Showing posts with label United States. Show all posts
Showing posts with label United States. Show all posts

Thursday, 1 November 2007

United States Department of Homeland Security

The United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS), commonly known in the United States as Homeland Security, is a Cabinet department of the Federal Government of the United States with the responsibility of protecting the territory of the United States from terrorist attacks and responding to natural disasters.

Whereas the Department of Defense is charged with military actions abroad, the Department of Homeland Security works in the civilian sphere to protect the United States within, at, and outside its borders. Its goal is to prepare for, prevent, and respond to domestic emergencies, particularly terrorism. On March 1, 2003, the DHS absorbed the now defunct United States Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), and assumed its duties.

With over 200,000 employees, DHS is the third largest cabinet department in the U.S. federal government after the Department of Defense and Department of Veterans Affairs. Homeland security policy is coordinated at the White House by the Homeland Security Council, with Frances Townsend as the Homeland Security Advisor. Other agencies with significant homeland security responsibilities include the Department of Health and Human Services, the Department of Justice, and the Department of Energy.

Establishment
In response to the September 11, 2001 attacks, President George W. Bush announced the establishment of an Office of Homeland Security (OHS) to coordinate "homeland security" efforts, to be headed by former Pennsylvania Governor Tom Ridge with the title of Assistant to the President for Homeland Security. The name is reminiscent of the British WW2-era Ministry of Home Security.
Former Pennsylvania Governor Tom Ridge took up his duties as OHS director on October 8, 2001.

On March 12, 2002, the Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS), a color-coded terrorism risk advisory scale, was created as a Presidential Directive to provide a "comprehensive and effective means to disseminate information regarding the risk of terrorist acts to Federal, State, and local authorities and to the American people."- Many procedures at government facilities are keyed off of the alert level; for example a facility may search all entering vehicles when the alert is above a certain level. Since January 2003, it has been administered in coordination with the DHS; it has also been the target of frequent jokes and ridicule on the part of the administration's detractors about its ineffectiveness. After resigning, Tom Ridge stated that he didn't always agree with the threat level adjustments pushed by other government agencies.

In January 2003, the office was merged into the Department of Homeland Security and the White House Homeland Security Council, both of which were created by the Homeland Security Act of 2002. The Homeland Security Council, similar in nature to the National Security Council, retains a policy coordination and advisory role and is led by the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security.
Creation of DHS
The department was established on November 25, 2002, by the Homeland Security Act of 2002. After months of discussion about employee rights and benefits and "rider" portions of the bill, it was signed into law by U.S. President George W. Bush. It was intended to consolidate U.S. executive branch organizations related to "homeland security" into a single Cabinet agency. Tom Ridge was named secretary on January 24, 2003 and began naming his chief deputies. DHS officially began operations on January 24, 2003, but most of the department's component agencies were not transferred into the new Department until March 1.
It was the largest government reorganization in 50 years (since the United States Department of Defense was created).
After establishing the basic structure of DHS and working to integrate its components and get the department functioning, Ridge announced his resignation on November 30, 2004, following the re-election of President Bush. Bush initially nominated former New York City Police Department commissioner Bernard Kerik as his successor, but on December 10, Kerik withdrew his nomination citing personal reasons and saying it "would not be in the best interests" of the country for him to pursue the post. On January 11, 2005, President Bush nominated federal judge Michael Chertoff to succeed Ridge. Chertoff was confirmed on February 15, 2005, by a vote of 98–0 in the U.S. Senate. He was sworn in the same day.
Controversy about adoption centered on whether the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Central Intelligence Agency should be incorporated in part or in whole (neither were included). The bill itself was also controversial for the presence of unrelated riders, as well as eliminating certain union-friendly civil service and labor protections for department employees. President Bush wanted to ensure senior Homeland Security leadership had the expedited ability to reassign or dismiss an employee for security reasons, incompetence, or insubordination. Then-Senate Minority Leader Tom Daschle wanted an appeals process that could take up to 18 months or as little as one month. The impasse became an issue during the 2002 congressional elections, which resulted in the Republican Party regaining a majority in the U.S. Senate. Soon thereafter, the U.S. Congress passed the Homeland Security Act of 2002 without the union-friendly measures, and President Bush signed the bill into law on November 25, 2002. In 2006, a federal court injunction blocked many aspects of the new personnel system named MaxHR as they relate to employee pay and discipline. As a result of the court ruling, DHS announced in early 2007 that it was retooling its pay and performance system and retiring the name MaxHR.

Wednesday, 11 July 2007

CIA's Role in the Study of UFOs, 1947-90 - part 4

Part 1

Part 2

Part 3

The 1970s and 1980s: The UFO Issue Refuses To Die

The Condon report did not satisfy many UFOlogists, who considered it a coverup for CIA activities in UFO research. Additional sightings in the early 1970s fueled beliefs that the CIA was somehow involved in a vast conspiracy. On 7 June 1975, William Spaulding, head of a small UFO group, Ground Saucer Watch (GSW), wrote to CIA requesting a copy of the Robertson panel report and all records relating to UFOs. Spaulding was convinced that the Agency was withholding major files on UFOs. Agency officials provided Spaulding with a copy of the Robertson panel report and of the Durant report.

On 14 July 1975, Spaulding again wrote the Agency questioning the authenticity of the reports he had received and alleging a CIA coverup of its UFO activities. Gene Wilson, CIA's Information and Privacy Coordinator, replied in an attempt to satisfy Spaulding, "At no time prior to the formation of the Robertson Panel and subsequent to the issuance of the panel's report has CIA engaged in the study of the UFO phenomena." The Robertson panel report, according to Wilson, was "the summation of Agency interest and involvement in UFOs." Wilson also inferred that there were no additional documents in CIA's possession that related to UFOs. Wilson was ill informed.

