cadets. During the last week the cadets are exposed to extreme physical and mental strains. The cadets run over 100 kilometers with a complete battle set and swim 10 miles towing a cargo up to 40 kgs. On average, only 1 out of 15-20 cadets passes this stage.

2nd stage - 11 weeks. The Cadets study underwater equipment, mines and other explosives, tactics of small groups both in the water and on the ground, recon, radio communication, cold weapons (knives etc.) and fire-arms (including underwater) training, parachute preparation, mountain climbing, driving of vehicles (ground, water, underwater), hand-to-hand battle on ground and in water (including fatal, traumatic, shock influence). During this preparation stage, a formation of small groups (up to 2, 3, 4 men) starts. The members of these groups study to understand each other from a half-word or half-look.

After the second stage, the cadets have to pass the exam on guarding and defense of coastal objects and ships from the saboteurs of the opponent - the special training programs are carried out, when various battle operations are simulated. Successful cadets, who have passed the examination, are directed to the separate brigades of the marines.

3rd stage - 8 weeks. The Cadets have to improve their skills. Under the recommendations of their instructors, some of the cadets remain in the brigades of marines; others come back to the PDSS groups, where they are trained further. The most capable cadets are offered to continue their training in special recon - sabotage center. This center prepares the members of group "Delfin".

There, cadets jump with a parachute from any heights, at any time of day or night, in any weather, on any district, land on ropes from helicopters, jump from the helicopter to water from height of 5 meters. They study to leave a submarine, to destroy the ships, sluices, dams, bridges and anti-submarine systems at the oceans, to capture air stations, command items and centers of communication, to survive in any climatic zone and in any weather, to make escape from captivities, to use poison, to use all kinds of the domestic and foreign weaponry etc. The hand-to-hand combat skills are developed individually for each employee. In “Delfin", the members of the group specialize on all regions of the world: Latin America, Northern America, Western Europe, South - East Asia, Southern and South - Western Africa, Near East, Mediterranean sea etc.

After finishing the preparation at the center, the cadets are sent in Sevastopol (Black sea, Ukraine). There they study various methods of struggle against sea animals, for example, sharks and dolphins (specially trained for fighting the underwater saboteurs).

Once per year the employees of "Delfin" have to pass the re-training – studies of new equipment, arms, experience of the domestic and foreign battle swimmers. Once per month the employees have the exams in all disciplines.

The group "Delfin" has access to all the weaponry that is required for fulfillment of their missions. Along with the standard Russian and foreign arms, specially designed underwater weapons like automatic device APS – 55 or pistol SPP - 1н, that can shoot underwater and can also be used on land, are available. The group also has a wide range of explosive devices, vacuum ammunition, small (27 kg) and large (70 kg) nuclear charges, means of neutralization of water-acoustic and electronic devices, closed cycle respiratory devices, devices of underwater orientation, super small submarines "Piranha" (6 saboteurs plus equipment), "Siren" torpedoes (2 saboteurs and equipment, torpedo is released from a standard torpedo tube of a submarine), electrical towage devices "Triton" and "Akula" (Shark) and a lot of other equipment.

Instructors of group "Delfin" also prepared the battle swimmers for groups "Alfa" and "Vympel". In 1970-80 underwater saboteurs worked in battle operations in many countries of the world: Angola, Vietnam, Egypt, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Ethiopia etc.

It is known that two underwater saboteurs were lost when mining a cargo ship of USA in the Kamran bay (Vietnam). They were killed by dolphins, which protected a bay. After that the members of group "Delfin" were introduced to anti-dolphin training too. Another known situation – at the coast of Africa the members of the "Delfin" were protecting the Soviet trade court and they noticed 6 unrecognized underwater saboteurs. The commander of the group "Delfin" dropped his knife and gave the order: “Fight without the weapons". The opponents had accepted a call. The fight was severe, and in several minutes the opponents were beaten. In one week it became known, that the opponents were the underwater saboteurs from South Africa Republic.

Original article: http://www.kgb-militaryschool.com/view/dolphin

Wednesday, 27 June 2007

SVR - personnel of Foreign Intelligence Service of Russian Federation.

Just as any government organization, and given that it is a global intelligence organization, the SVR employs people from many disciplines - law, journalism, public affairs, accounting, medicine, occupational health nursing, finance, logistics, business, engineering, computer science/information technology, forensics, and the natural and physical sciences. The SVR has secretaries and other program generalists who have extensive experience and competence in performing their duties.

Since its inception (in December 1991), the SVR has departed from past precedent analysis methodologies of the KGB First Chief Directorate. No longer are the analytical products (assessments, estimates, white papers, and strategic studies) geared toward a preconceived or political agenda or rife with Communist era political correctness, but are geared with a mandate of objectivity from analysis of both open source and collected information. This is a major change because under the U.S.S.R., the political leaders wanted the raw intelligence and would perform the "analysis" themselves- whereas the Russian Federation's leaders want professional, scholarly, in-depth analyses and briefings provided for them. SVR analysts tend to be paid far higher salaries and benefits than their counterparts in academia or think tanks and represent some of the best minds in the Russian Federation. SVR analysts generally have a Ph. D. or master's degree in their field or discipline (primarily with respect to international relations, geographic area studies, economics, political science, history, psychology, sociology, anthropology, and law). Analysts are assigned to either a geographic or functional division within the Operations Directorate in order to interact with operational personnel. The Analysis & Information Directorate has core analysts who collate and analyze information, and write necessary documents, briefing materials, and papers to inform policymakers in the Russian Federation. Unlike intelligence analysts in other foreign intelligence services, SVR analysts are not shy about adding their opinions and providing recommended courses of action (with projected outcomes analyses) as addenda to their products; in fact, President Yeltsin and President Putin and their administrations have encouraged this practice. Many of the SVR's analytic products have been disseminated to other governments (especially since the events of 9/11) and have gained the SVR greater stature and respect as a premier global intelligence organization. The SVR does make a historical series available to the public and media (either in paper or CD-ROM forms).