In September 1977, Spaulding and GSW, unconvinced by Wilson's response, filed a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) lawsuit against the Agency that specifically requested all UFO documents in CIA's possession. Deluged by similar FOIA requests for Agency information on UFOs, CIA officials agreed, after much legal maneuvering, to conduct a "reasonable search" of CIA files for UFO materials. Despite an Agency-wide unsympathetic attitude toward the suit, Agency officials, led by Launie Ziebell from the Office of General Counsel, conducted a thorough search for records pertaining to UFOs. Persistent, demanding, and even threatening at times, Ziebell and his group scoured the Agency. They even turned up an old UFO file under a secretary's desk. The search finally produced 355 documents totaling approximately 900 pages. On 14 December 1978, the Agency released all but 57 documents of about 100 pages to GSW. It withheld these 57 documents on national security grounds and to protect sources and methods.

Although the released documents produced no smoking gun and revealed only a low-level Agency interest in the UFO phenomena after the Robertson panel report of 1953, the press treated the release in a sensational manner. The New York Times, for example, claimed that the declassified documents confirmed intensive government concern over UFOs and that the Agency was secretly involved in the surveillance of UFOs. GSW then sued for the release of the withheld documents, claiming that the Agency was still holding out key information. It was much like the John F. Kennedy assassination issue. No matter how much material the Agency released and no matter how dull and prosaic the information, people continued to believe in a Agency coverup and conspiracy.

DCI Stansfield Turner was so upset when he read The New York Times article that he asked his senior officers, "Are we in UFOs?" After reviewing the records, Don Wortman, Deputy Director for Administration, reported to Turner that there was "no organized Agency effort to do research in connection with UFO phenomena nor has there been an organized effort to collect intelligence on UFOs since the 1950s." Wortman assured Turner that the Agency records held only "sporadic instances of correspondence dealing with the subject," including various kinds of reports of UFO sightings. There was no Agency program to collect actively information on UFOs, and the material released to GSW had few deletions. Thus assured, Turner had the General Counsel press for a summary judgment against the new lawsuit by GSW. In May 1980, the courts dismissed the lawsuit, finding that the Agency had conducted a thorough and adequate search in good faith.

During the late 1970s and 1980s, the Agency continued its low-key interest in UFOs and UFO sightings. While most scientists now dismissed flying saucers reports as a quaint part of the 1950s and 1960s, some in the Agency and in the Intelligence Community shifted their interest to studying parapsychology and psychic phenomena associated with UFO sightings. CIA officials also looked at the UFO problem to determine what UFO sightings might tell them about Soviet progress in rockets and missiles and reviewed its counterintelligence aspects. Agency analysts from the Life Science Division of OSI and OSWR officially devoted a small amount of their time to issues relating to UFOs. These included counterintelligence concerns that the Soviets and the KGB were using US citizens and UFO groups to obtain information on sensitive US weapons development programs (such as the Stealth aircraft), the vulnerability of the US air-defense network to penetration by foreign missiles mimicking UFOs, and evidence of Soviet advanced technology associated with UFO sightings.

CIA also maintained Intelligence Community coordination with other agencies regarding their work in parapsychology, psychic phenomena, and "remote viewing" experiments. In general, the Agency took a conservative scientific view of these unconventional scientific issues. There was no formal or official UFO project within the Agency in the 1980s, and Agency officials purposely kept files on UFOs to a minimum to avoid creating records that might mislead the public if released.

The 1980s also produced renewed charges that the Agency was still withholding documents relating to the 1947 Roswell incident, in which a flying saucer supposedly crashed in New Mexico, and the surfacing of documents which purportedly revealed the existence of a top secret US research and development intelligence operation responsible only to the President on UFOs in the late 1940s and early 1950s. UFOlogists had long argued that, following a flying saucer crash in New Mexico in 1947, the government not only recovered debris from the crashed saucer but also four or five alien bodies. According to some UFOlogists, the government clamped tight security around the project and has refused to divulge its investigation results and research ever since. In September 1994, the US Air Force released a new report on the Roswell incident that concluded that the debris found in New Mexico in 1947 probably came from a once top secret balloon operation, Project MOGUL, designed to monitor the atmosphere for evidence of Soviet nuclear tests.

Circa 1984, a series of documents surfaced which some UFOlogists said proved that President Truman created a top secret committee in 1947, Majestic-12, to secure the recovery of UFO wreckage from Roswell and any other UFO crash sight for scientific study and to examine any alien bodies recovered from such sites. Most if not all of these documents have proved to be fabrications. Yet the controversy persists.

Like the JFK assassination conspiracy theories, the UFO issue probably will not go away soon, no matter what the Agency does or says. The belief that we are not alone in the universe is too emotionally appealing and the distrust of our government is too pervasive to make the issue amenable to traditional scientific studies of rational explanation and evidence.

Source - CIA's Role in the Study of UFOs, 1947-90, Central Intelligence Agency

Interested in UFOs? Take a look at this blog.

CIA's Role in the Study of UFOs, 1947-90 - part 3

Part 1

Part 2

The 1960s: Declining CIA Involvement and Mounting Controversy

In the early 1960s, Keyhoe, Davidson, and other UFOlogists maintained their assault on the Agency for release of UFO information. Davidson now claimed that CIA "was solely responsible for creating the Flying Saucer furor as a tool for cold war psychological warfare since 1951." Despite calls for Congressional hearings and the release of all materials relating to UFOs, little changed.

In 1964, however, following high-level White House discussions on what to do if an alien intelligence was discovered in space and a new outbreak of UFO reports and sightings, DCI John McCone asked for an updated CIA evaluation of UFOs. Responding to McCone's request, OSI asked the CD to obtain various recent samples and reports of UFO sightings from NICAP. With Keyhoe, one of the founders, no longer active in the organization, CIA officers met with Richard H. Hall, the acting director. Hall gave the officers samples from the NICAP database on the most recent sightings.

After OSI officers had reviewed the material, Donald F. Chamberlain, OSI Assistant Director, assured McCone that little had changed since the early 1950s. There was still no evidence that UFOs were a threat to the security of the United States or that they were of "foreign origin." Chamberlain told McCone that OSI still monitored UFO reports, including the official Air Force investigation, Project BLUE BOOK.

At the same time that CIA was conducting this latest internal review of UFOs, public pressure forced the Air Force to establish a special ad hoc committee to review BLUE BOOK. Chaired by Dr. Brian O'Brien, a member of the Air Force Scientific Advisory Board, the panel included Carl Sagan, the famous astronomer from Cornell University. Its report offered nothing new. It declared that UFOs did not threaten the national security and that it could find "no UFO case which represented technological or scientific advances outside of a terrestrial framework." The committee did recommend that UFOs be studied intensively, with a leading university acting as a coordinator for the project, to settle the issue conclusively.

The House Armed Services Committee also held brief hearings on UFOs in 1966 that produced similar results. Secretary of the Air Force Harold Brown assured the committee that most sightings were easily explained and that there was no evidence that "strangers from outer space" had been visiting Earth. He told the committee members, however, that the Air Force would keep an open mind and continue to investigate all UFO reports.

Following the report of its O'Brien Committee, the House hearings on UFOs, and Dr. Robertson's disclosure on a CBS Reports program that CIA indeed had been involved in UFO analysis, the Air Force in July 1966 again approached the Agency for declassification of the entire Robertson panel report of 1953 and the full Durant report on the Robertson panel deliberations and findings. The Agency again refused to budge. Karl H. Weber, Deputy Director of OSI, wrote the Air Force that "We are most anxious that further publicity not be given to the information that the panel was sponsored by the CIA." Weber noted that there was already a sanitized version available to the public. Weber's response was rather shortsighted and ill considered. It only drew more attention to the 13-year-old Robertson panel report and CIA's role in the investigation of UFOs. The science editor of The Saturday Review drew nationwide attention to the CIA's role in investigating UFOs when he published an article criticizing the "sanitized version" of the 1953 Robertson panel report and called for release of the entire document.

Unknown to CIA officials, Dr. James E. McDonald, a noted atmospheric physicist from the University of Arizona, had already seen the Durant report on the Robertson panel proceedings at Wright-Patterson on 6 June 1966. When McDonald returned to Wright-Patterson on 30 June to copy the report, however, the Air Force refused to let him see it again, stating that it was a CIA classified document. Emerging as a UFO authority, McDonald publicly claimed that the CIA was behind the Air Force secrecy policies and coverup. He demanded the release of the full Robertson panel report and the Durant report.

Bowing to public pressure and the recommendation of its own O'Brien Committee, the Air Force announced in August 1966 that it was seeking a contract with a leading university to undertake a program of intensive investigations of UFO sightings. The new program was designed to blunt continuing charges that the US Government had concealed what it knew about UFOs. On 7 October, the University of Colorado accepted a $325,000 contract with the Air Force for an 18-month study of flying saucers. Dr. Edward U. Condon, a physicist at Colorado and a former Director of the National Bureau of Standards, agreed to head the program. Pronouncing himself an "agnostic" on the subject of UFOs, Condon observed that he had an open mind on the question and thought that possible extraterritorial origins were "improbable but not impossible." Brig. Gen. Edward Giller, USAF, and Dr. Thomas Ratchford from the Air Force Research and Development Office became the Air Force coordinators for the project.

In February 1967, Giller contacted Arthur C. Lundahl, Director of CIA's National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC), and proposed an informal liaison through which NPIC could provide the Condon Committee with technical advice and services in examining photographs of alleged UFOs. Lundahl and DDI R. Jack Smith approved the arrangement as a way of "preserving a window" on the new effort. They wanted the CIA and NPIC to maintain a low profile, however, and to take no part in writing any conclusions for the committee. No work done for the committee by NPIC was to be formally acknowledged.

Ratchford next requested that Condon and his committee be allowed to visit NPIC to discuss the technical aspects of the problem and to view the special equipment NPIC had for photoanalysis. On 20 February 1967, Condon and four members of his committee visited NPIC. Lundahl emphasized to the group that any NPIC work to assist the committee must not be identified as CIA work. Moreover, work performed by NPIC would be strictly of a technical nature. After receiving these guidelines, the group heard a series of briefings on the services and equipment not available elsewhere that CIA had used in its analysis of some UFO photography furnished by Ratchford. Condon and his committee were impressed.

Condon and the same group met again in May 1967 at NPIC to hear an analysis of UFO photographs taken at Zanesville, Ohio. The analysis debunked that sighting. The committee was again impressed with the technical work performed, and Condon remarked that for the first time a scientific analysis of a UFO would stand up to investigation. The group also discussed the committee's plans to call on US citizens for additional photographs and to issue guidelines for taking useful UFO photographs. In addition, CIA officials agreed that the Condon Committee could release the full Durant report with only minor deletions.

In April 1969, Condon and his committee released their report on UFOs. The report concluded that little, if anything, had come from the study of UFOs in the past 21 years and that further extensive study of UFO sightings was unwarranted. It also recommended that the Air Force special unit, Project BLUE BOOK, be discontinued. It did not mention CIA participation in the Condon committee's investigation. A special panel established by the National Academy of Sciences reviewed the Condon report and concurred with its conclusion that "no high priority in UFO investigations is warranted by data of the past two decades." It concluded its review by declaring, "On the basis of present knowledge, the least likely explanation of UFOs is the hypothesis of extraterrestrial visitations by intelligent beings." Following the recommendations of the Condon Committee and the National Academy of Sciences, the Secretary of the Air Force, Robert C. Seamans, Jr., announced on 17 December 1969 the termination of BLUE BOOK.