The SVR's Science Directorate organizationally houses the SVR Academy (formerly called the "Academy of Foreign Intelligence" in the pre-Putin era of the SVR and "The Red Banner School" during the KGB's existence). The SVR Academy is primarily located at Yasenevo (just outside metro Moscow) and provides world-class training, education, and facilities to officer candidates and other students. Academy professors are highly experienced intelligence practitioners, many even have advanced degrees from Russian, British, American, Canadian, and other universities. Interestingly enough, the SVR has a "publishing house" where professors, students, and SVR executives can publish books, training manuals, research compendiums, and in-house journals. The SVR Academy coordinates all training and education needs (in-service and external) for the SVR's global workforce- including basic and advanced operations curricula, counter-terrorism courses, and even doctoral courses.

Under the current Administration and General Sergei Lebedev's (the current Director) leadership, the salaries and benefits paid to SVR officers have improved significantly. The days of the mid-1990s, where SVR had problems making payroll, are gone. As an example, in 2002, all SVR Officers received an across-the-board 50% raise (in addition to the ordinary salary adjustments for state employees) and new (tax-free) allowances to afford a home, condominium, or apartment in the Russian Federation (even while stationed overseas). SVR officers currently receive competitive salaries with the Russian and CIS private economic sectors and special tax advantages. Retirement benefits are correlated to the Russian military's defined benefit plan (regular, non-contributory annuity) and are higher than those provided to other civil servants, and the social insurance plan (which provides regular payments for women at age 60 and men at age 65, survivors payments and disability payments). President Putin has reportedly expressed a desire for civil servants to have a savings-investment plan like that provided by the U.S. Government to its federal civilian employees and members of the uniformed services. The SVR and the FSB are believed to be the first two federal entities where a thrift savings-investment plan would be offered as a third tier to complement the regular annuity and social insurance plans.

The SVR was somewhat "shunned" by many of the best students and intellectuals during the 1990s. Since 2002, recruitment (according to the Russian media) has picked up and the service is operating at full staff ceiling. In other words, the only people being hired are those needed to replace an employee who is retiring or separating. While standards fell in the late 1990s, now only the best and brightest, cream-of-the-crop candidates are being hired to become SVR officers. Minimum requirements are being between 21 and 35 years old (age waivers may be granted on a case-by-case basis by the SVR Director), being a Russian citizen, no prior criminal record (no felonies, drug use, hooliganism, moral turpitude), good mental and physical health, and having a bachelor's degree. A graduate degree in law, international relations, foreign languages, public administration, economics, criminal justice, business, geographic area studies, engineering, computer science, or history is desired. Prior military experience and overseas experience is considered desirable. Unlike the KGB, the SVR welcomes all races, ethnicities and creeds. All personnel, just as in any other Russian Federation ministry, serve at the pleasure of the ministry head (in this case, the SVR Director).

SVR - overview of Foreign Intelligence Service of Russian Federation.

Foreign Intelligence Service (Russian: Служба Внешней Разведки) or (SVR) is Russia's primary external intelligence agency. The SVR is the successor of First Chief Directorate of the KGB since December 18 1991 as the U.S.S.R. was facing its geopolitical end. The former chief of the KGB First Chief Directorate, Yevgeni Primakov, was appointed head of the SVR.

Unlike the FSB, the SVR is responsible for intelligence abroad and does not operate as a traditional law enforcement organization. It works in cooperation with the Russian military intelligence organization GRU. The SVR also enters into anti-terrorist cooperation and intelligence-sharing arrangements with foreign intelligence agencies. The service also provides analysis and dissemination of intelligence to Russian Federation policymakers. Additionally, SVR provides environmental intelligence analysis and assists other security services concerning counternarcotics operations.

The Constitutional basis for the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) can be found in Articles 71, 72, 76 and 80 of the Russian Federation's Constitution. The power of the Russian Federation President to exercise executive direction and control of the SVR is based on Articles 80, 83, 86, 87, and 90 of the Russian Constitution.

The Russian Federation's "Law on Foreign Intelligence Organs" was passed by the Duma and the Federation Council in late 1995 and signed into effect by then-President Boris Yeltsin on 10 January 1996. The law authorizes the SVR to carry out the following missions:

  1. Acquire, process and analyze information vital to the Russian Federation's interests;

  2. Assist the federal government in implementing measures to ensure Russia's security;

  3. Conduct activities to benefit the economic, scientific and technological development of Russia;

  4. Protect employees of Russian institutions overseas and their families;

  5. Provide personnel security for government personnel and their families;

  6. Cooperate and conduct liaison activities with foreign security services (consistent with the law, treaties and agreements);

  7. Establish and operate information systems and communication networks pertaining to foreign intelligence administration.