Continue reading - The 1970s and 1980s: The UFO Issue Refuses To Die

CIA's Role in the Study of UFOs, 1947-90 - part 2

Part 1

The Robertson Panel, 1952-53

On 4 December 1952, the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC) took up the issue of UFOs. Amory, as acting chairman, presented DCI Smith's request to the committee that it informally discuss the subject of UFOs. Chadwell then briefly reviewed the situation and the active program of the ATIC relating to UFOs. The committee agreed that the DCI should "enlist the services of selected scientists to review and appraise the available evidence in the light of pertinent scientific theories" and draft an NSCID on the subject. Maj. Gen. John A. Samford, Director of Air Force Intelligence, offered full cooperation.

At the same time, Chadwell looked into British efforts in this area. He learned the British also were active in studying the UFO phenomena. An eminent British scientist, R. V. Jones, headed a standing committee created in June 1951 on flying saucers. Jones' and his committee's conclusions on UFOs were similar to those of Agency officials: the sightings were not enemy aircraft but misrepresentations of natural phenomena. The British noted, however, that during a recent air show RAF pilots and senior military officials had observed a "perfect flying saucer." Given the press response, according to the officer, Jones was having a most difficult time trying to correct public opinion regarding UFOs. The public was convinced they were real.

In January 1953, Chadwell and H. P. Robertson, a noted physicist from the California Institute of Technology, put together a distinguished panel of nonmilitary scientists to study the UFO issue. It included Robertson as chairman; Samuel A. Goudsmit, a nuclear physicist from the Brookhaven National Laboratories; Luis Alvarez, a high-energy physicist; Thornton Page, the deputy director of the Johns Hopkins Operations Research Office and an expert on radar and electronics; and Lloyd Berkner, a director of the Brookhaven National Laboratories and a specialist in geophysics.

The charge to the panel was to review the available evidence on UFOs and to consider the possible dangers of the phenomena to US national security. The panel met from 14 to 17 January 1953. It reviewed Air Force data on UFO case histories and, after spending 12 hours studying the phenomena, declared that reasonable explanations could be suggested for most, if not all, sightings. For example, after reviewing motion-picture film taken of a UFO sighting near Tremonton, Utah, on 2 July 1952 and one near Great Falls, Montana, on 15 August 1950, the panel concluded that the images on the Tremonton film were caused by sunlight reflecting off seagulls and that the images at Great Falls were sunlight reflecting off the surface of two Air Force interceptors.

The panel concluded unanimously that there was no evidence of a direct threat to national security in the UFO sightings. Nor could the panel find any evidence that the objects sighted might be extraterrestrials. It did find that continued emphasis on UFO reporting might threaten "the orderly functioning" of the government by clogging the channels of communication with irrelevant reports and by inducing "hysterical mass behavior" harmful to constituted authority. The panel also worried that potential enemies contemplating an attack on the United States might exploit the UFO phenomena and use them to disrupt US air defenses.

To meet these problems, the panel recommended that the National Security Council debunk UFO reports and institute a policy of public education to reassure the public of the lack of evidence behind UFOs. It suggested using the mass media, advertising, business clubs, schools, and even the Disney corporation to get the message across. Reporting at the height of McCarthyism, the panel also recommended that such private UFO groups as the Civilian Flying Saucer Investigators in Los Angeles and the Aerial Phenomena Research Organization in Wisconsin be monitored for subversive activities.

The Robertson panel's conclusions were strikingly similar to those of the earlier Air Force project reports on SIGN and GRUDGE and to those of the CIA's own OSI Study Group. All investigative groups found that UFO reports indicated no direct threat to national security and no evidence of visits by extraterrestrials.

Following the Robertson panel findings, the Agency abandoned efforts to draft an NSCID on UFOs. The Scientific Advisory Panel on UFOs (the Robertson panel) submitted its report to the IAC, the Secretary of Defense, the Director of the Federal Civil Defense Administration, and the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board. CIA officials said no further consideration of the subject appeared warranted, although they continued to monitor sightings in the interest of national security. Philip Strong and Fred Durant from OSI also briefed the Office of National Estimates on the findings. CIA officials wanted knowledge of any Agency interest in the subject of flying saucers carefully restricted, noting not only that the Robertson panel report was classified but also that any mention of CIA sponsorship of the panel was forbidden. This attitude would later cause the Agency major problems relating to its credibility.

The 1950s: Fading CIA Interest in UFOs

After the report of the Robertson panel, Agency officials put the entire issue of UFOs on the back burner. In May 1953, Chadwell transferred chief responsibility for keeping abreast of UFOs to OSI's Physics and Electronic Division, while the Applied Science Division continued to provide any necessary support. Todos M. Odarenko, chief of the Physics and Electronics Division, did not want to take on the problem, contending that it would require too much of his division's analytic and clerical time. Given the findings of the Robertson panel, he proposed to consider the project "inactive" and to devote only one analyst part-time and a file clerk to maintain a reference file of the activities of the Air Force and other agencies on UFOs. Neither the Navy nor the Army showed much interest in UFOs, according to Odarenko.

A nonbeliever in UFOs, Odarenko sought to have his division relieved of the responsibility for monitoring UFO reports. In 1955, for example, he recommended that the entire project be terminated because no new information concerning UFOs had surfaced. Besides, he argued, his division was facing a serious budget reduction and could not spare the resources. Chadwell and other Agency officials, however, continued to worry about UFOs. Of special concern were overseas reports of UFO sightings and claims that German engineers held by the Soviets were developing a "flying saucer" as a future weapon of war.

To most US political and military leaders, the Soviet Union by the mid-1950s had become a dangerous opponent. Soviet progress in nuclear weapons and guided missiles was particularly alarming. In the summer of 1949, the USSR had detonated an atomic bomb. In August 1953, only nine months after the United States tested a hydrogen bomb, the Soviets detonated one. In the spring of 1953, a top secret RAND Corporation study also pointed out the vulnerability of SAC bases to a surprise attack by Soviet long-range bombers. Concern over the danger of a Soviet attack on the United States continued to grow, and UFO sightings added to the uneasiness of US policymakers.

Mounting reports of UFOs over eastern Europe and Afghanistan also prompted concern that the Soviets were making rapid progress in this area. CIA officials knew that the British and Canadians were already experimenting with "flying saucers." Project Y was a Canadian-British-US developmental operation to produce a nonconventional flying-saucer-type aircraft, and Agency officials feared the Soviets were testing similar devices.

Adding to the concern was a flying saucer sighting by US Senator Richard Russell and his party while traveling on a train in the USSR in October 1955. After extensive interviews of Russell and his group, however, CIA officials concluded that Russell's sighting did not support the theory that the Soviets had developed saucerlike or unconventional aircraft. Herbert Scoville, Jr., the Assistant Director of OSI, wrote that the objects observed probably were normal jet aircraft in a steep climb.

Wilton E. Lexow, head of the CIA's Applied Sciences Division, was also skeptical. He questioned why the Soviets were continuing to develop conventional-type aircraft if they had a "flying saucer." Scoville asked Lexow to assume responsibility for fully assessing the capabilities and limitations of nonconventional aircraft and to maintain the OSI central file on the subject of UFOs.

CIA's U-2 and OXCART as UFOs

In November 1954, CIA had entered into the world of high technology with its U-2 overhead reconnaissance project. Working with Lockheed's Advanced Development facility in Burbank, California, known as the Skunk Works, and Kelly Johnson, an eminent aeronautical engineer, the Agency by August 1955 was testing a high-altitude experimental aircraft--the U-2. It could fly at 60,000 feet; in the mid-1950s, most commercial airliners flew between 10,000 feet and 20,000 feet. Consequently, once the U-2 started test flights, commercial pilots and air traffic controllers began reporting a large increase in UFO sightings.

The early U-2s were silver (they were later painted black) and reflected the rays from the sun, especially at sunrise and sunset. They often appeared as fiery objects to observers below. Air Force BLUE BOOK investigators aware of the secret U-2 flights tried to explain away such sightings by linking them to natural phenomena such as ice crystals and temperature inversions. By checking with the Agency's U-2 Project Staff in Washington, BLUE BOOK investigators were able to attribute many UFO sightings to U-2 flights. They were careful, however, not to reveal the true cause of the sighting to the public.

According to later estimates from CIA officials who worked on the U-2 project and the OXCART (SR-71, or Blackbird) project, over half of all UFO reports from the late 1950s through the 1960s were accounted for by manned reconnaissance flights (namely the U-2) over the United States. This led the Air Force to make misleading and deceptive statements to the public in order to allay public fears and to protect an extraordinarily sensitive national security project. While perhaps justified, this deception added fuel to the later conspiracy theories and the coverup controversy of the 1970s. The percentage of what the Air Force considered unexplained UFO sightings fell to 5.9 percent in 1955 and to 4 percent in 1956.

At the same time, pressure was building for the release of the Robertson panel report on UFOs. In 1956, Edward Ruppelt, former head of the Air Force BLUE BOOK project, publicly revealed the existence of the panel. A best-selling book by UFOlogist Donald Keyhoe, a retired Marine Corps major, advocated release of all government information relating to UFOs. Civilian UFO groups such as the National Investigations Committee on Aerial Phenomena (NICAP) and the Aerial Phenomena Research Organization (APRO) immediately pushed for release of the Robertson panel report. Under pressure, the Air Force approached CIA for permission to declassify and release the report. Despite such pressure, Philip Strong, Deputy Assistant Director of OSI, refused to declassify the report and declined to disclose CIA sponsorship of the panel. As an alternative, the Agency prepared a sanitized version of the report which deleted any reference to CIA and avoided mention of any psychological warfare potential in the UFO controversy.

The demands, however, for more government information about UFOs did not let up. On 8 March 1958, Keyhoe, in an interview with Mike Wallace of CBS, claimed deep CIA involvement with UFOs and Agency sponsorship of the Robertson panel. This prompted a series of letters to the Agency from Keyhoe and Dr. Leon Davidson, a chemical engineer and UFOlogist. They demanded the release of the full Robertson panel report and confirmation of CIA involvement in the UFO issue. Davidson had convinced himself that the Agency, not the Air Force, carried most of the responsibility for UFO analysis and that "the activities of the US Government are responsible for the flying saucer sightings of the last decade." Indeed, because of the undisclosed U-2 and OXCART flights, Davidson was closer to the truth than he suspected. CI, nevertheless held firm to its policy of not revealing its role in UFO investigations and refused to declassify the full Robertson panel report.

In a meeting with Air Force representatives to discuss how to handle future inquires such as Keyhoe's and Davidson's, Agency officials confirmed their opposition to the declassification of the full report and worried that Keyhoe had the ear of former DCI VAdm. Roscoe Hillenkoetter, who served on the board of governors of NICAP. They debated whether to have CIA General Counsel Lawrence R. Houston show Hillenkoetter the report as a possible way to defuse the situation. CIA officer Frank Chapin also hinted that Davidson might have ulterior motives, "some of them perhaps not in the best interest of this country," and suggested bringing in the FBI to investigate. Although the record is unclear whether the FBI ever instituted an investigation of Davidson or Keyhoe, or whether Houston ever saw Hillenkoetter about the Robertson report, Hillenkoetter did resign from the NICAP in 1962.

The Agency was also involved with Davidson and Keyhoe in two rather famous UFO cases in the 1950s, which helped contribute to a growing sense of public distrust of CIA with regard to UFOs. One focused on what was reported to have been a tape recording of a radio signal from a flying saucer; the other on reported photographs of a flying saucer. The "radio code" incident began innocently enough in 1955, when two elderly sisters in Chicago, Mildred and Marie Maier, reported in the Journal of Space Flight their experiences with UFOs, including the recording of a radio program in which an unidentified code was reportedly heard. The sisters taped the program and other ham radio operators also claimed to have heard the "space message." OSI became interested and asked the Scientific Contact Branch to obtain a copy of the recording.