SVR Intelligence oversight and command structure

The President of the Russian Federation exercises executive oversight and supervision of the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) pursuant to Articles 2, 4, 5, 10, 12, and 14 of the 1996 Foreign Intelligence Organs Act. The Legislative Branch monitors SVR financial and staffing issues pursuant to Article 24. The Procurator General (per Article 25) has the authority to investigate and assess whether the SVR follows Russian law. SVR officials provide regular briefings to members of the Federation Council and the Duma. Most appropriations bills for the SVR start in the Federation Council rather than in the Duma. The Russian Federation President has the prerogative of special administrative privilege to issue special orders, instructions and decrees concerning foreign intelligence (on behalf of the Duma and Federation Council) that, at his discretion, can remain secret or be made public.

The SVR Director is appointed by and reports directly to the President of Russia (currently Vladimir Putin). The Director holds the rank and grade of a Ground Forces General or Navy Admiral of the Fleet. The Director provides briefings to the President every Monday and on other occasions as necessary. The Director is also a member of the Security Council of Russia and the Defense Council (svr.gov.ru).

The SVR consists of the following organizational structure as outlined on the SVR official website that also includes their organization chart. The SVR Director functions as a strong CEO. The SVR Consultants Group reports to and directly advises the Director. Within the Director's Office ("Apparat") there are the following- Public Relations/Press/Mass Media Bureau; the Inspector General; Legal; Protocol; Power Structure Liaison; and the First Deputy Director. The First Deputy Director acts more in the capacity of a Chief Operating Officer, acts in the capacity of "Acting SVR Director" in the SVR Director's absence, and oversees the Economic Intelligence Direction and the Foreign Counterintelligence Direction. The SVR consists of 5 line directorates, each is headed by a Deputy Director:

  1. Personnel;

  2. Analysis & Information;

  3. Science;

  4. Operations;

  5. Operational Logistics & Support.

Each of the Deputy Directors is headed by a Deputy Director who reports to the SVR Director. The SVR Academy (formerly titled as the Academy of Foreign Intelligence during the Yeltsin Administration and the Andropov Red Banner Institute and School during the USSR) is located as a division within the Science Directorate (svr.gov.ru).

Ground Forces General Sergei Lebedev is the SVR Director. The SVR budget is classified, however portions of the budget were made public during Yeltsin's first presidential term (svr.gov.ru).

Delfin - operations of Russian commando frogmen units.

Operations and reforms of Russian frogmen units:

  • 1938 October 22: During a wargaming between units of the Russian Pacific Fleet in Vladivostok, a group of Soviet military divers exited an SCH-112 military submarine through a torpedo tube, entered the naval base and completed certain acts of sabotage. Those combat divers were equipped with oxygen rebreathers, dry suits, handguns and grenades. However, this did not lead to a permanent combat diver unit being set up. This is the beginning of the history of combat divers.

  • 1941 August 11: RON (рота особого назначения, Rota Osobogo Naznacheniya; Company of Special Designation), a Soviet combat frogman unit, was set up on Goloday Island (which is now called Dekabristov Island) near Leningrad. Its commander was Ivan Vasilyevich Prokhvatilov.

  • 1941 August: 2 RON frogmen towing a sea mine demolished a bridge over the river Narva which German forces had reached.

  • 1941 September: During Finland's army's re-invasion of the area around Lake Ladoga which had been lost to the USSR, Finnish forces took an island south of Vyborg, isolating 23 Soviet units who were in Vyborg port. Two RON frogmen swam to the island, laying a guide cable. 50 RON frogmen followed this cable and landed and found that the Finns had removed parts from their guns and abandoned the island, perhaps because the Finns had seen the Soviet preparations.

  • In these early days RON made its own equipment, including adapting army breathing sets for underwater use; they did not use fins until the end of the 1950's.

  • 1941 September 23: 270 German aircraft attack the Soviet naval base at Kronstadt near Leningrad. During this they sank a transport vessel "Barta" opposite Peterhof. It sat on the seabed but remained partly out of the water.

  • 1941 September: Prokhvatilov decides to use the Barta wreck as an observation post. They saw that the Germans had built a big pier at Staraya Peterhof, and piles of naval mines by it. RON frogmen towed two naval mines to the pier and destroyed it. The Germans did not rebuild it.

  • The Germans had built V1 rocket launching pads in the Strelna area to bombard Leningrad. The diver-intelligence officer Vladimir Borisov swam to the area and changed into German clothes and reconnoitered in the plant and returned and reported what he had found. Soviet aircraft and artillery destroyed the V1 launching pads.1941, first part of October: start of frogman training in the Soviet Pacific Fleet.

  • 1941-1943, winters: RON men patrol the supply road over the ice of frozen Lake Ladoga.

  • 1943 September: During the long siege of Leningrad, a group of Soviet Underwater Spetsnaz troopers (combat swimmers of RON unit) entered a German naval base at Strelna and destroyed Italian combat boats of the Decima Flottiglia MAS.

  • 1944 April: ROON (a unit like RON) was formed in the Soviet Black Sea fleet.

  • 1944 July: Combat swimmers of RON completed underwater work onboard of the German submarine U-250, which had been sunk by a Soviet anti-submarine MO-103 Hunter-killer. Some secret documents and a new type of acoustic torpedo were found. Later some key components of this T-5 G7es torpedo were given to British naval specialists by the Soviet forces. German aircraft and torpedo boats tried to interrupt the diving operation. The negotiations between Soviet and British sides about the T-5 acoustic torpedo are depicted in the book "The Way to Victory" written by Soviet admiral N.G. Kuznetsov.

  • 1945 October: RON and ROON and all similar organizations were officially disbanded.

  • 1946 July; 1950 start; 1952 May 29: discussions in the USSR about need for combat frogmen.

  • 1953 January 24: A conference in the USSR confirmed that combat frogmen were needed.

  • 1953: The first naval combat divers' unit, the 6th OMRP, was established in the Black Sea.

  • 1954: Scuba divers' or frogmen's footprints were found a beach near a sanatorium used by Soviet state party elite. This caused a security alarm and pushed the USSR towards forming a combat frogman unit.

  • 1954 October 15: The naval combat divers' unit, the 561st OMRP, was established in the Baltic Sea.

  • 1956 April: The Lionel Crabb underwater spying incident at the Soviet warship Ordzhonikidze caused a security alarm and pushed the USSR towards forming a combat frogman unit.

  • Of Soviet oxygen rebreathers whose make codes end in two digits, the lowest such number is 51 (the IDA51). (The characteristic metal backpack-box (like the IDA71 has), seems to be first definitely known of in the LVI-57; the LVI-57 shown on Jan Willem Bech's site was made in 1964.) Sometimes with Soviet products (as with the AK47 rifle) these numbers indicate when that make came into production, e.g. the IDA71 in 1971.

  • 1967 June: When the Six-Day War between Israel and Arab nations happened, some Soviet ships were in Port Said. This showed Soviet naval commanders that Soviet ships in the Eastern Mediterranean were well protected from air attack, but were not properly protected from frogman attacks. As a result, afterwards Soviet naval commanders decided to form the PDSS.

  • 1967: PDSS (Противо-Диверсионные Силы и Средства, Protivo-Diversionnyye Sily i Sredstva = Anti-diversionary forces and means) started to be developed in the Soviet Black Sea Fleet. PDSS is a complex of special measures developed by the Soviet Navy to counter possible attacks by frogmen. PDSS includes special trained units (teams) of the Soviet Navy, and frogman and anti-frogman training, and special weapons and tactics. According to some historians, Soviet Naval Commanders decided to form PDSS after the Lionel Crabb incident. PDSS includes special trained units (teams) of the Soviet Navy, and special weapon and tactics.

  • 1968: The 6th OMRP was transformed into the 17th Отдельная бригада специального назначения, OBrSpN, Otdel'naja brigada spetsial'nogo naznacheniya = Detached Brigade for Special Purpose).

  • 1969: PDSS units were formed in the Soviet Pacific and Baltic and Northern fleets.

  • 1970 and after: frogmen from the OB PDSS operated in Angola, Vietnam, Egypt, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Ethiopia, etc, often on request of the nation that they operated in. They went to Angola and Nicaragua to protect Soviet ships and to consult with local armed forces men.(date unknown): Soviet frogmen were protecting a USSR trade commission who were visiting a place on the coast of Africa, and they saw and fought against and drove off a group of 6 or 8 South African combat frogmen in an underwater fight. No deaths.

  • 1989: Mihail Gorbachev and George H. W. Bush met onboard the Soviet ship Maksim Gorkiy near the coast of Malta, and for 3 days frogmen from the Baltic Fleet (including spetsnazmen from the 561 OMRP) and Osnaz protected it.

  • 1990: The 17th OBrSpN was transformed into the 1464th OMRP.

  • 1995, January-May: Several seamen, midshipmen, warrant officers, and officers from different OMRPs as volunteers took part in the 1st Chechen War. They were included into the Naval Infantry units, and operated as average Marines in Naval Infantry's reconnaissance units, not as a separate Spetsnaz unit.

  • 2004: The Russian State-controlled Channel One showed a documentary film dedicated to some operations of Spetsnaz which were not known by the general public. The film is called "Spetsnaz: the Operations". Among other stories, the film depicted an episode about tactics of Russian combat swimmers from a PDSS unit. The episode was based on a real incident that occurred a few years earlier in a Russian naval base. Agents of a Russian PDSS team detected activity of foreign frogmen inside a naval base. According to the film's narrator, those frogmen were well-trained professionals and they planned to accomplish a terrorist action inside the Russian base as a Russian battleship was arriving in a harbour. The intruders had recruited a local man as a source of information. They planned to destroy a pier together with relatives of naval officers and sailors by remote explosion of a special mine. During fast and bloody combat all the foreign frogmen were killed, and their weaponry and explosive devices and diving equipment were captured by a PDSS team.

Delfin - equipment of Russian commando frogmen units.

Russian frogmen use this equipment among others:

  • Rebreathers of type IDA (IDA71, for example)

  • Midget submarine of type "Piranha", can carry 6 frogmen and their equipment

  • 2-man Manned torpedo of type "Siren" that can be launched through an ordinary submarine's torpedo tube. It is longer than a British or Italian Chariot because it has 2 warheads.