Field officers from the Contact Division (CD), one of whom was Dewelt Walker, made contact with the Maier sisters, who were "thrilled that the government was interested," and set up a time to meet with them. In trying to secure the tape recording, the Agency officers reported that they had stumbled upon a scene from Arsenic and Old Lace. "The only thing lacking was the elderberry wine," Walker cabled Headquarters. After reviewing the sisters' scrapbook of clippings from their days on the stage, the officers secured a copy of the recording. OSI analyzed the tape and found it was nothing more than Morse code from a US radio station.

The matter rested there until UFOlogist Leon Davidson talked with the Maier sisters in 1957. The sisters remembered they had talked with a Mr. Walker who said he was from the US Air Force. Davidson then wrote to a Mr. Walker, believing him to be a US Air Force Intelligence Officer from Wright-Patterson, to ask if the tape had been analyzed at ATIC. Dewelt Walker replied to Davidson that the tape had been forwarded to proper authorities for evaluation, and no information was available concerning the results. Not satisfied, and suspecting that Walker was really a CIA officer, Davidson next wrote DCI Allen Dulles demanding to learn what the coded message revealed and who Mr. Walker was. The Agency, wanting to keep Walker's identity as a CIA employee secret, replied that another agency of the government had analyzed the tape in question and that Davidson would be hearing from the Air Force. On 5 August, the Air Force wrote Davidson saying that Walker "was and is an Air Force Officer" and that the tape "was analyzed by another government organization." The Air Force letter confirmed that the recording contained only identifiable Morse code which came from a known US-licensed radio station.

Davidson wrote Dulles again. This time he wanted to know the identity of the Morse operator and of the agency that had conducted the analysis. CIA and the Air Force were now in a quandary. The Agency had previously denied that it had actually analyzed the tape. The Air Force had also denied analyzing the tape and claimed that Walker was an Air Force officer. CIA officers, under cover, contacted Davidson in Chicago and promised to get the code translation and the identification of the transmitter, if possible.

In another attempt to pacify Davidson, a CIA officer, again under cover and wearing his Air Force uniform, contacted Davidson in New York City. The CIA officer explained that there was no super agency involved and that Air Force policy was not to disclose who was doing what. While seeming to accept this argument, Davidson nevertheless pressed for disclosure of the recording message and the source. The officer agreed to see what he could do. After checking with Headquarters, the CIA officer phoned Davidson to report that a thorough check had been made and, because the signal was of known US origin, the tape and the notes made at the time had been destroyed to conserve file space.

Incensed over what he perceived was a runaround, Davidson told the CIA officer that "he and his agency, whichever it was, were acting like Jimmy Hoffa and the Teamster Union in destroying records which might indict them." Believing that any more contact with Davidson would only encourage more speculation, the Contact Division washed its hands of the issue by reporting to the DCI and to ATIC that it would not respond to or try to contact Davidson again. Thus, a minor, rather bizarre incident, handled poorly by both CIA and the Air Force, turned into a major flap that added fuel to the growing mystery surrounding UFOs and CIA's role in their investigation.

Another minor flap a few months later added to the growing questions surrounding the Agency's true role with regard to flying saucers. CIA's concern over secrecy again made matters worse. In 1958, Major Keyhoe charged that the Agency was deliberately asking eyewitnesses of UFOs not to make their sightings public.

The incident stemmed from a November 1957 request from OSI to the CD to obtain from Ralph C. Mayher, a photographer for KYW-TV in Cleveland, Ohio, certain photographs he took in 1952 of an unidentified flying object. Harry Real, a CD officer, contacted Mayher and obtained copies of the photographs for analysis. On 12 December 1957, John Hazen, another CD officer, returned the five photographs of the alleged UFO to Mayher without comment. Mayher asked Hazen for the Agency's evaluation of the photos, explaining that he was trying to organize a TV program to brief the public on UFOs. He wanted to mention on the show that a US intelligence organization had viewed the photographs and thought them of interest. Although he advised Mayher not to take this approach, Hazen stated that Mayher was a US citizen and would have to make his own decision as to what to do.

Keyhoe later contacted Mayher, who told him his story of CIA and the photographs. Keyhoe then asked the Agency to confirm Hazen's employment in writing, in an effort to expose CIA's role in UFO investigations. The Agency refused, despite the fact that CD field representatives were normally overt and carried credentials identifying their Agency association. DCI Dulles's aide, John S. Earman, merely sent Keyhoe a noncommittal letter noting that, because UFOs were of primary concern to the Department of the Air Force, the Agency had referred his letter to the Air Force for an appropriate response. Like the response to Davidson, the Agency reply to Keyhoe only fueled the speculation that the Agency was deeply involved in UFO sightings. Pressure for release of CIA information on UFOs continued to grow.

Although CIA had a declining interest in UFO cases, it continued to monitor UFO sightings. Agency officials felt the need to keep informed on UFOs if only to alert the DCI to the more sensational UFO reports and flaps.

Continue reading - The 1960s: Declining CIA Involvement and Mounting Controversy

CIA's Role in the Study of UFOs, 1947-90

An extraordinary 95 percent of all Americans have at least heard or read something about Unidentified Flying Objects (UFOs), and 57 percent believe they are real. Former US Presidents Carter and Reagan claim to have seen a UFO. UFOlogists--a neologism for UFO buffs--and private UFO organizations are found throughout the United States. Many are convinced that the US Government, and particularly CIA, are engaged in a massive conspiracy and coverup of the issue. The idea that CIA has secretly concealed its research into UFOs has been a major theme of UFO buffs since the modern UFO phenomena emerged in the late 1940s.

In late 1993, after being pressured by UFOlogists for the release of additional CIA information on UFOs, DCI R. James Woolsey ordered another review of all Agency files on UFOs. Using CIA records compiled from that review, this study traces CIA interest and involvement in the UFO controversy from the late 1940s to 1990. It chronologically examines the Agency's efforts to solve the mystery of UFOs, its programs that had an impact on UFO sightings, and its attempts to conceal CIA involvement in the entire UFO issue. What emerges from this examination is that, while Agency concern over UFOs was substantial until the early 1950s, CIA has since paid only limited and peripheral attention to the phenomena.