  • Electric diver-tug of type "Akula" (= Shark).

  • Midget submarine of type "Triton-1", which can carry 2 combat divers

  • Midget submarine of type "Triton-2", which can carry 6 combat divers

  • APS Underwater Assault Rifle

  • SPP-1 Underwater Pistol

  • Protei-5 and similar one-man underwater diver-carriers.

Delfin - overview of Russian commando frogmen units.

Delfin is a reported or supposed name for a Russian commando frogmen unit.

The Soviet Union started frogman operations during World War II. In 1941 the first unit of combat divers (or RON team) was formed in Leningrad.

Nowadays Russian combat swimmers (formerly called "combat divers") are part of the Naval Spetsnaz. Naval Spetsnaz is a branch of Intelligence.

Organization

SpN PDSS (Противо-Диверсионные Силы и Средства, Protivo-Diversionnye Sily i Sredstva; Anti-diversionary forces and means) are units of a special purpose anti-sabotage divers, which appeared in the Soviet Navy in the end of the 1960s to counter possible attacks of frogmen. Their name in full is (о) СпН ПДСС, [отряды] Специального назначения по борьбе с подводными диверсионными силами и средствами ((o) SpN PDSS, [otryady] Spetsial'nogo naznacheniya po bor'be s podvodnymi diversionnymi silami i sredstvami; Special-purpose combat [forces] with underwater diversionary forces and facilities).

Before 2001/2000 they were called ОБ ПДСС, Отряды по борьбе с подводными диверсионными силами и средствами (OB PDSS, Otryady po bor'be s podvodnymi diversionnymi silami i sredstvami; Combat forces with underwater diversionary forces and facilities).

Officially there are no Naval Spetsnaz units in any of the former Soviet states. They are all officially referred to by cover-up false names and numbers called "Legends", which the Spetsnaz men must tell to everybody (including the Defence Minister). For example, Naval Spetsnaz Unit in the Baltic Fleet officially is Аварийно-спасательная школа №49 (Avariyno-spasatel'naya shkola nomer 49; Diving Rescue School No. 49).

All Russian military units have their own five-digit number. For example, Naval Spetsnaz Unit in the Baltic Fleet officially has military unit No. 10617.

Among Navy and Army Intelligence servicemen, all Naval Spetsnaz units are called ОМРП (OMRP, Отдельный морской разведывательный пункт (Otdel'nyy morskoy razvedyvatel'nyy punkt; Detached Naval Reconnaissance Point) and have their own numbers. For example, Naval Spetsnaz Unit in the Baltic Fleet officially is the 561st OMRP.

The Naval Spetznaz units have unofficial names. For example, Naval Spetsnaz Unit in the Baltic Fleet are unofficially called by themselves and other servicemen Парусники (Parusniki; Sailing Ships), because this unit is based in a settlement called Парусное (Parusnoye), whose name means "sail place". But in the 1950s and 1960s they were unofficially called Потехинцы (Potekhintsy) after their first commander Colonel Potekhin.

This link gives details of training and actions of Soviet combat frogmen, and says that they are in a KGB OSNAZ organization called Delfin. Other sources mention units called "Dolfin", "Omega", "Barrakuda", etc. But another source says that Naval Spetsnaz units have never used such names, but that the name Delfin arose as false information sold to a journalist, who published information about this unit in the early 1990s.

Every PDSS unit has around 50-60 combat swimmers. There are PDSS units in all major Naval Bases.

Every OMRP has about 120-200 combat divers. There are now four OMRP's in Russia, one for each Fleet: Northern Fleet, Baltic Fleet, Black Sea Fleet, Pacific Ocean Fleet.

Grom - division of the FSB responsible for VVIP (Very Very Important People) security.

Grom (Thunder) is a division of the FSB responsible for VVIP (Very Very Important People) security. Allegedly formed in the KGB during its final years, it consists of former members of Alpha Group and other KGB/MVD OSNAZ units.

Vympel, Vega Group or Spetsgruppa V - Russian counter-terrorism unit.

Vympel (Russian: Вымпел meaning Pennant, also known as Vega Group or Spetsgruppa V) is a Russian counter-terrorism unit. The exact lineage is not known but the unit was formed in 1981 by KGB Gen. Drozdov within the First Chief Directorate of the KGB as a dedicated OSNAZ unit specialised in deep penetration, sabotage, universal direct and covert action, embassy protection and spy cell activation in case of war.

Most of the Vympel operatives mastered 2-3 foreign languages, for they were supposed to act in foreign countries, deep behind enemy lines. The first approved Vympel agent was Evgueni Savintsev, a professional KGB officer.

Vympel quickly gained the reputation of being the best Russian special forces unit ever, surpassing its GRU and MVD counterparts. However, after the collapse of the USSR, Vympel was decimated by endless re-organisation and re-definition: it passed under the aegis of the Security Ministry before being receded to the GUO (both institutions were shortlived offspring of the ex-KGB during the Yeltsin era) and finally passed to the MVD.

The militsiya had no use for such a unit. The bulk of the Vympel operatives couldn't stand the humiliation of being subordinated to the 'police', and duly resigned (of 278 officers, only 57 accepted to remain within the MVD). The unit was re-named Vega.

In 1995, the FSB Special Operations Center (TsSN FSB) was logically granted control over Vympel. Vympel regained its original name and was re-integrated in the Intelligence Service structures. The emphasis shifted from covert and clandestine sabotage operations to counter-terrorism and nuclear safety enforcement. Vympel operatives undergo special training related to improvised or special explosive devices, permitting them to use 'terrorist-like' tactics to carry out their operations. Physical training includes close hand combat, parachute training, diving, underwater combat techniques, climbing, ropetech alpinism.

Vympel (i.e. the Directorate "V" of the TsSN FSB) is still a classified and secretive unit. Little is known about its current operations and activities, the exception being the capture of the Chechen terrorist and rebel leader Salman Raduev in March 2000.

OSNAZ - [voiska] osobogo naznacheniya.

OSNAZ (Russian: [voiska] osobogo naznacheniya, ОСНАЗ = [войска] особого назначения, "special purpose [detachments]") were special forces troops within the KGB (its predecessors and its successor, Federal Security Service) and the MVD.

OSNAZ has always been shrouded in a veil of mystery and remains so even to this day. There is no OSNAZ headquarters as the various groups were formed within the various directorates as needed.

During the Great Patriotic War the OSNAZ of the NKVD fought on the frontlines against the Nazi Germany as VDV in the form of Airborne regiments/Brigades, with some units achieving "Guards" status at the end of the conflict.

KGB/FSB OSNAZ

The known KGB OSNAZ units were as follows:

It is known that several have survived the fall of the Soviet Government and still exist, with the Alpha Group being the most famous.

MVD OSNAZ

The Ministry for Internal Affairs (MVD) has several OSNAZ units, such as SOBR. Other MVD units such as Vityaz and "Rus" are classed as Spetsnaz units. They act under the aegis of their corresponding GUVD MVD (Main Internal Affairs Directorate of the Interior Ministry). They are not secret or classified units, even if their operations may be classified.

Caveat: OMON is not an OSNAZ unit. Regular police forces (militsiya) also have their special purpose units (OMSN). MVD OSNAZ units and MVD Interior operative troops (such as ODON operatives) usually wear green or olive berets, the most skilled servicemen being awarded with a purple beret (краповый берет, krapovy beret) after succeeding in a tough competition held every year. The latter OSNAZ members are commonly called krapoviki.

SVR OSNAZ

Zaslon is a possible name for a suspected and highly secret OSNAZ organization within the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR).

Russian Navy

OSNAZ is the name for Russian Navy Special Forces. Formed into 1,000 man brigades, one per Fleet. Each brigade consists of several small battalions.

Alpha Group or Spetsgruppa A - a dedicated counter-terrorism unit that belongs to OSNAZ of the FSB.

The Alfa Group (also known as Spetsgruppa A) is a dedicated counter-terrorism unit that belongs to OSNAZ of the FSB (former KGB), or more specifically the "A" Directorate of the FSB Special Operations Center (TsSN). It is currently believed to consist of 700 persons, 400 assigned to the Moscow Detachment and the remaining 300 located in other cities in Russia.

Alfa Group's primary function is believed to be to carry out urban counter-terrorist missions under the direct sanction and control of the Russian political leadership. However, little is publicly known and other plausible missions would include a variety of paramilitary, policing and/or covert operations, similar to the missions of its secretive pendant, the "V" Group, or Vympel.

Training and equipment

By Russian standards, Alfa squad is lavishly supported and funded and has access to state of the art small arms and equipment. They have employed chemical agents in hostage rescue operations and are capable of functioning in an NBC environment. Little further information is publicly available. It is assumed that Alfa is equipped with sniper and counter-sniper capability, tactical emergency medical services, demolitions, tactical intelligence and other functions typical of both police SWAT teams and the special operations community. It is unknown whether they have dedicated hostage negotiators.

History

"Alfa Group" or Group A, a special forces (spetsnaz) or special operations detachment OSNAZ unit attached to the KGB was created 29 July 1974 within the First Chief Directorate of the KGB on the orders of Yuri Andropov, then Chairman of the KGB. It was intended for secret foreign operations.

Their most notable mission during the Soviet period was the seizure of Amin's palace in Afghanistan on 27 December 1979, the special operation which began the Afghan war. According to many Russian sources of information (including the memoirs of the Alpha and other compounds' officers that took part in the seizure), the operation was called «Шторм-333» (English: "Storm-333"). Jointly with the Alfa group, called «Гром» (English:Thunder) in that time, which consisted of 24 troops, in the operation took part another special KGB group: «Зенит»(English:Zenith) — 30 troops. Also from the USSR Ministry of Defense in the operation participated so-called Muslim battalion — 520 troops (which consisted exclusively of the soldiers from the southern republics of the USSR) and one Air Landing company—100 troops. In the operation Alfa group lost 2 troops, Zenith group lost 3 troops, Muslim battalion — 5 troops and the Air Landing company — 9 troops; more than 50 were wounded. The Afghan president, Hafizullah Amin and his approximately 200 elite guards were killed. During the operation also other governmental buildings such as the Ministry of Interior building, the Internal Security (KHAD) building and the General Staff building (Darul Aman Palace) were seized. Alpha group's veterans call this operation one of the most successful in the group's history.