Background

The emergence in 1947 of the Cold War confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union also saw the first wave of UFO sightings. The first report of a "flying saucer" over the United States came on 24 June 1947, when Kenneth Arnold, a private pilot and reputable businessman, while looking for a downed plane sighted nine disk-shaped objects near Mt. Rainier, Washington, traveling at an estimated speed of over 1,000 mph. Arnold's report was followed by a flood of additional sightings, including reports from military and civilian pilots and air traffic controllers all over the United States. In 1948, Air Force Gen. Nathan Twining, head of the Air Technical Service Command, established Project SIGN (initially named Project SAUCER) to collect, collate, evaluate, and distribute within the government all information relating to such sightings, on the premise that UFOs might be real and of national security concern.

The Technical Intelligence Division of the Air Material Command (AMC) at Wright Field (later Wright-Patterson Air Force Base) in Dayton, Ohio, assumed control of Project SIGN and began its work on 23 January 1948. Although at first fearful that the objects might be Soviet secret weapons, the Air Force soon concluded that UFOs were real but easily explained and not extraordinary. The Air Force report found that almost all sightings stemmed from one or more of three causes: mass hysteria and hallucination, hoax, or misinterpretation of known objects. Nevertheless, the report recommended continued military intelligence control over the investigation of all sightings and did not rule out the possibility of extraterrestrial phenomena.

Amid mounting UFO sightings, the Air Force continued to collect and evaluate UFO data in the late 1940s under a new project, GRUDGE, which tried to alleviate public anxiety over UFOs via a public relations campaign designed to persuade the public that UFOs constituted nothing unusual or extraordinary. UFO sightings were explained as balloons, conventional aircraft, planets, meteors, optical illusions, solar reflections, or even "large hailstones." GRUDGE officials found no evidence in UFO sightings of advanced foreign weapons design or development, and they concluded that UFOs did not threaten US security. They recommended that the project be reduced in scope because the very existence of Air Force official interest encouraged people to believe in UFOs and contributed to a "war hysteria" atmosphere. On 27 December 1949, the Air Force announced the project's termination.

With increased Cold War tensions, the Korean war, and continued UFO sightings, USAF Director of Intelligence Maj. Gen. Charles P. Cabell ordered a new UFO project in 1952. Project BLUE BOOK became the major Air Force effort to study the UFO phenomenon throughout the 1950s and 1960s. The task of identifying and explaining UFOs continued to fall on the Air Material Command at Wright-Patterson. With a small staff, the Air Technical Intelligence Center (ATIC) tried to persuade the public that UFOs were not extraordinary. Projects SIGN, GRUDGE, and BLUE BOOK set the tone for the official US Government position regarding UFOs for the next 30 years.

Early CIA Concerns, 1947-52

CIA closely monitored the Air Force effort, aware of the mounting number of sightings and increasingly concerned that UFOs might pose a potential security threat. Given the distribution of the sightings, CIA officials in 1952 questioned whether they might reflect "midsummer madness.'' Agency officials accepted the Air Force's conclusions about UFO reports, although they concluded that "since there is a remote possibility that they may be interplanetary aircraft, it is necessary to investigate each sighting."

A massive buildup of sightings over the United States in 1952, especially in July, alarmed the Truman administration. On 19 and 20 July, radar scopes at Washington National Airport and Andrews Air Force Base tracked mysterious blips. On 27 July, the blips reappeared. The Air Force scrambled interceptor aircraft to investigate, but they found nothing. The incidents, however, caused headlines across the country. The White House wanted to know what was happening, and the Air Force quickly offered the explanation that the radar blips might be the result of "temperature inversions." Later, a Civil Aeronautics Administration investigation confirmed that such radar blips were quite common and were caused by temperature inversions.

Although it had monitored UFO reports for at least three years, CIA reacted to the new rash of sightings by forming a special study group within the Office of Scientific Intelligence (OSI) and the Office of Current Intelligence (OCI) to review the situation. Edward Tauss, acting chief of OSI's Weapons and Equipment Division, reported for the group that most UFO sightings could be easily explained. Nevertheless, he recommended that the Agency continue monitoring the problem, in coordination with ATIC. He also urged that CIA conceal its interest from the media and the public, "in view of their probable alarmist tendencies" to accept such interest as confirming the existence of UFOs.

Upon receiving the report, Deputy Director for Intelligence (DDI) Robert Amory, Jr. assigned responsibility for the UFO investigations to OSI's Physics and Electronics Division, with A. Ray Gordon as the officer in charge. Each branch in the division was to contribute to the investigation, and Gordon was to coordinate closely with ATIC. Amory, who asked the group to focus on the national security implications of UFOs, was relaying DCI Walter Bedell Smith's concerns. Smith wanted to know whether or not the Air Force investigation of flying saucers was sufficiently objective and how much more money and manpower would be necessary to determine the cause of the small percentage of unexplained flying saucers. Smith believed "there was only one chance in 10,000 that the phenomenon posed a threat to the security of the country, but even that chance could not be taken." According to Smith, it was CIA's responsibility by statute to coordinate the intelligence effort required to solve the problem. Smith also wanted to know what use could be made of the UFO phenomenon in connection with US psychological warfare efforts.

Led by Gordon, the CIA Study Group met with Air Force officials at Wright-Patterson and reviewed their data and findings. The Air Force claimed that 90 percent of the reported sightings were easily accounted for. The other 10 percent were characterized as "a number of incredible reports from credible observers." The Air Force rejected the theories that the sightings involved US or Soviet secret weapons development or that they involved "men from Mars"; there was no evidence to support these concepts. The Air Force briefers sought to explain these UFO reports as the misinterpretation of known objects or little understood natural phenomena. Air Force and CIA officials agreed that outside knowledge of Agency interest in UFOs would make the problem more serious. This concealment of CIA interest contributed greatly to later charges of a CIA conspiracy and coverup.