During October 1985, Alfa was dispatched to Beirut when four Russian diplomats had been taken hostage by militant Sunni Muslims. By the time Alfa was onsite, one of the hostages had already been killed. The perpetrators and their relatives were identified by supporting KGB operatives, and the latter were taken hostage. Following the standard policy of 'no negotiation', Alfa proceeded to sever some of their hostages' body parts and sent them to the perpetrators with a warning that more would follow if the Russian hostages were not released immediately. The tactic was a success and no other Russian national was taken hostage in the Middle East for the next 20 years.

During the Soviet coup attempt of 1991 the Alfa group (under the command of Major General Viktor Karpukhin) was assigned the task of entering the White House, Russia's parliament building, and killing Boris Yeltsin and the other Russian leaders following a planned assault on the entrance by paratroopers. This order was unanimously refused. Unit members mingled through the crowds and assessed the possibility of undertaking such an operation. According to their statements in the following months, it could have been carried out with success, and achieved its main objectives within 20 to 25 minutes, but would have resulted in hundreds if not thousands of civilian deaths.

Alfa Group served extensively in the Soviet war in Afghanistan. The unit continued to exist after the collapse of the Soviet Union and has been used in a variety of crisis situations such as the Moscow Theatre Siege of October 23, 2002, the Beslan school hostage crisis of 2004, and the killing of Chechen rebel leader Movsar Barayev.

Organization and structure of Spetsnaz, Russian special purpose regiments.

Federal Security Service units

The Center of Special Operations (CSN) of the FSB is designed to combat terrorism and to protect the constitutional order in the Russian Federation. The CSN FSB consists of 3 different "operative" subdivisions - Department A (also known as spetsgruppa "Alfa"), Department V (also known as spetsgruppa "Vympel"), and so-called SSO (Special Operations Service). The headquarters of CSN FSB is a huge complex of buildings and training areas (dozens of hectares worth of land, 76 training facilities, etc). It is located in the town of Balashikha-2, only 10 km away from the Moscow ring. The average training of a solid CSN operative lasts about 5 years.

"Alfa" is a well-known counter-terrorist unit begun in 1974. Today "Alfa" is a highly professional unit, which consists of roughly 300 servicemen. The majority of the unit is stationed at Moscow, the rest of the unit is located in three other cities - Krasnodar, Yekaterinburg, and Khabarovsk. All the "Alfa" operatives undergo special airborne and firearms training. Roughly one third of them have special mountain training; another third have special counter-sabotage diving training. Spetsnaz operatives always improve on their skills in countless exercises and special operations (including constant service in North Caucasus). The unit utilizes a wide range of modern Russian and foreign weapons and equipment, some modified from the original versions to fit the unique needs of the unit.

"Vympel" (the Pennant) – formerly known as an elite cold war-era KGB sabotage unit – is now also a counter-terrorist and counter-sabotage unit. But, unlike "Alfa", instead of learning how to storm airplanes and buses, they operate in an entirely different environment. They are experts in 18 special disciplines (among which - how to infiltrate guarded buildings, extensive marksmanship training, driving APCs and airplanes, and medical training) and are Russia's last defense against possible terrorist acts involving nuclear plants, hydroelectric dams, and other industrial complexes. However, "Vympel" operatives are still heavily used in special operations missions in the Northern Caucasus, along with their counterparts from "Alfa" unit. "Vympel" has 4 operative units, "Alfa" has 5 operative units. One unit from each Department is always participating in offensive operations in Chechnya. They constantly rotate their troops, and each operative unit is stationed in Chechnya at least 2-3 times per year. "Vympel" is stationed in Moscow, but it also has multiple branch offices in virtually every city where there is a nuclear power plant.

Department A and B operatives' standard BDU color is black. However, in Chechnya they use different kinds of camouflage.

Not much information about SSO can be obtained, but it is known that they also participate in FSB special operations in the Northern Caucasus and also act as highly skilled bodyguards for government officials.

Together with Center of Special Operations and its elite units, there are many FSB special forces units of regional significance. Such operative detachments are usually called ROSN (Regional Department of Special Designation). The most powerful ROSNs are said to be at Saint Petersburg (ROSN "Grad") and Nizhny Novgorod.

Ministry of Interior units

Spetnaz MVD includes 16 Interior Troops units, which are of good quality and intended for use to combat insurgency and for counter-terrorism purposes. These units usually have a unique name and official OSN number. Here is a list of some of these spetsnaz units (the list is deliberately not full due to obvious reasons):

  • 1st PSN (former 6th OSN) VV "Vityaz" - stationed in Moscow;

  • 7th OSN VV "Rosich" - Novocherkassk;

  • 8th OSN VV "Rus" - Moscow;

  • 12th OSN VV "Ratnik" - Nizhni Tagil;

  • 15th OSN VV "Vyatich" - Armavir;

  • 16th OSN VV "Skif" - Rostov.

They are generally well-trained and equipped, being far superior to the regular Russian infantry. For example, it is claimed that the unit "Rus" had fought successfully against the insurgents in Chechnya with a casualty ratio of approximately 1 to 200. Their missions may include reconnaissance missions and regular combat operations (mostly house-to-house CQB assaults). They (especially "Vitjaz") have sometimes served as the back-up team during the counter-terrorist operations by team "Alpha". The parallel of United States Army Rangers and 1st SFOD-D (aka "Delta Force") is apparent.

Aside from the Interior troops special forces, MVD has plenty of police special forces, which are stationed in virtually every large Russian city. While OMON units are mostly used as riot police and during drug busts, they are not really considered a significant counter-terrorist force and simply lack the sufficient expertise. For these reasons MVD has numerous OMSN units (formerly known as SOBR), which consist of senior ranked police officers and are properly trained and equipped to combat terrorists, insurgency, and to participate in any kind of high-risk mission in general.

Russian army special forces

Spetsnaz GRU, or Russian army special forces, are the original SPETSNAZ and are generally considered the best trained units of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. Despite this, they are not very similar to the Special Forces of the US or the SAS of the UK. The Spetsnaz have created a fierce reputation as one of the best special forces in the world today due to the very harsh standards of their training. They are controlled by the GRU (the Russian military intelligence agency). During the Cold War, these units were deployed in Eastern Europe in order to carry out reconnaissance and sabotage missions against the NATO forces in the event of a war in Europe. The units of Spetsnaz GRU have no official names, such as is the case with units of Spetsnaz MVD. They are generally referred to by numbers, for example, "16th Separate Brigade of Spetsnaz", much like any other military unit, and are usually integrated in the structure of the VDV (airborne troops) though not under VDV command aegis.

Few details are actually known about the operations of Spetsnaz GRU, but it is known that the units were heavily involved in wars in Afghanistan and Chechnya. Spetnaz GRU teams usually wear standard-issue VDV uniforms, light blue VDV berets and unit patches in order to avoid identification. However, they can also wear different uniforms, for instance, they would wear the uniform of a unit which is stationed nearby, in order to blend in.

Here are most of the Spetsnaz Brigades and the location at which they are stationed:

  • 2nd ObrSpN - Promezhitsy (Pskov region); strength around 960 (Leningrad Military District)

  • 3rd Guards ObrSpN - Roshinskij (Samara Oblast); (Volga-Ural Military District)

  • 10th (Mountain) ObrSpN - Molkino (Krasnodar region); activated July 1, 2003 (North Caucasus Military District)

  • 12th ObrSpN - city of Asbest-5 Sverdlovsk region); (Volga-Ural Military District)transferring: Chaikovskyy (Perm')

  • 22nd Guards ObrSpN - Kovalevka (Rostov Oblast); (North Caucasus Military District)

  • 67th ObrSpN - Berdsk (Novosibirsk Oblast); (Siberian Military District)

  • 83 SPETZNAZ CDO BDE Ussuryysk (Far East Military District)

  • 216 INDEP SPETZNAZ BN Moscow (Moscow Military District)

and many others, including:

  • 14th Separate Brigade of Special Designation Ussuriysk, Far Eastern Military District

  • 16th Spetsnaz Brigade - formerly Teplyi Stan, suburb of Moscow, now [Tambov[Chuchkovo]], Moscow Military District

  • 24th Spetsnaz Brigade - [Ulan-Ude[Kyakhta]], Siberian Military District

A Spetsnaz brigade consists of three to five Spetsnaz battalions, a signals company, support units, and a headquarters company containing highly skilled professional soldiers responsible for carrying out assassinations, kidnappings, and contact with agents in the enemy rear area. The organisation of a naval SPETSNAZ brigade reflects its emphasis on sea infiltration, with up to three frogman battalions, one parachute battalion, and a mini-submarine battalion, as well as the signals company, headquarters company, and support elements.

Russian Naval Spetsnaz

The Soviet Naval Spetsnaz came in to being in 1957 by order of Defence Minister Zhukov.The Black Sea fleet created their spetsnaz unit in 1967. A marine counter terrorist and counter sabotage unit was created in 1969 as "protivodiversionniye sili i sredstva"-counter-underwater forces. In 1970, the Main intelligence service of a General staff (GRU) created a top secret reconnaissance - sabotage group "Delfin" (Dolphin) for operations against sea bases of foreign states. Instructors from group "Delfin" prepared the combat swimmers for KGB groups "Alfa" and "Vympel". At the fall of the Soviet government, each of the Soviet Red Banner Fleets (four total) had a Naval Spetsnaz Brigade assigned to it (see combat swimmers). Furthermore, modern Alfa and Vympel special purpose forces also have naval units.

Russian Naval Infantry, or the Russian Marines, are elite forces, but by no means are they Spetsnaz troops as Naval Special Operations would be carried out by Delfin (Naval Spetsnaz) troops rather than the Marines, which are intended to spearhead amphibious invasions. The 4 Major Naval Spetsnaz units are:

  • 4 INDEP SPETZNAZ PT Parusnoe (Baltyysk) (Baltic Fleet) formerly Viljandi, Estonia (transferred from Army GRU to Navy GRU)

  • 431 INT SPETZNAZ PT Tuapse (Black Sea Fleet) formerly Kronstadt (Baltic Fleet)

  • 42 SPETZNAZ PT Russkyy island (Pacific Fleet)

  • 420 INT SPETZNAZ PT Polyarnyy (Northern Fleet)

Osnaz

Russian intelligence agencies, MVD, FSB, and the FPS and the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR, "Sluzhba Vneshnej Razvedki", Russian equivalent of the American CIA) have their own Osnaz units.

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