The CIA Study Group also searched the Soviet press for UFO reports, but found none, causing the group to conclude that the absence of reports had to have been the result of deliberate Soviet Government policy. The group also envisioned the USSR's possible use of UFOs as a psychological warfare tool. In addition, they worried that, if the US air warning system should be deliberately overloaded by UFO sightings, the Soviets might gain a surprise advantage in any nuclear attack.

Because of the tense Cold War situation and increased Soviet capabilities, the CIA Study Group saw serious national security concerns in the flying saucer situation. The group believed that the Soviets could use UFO reports to touch off mass hysteria and panic in the United States. The group also believed that the Soviets might use UFO sightings to overload the US air warning system so that it could not distinguish real targets from phantom UFOs. H. Marshall Chadwell, Assistant Director of OSI, added that he considered the problem of such importance "that it should be brought to the attention of the National Security Council, in order that a communitywide coordinated effort towards it solution may be initiated."

Chadwell briefed DCI Smith on the subject of UFOs in December 1952. He urged action because he was convinced that "something was going on that must have immediate attention" and that "sightings of unexplained objects at great altitudes and traveling at high speeds in the vicinity of major US defense installations are of such nature that they are not attributable to natural phenomena or known types of aerial vehicles." He drafted a memorandum from the DCI to the National Security Council (NSC) and a proposed NSC Directive establishing the investigation of UFOs as a priority project throughout the intelligence and the defense research and development community. Chadwell also urged Smith to establish an external research project of top-level scientists to study the problem of UFOs. After this briefing, Smith directed DDI Amory to prepare a NSC Intelligence Directive (NSCID) for submission to the NSC on the need to continue the investigation of UFOs and to coordinate such investigations with the Air Force.

Continue reading - The Robertson Panel, 1952-53

The Berlin Tunnel

No single operation more typifies Berlin's importance as a strategic intelligence base then the construction of the Berlin Tunnel. Probably one of the most ambitious operations undertaken by the CIA in the 1950s, it succeeded despite the fact that the KGB knew about the operation even before construction of the tunnel had began!

The genesis of the tunnel operation lay in Berlin's location in Europe and its prewar status as the capital of a militarily and economically dominant Germany. The largest city on the Continent, Berlin lay at the center of a vast network of transportation and communications lines that extended from Western France to deep into Soviet Russia and Eastern Europe. This was still true in the 1950s; Soviet telephone and telegraph communications between Moscow, Warsaw, and Bucharest were routed through Berlin, for example. This became a factor of crucial importance beginning in 1951, when the Soviets began to shift from wireless communications to encrypted land lines for almost all military traffic. Land lines existed in two forms: overhead lines strung from telephone poles and underground cables. Both carried encrypted messages as well as nonsecure voice communications.

CIA officers examining this situation in 1952 concluded that underground cables offered the more valuable target, since they were buried and hence not subject to constant visual surveillance. If a tap could be placed covertly, it would be likely to remain in place for some time. Thus was born the idea of tunneling into the Soviet sector of Berlin to tap into Soviet military communications. The concept was tested in the spring of 1953, when an agent in the East Berlin telephone exchange patched an East Berlin telephone line into West Berlin late one night to sample what might be obtained. Even after midnight the communications traffic was sufficiently valuable that CIA Headquarters decided to go ahead with the operation.

During 1953, CIA continued to gather data and test the idea of tapping communications in East Berlin. By August 1953, detailed plans for the tunnel were completed and a proposal was drawn up for approval by DCI Allen Dulles. After much discussion, this was obtained on 20 January 1954.

Having learned the location of the underground cables used by the Soviets from an agent inside the East Berlin post office, the Altglienicke district was selected as the best site for a cable tap. Work began in February 1954, using the construction of an Air Force radar site and warehouse as a cover. The tunnel itself was completed a year later, at the end of February 1955, and the taps were in place and operating shortly thereafter.

Unfortunately, the whole operation was blown even before the DCI approved the project. On 22 October 1953, US intelligence officers briefed a British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) audience that included KGB mole George Blake. Blake reported the existence of the tunnel project during his next meeting with his case officer, Sergei Kondrashev, in London the following December. However, a full report was not sent to Moscow until 12 February 1954.

Although the KGB was aware of the potential importance of the tap, its first priority was to protect Blake. Knowledge of the tunnel's existence was very closely held within the KGB--neither the GRU (Soviet military intelligence) nor the East German Stasi was informed. Rather than immediately shutting down the tunnel, the Soviets thus implemented a general tightening up of security procedures. A small team was formed to secretly locate the tap, which they did by late 1955. Early in 1956 the Soviets developed a plan whereby the tap would be "accidentally" discovered without putting Blake at risk. On the night of 21-22 April 1956, a special signal corps team began to dig. By 0200 they had discovered the tap chamber. At 1230 the following day they opened a trapdoor leading from the tap chamber down a vertical shaft to the tunnel. By 1420 they had penetrated the tunnel in the full glare of a well-organized publicity coup.

The digging operation had been seen from an observation post atop the warehouse in West Berlin and the tunnel evacuated long before the Soviets entered the tap chamber. A microphone was left in place to record what was going on. The Soviet publicity coup backfired: rather than condemning the operation, the non-Soviet press hailed it as audacious and well-planned. Of course, at the time, no one knew the extent of Soviet foreknowledge.

Since KGB archives remain closed, we cannot be certain that the Soviets did not exploit their prior knowledge of the cable tap for their own purposes--to plant false information, for example. However, according to former DCI Richard Helms, the possibility that the Soviets used the tunnel for "disinformazia" (disinformation) was closely examined after Blake's exposure and arrest in 1961. Finally, it was concluded that the intelligence that had been collected was genuine.

The sheer volume of the "take" from the tunnel operation would tend to support that conclusion. In all, about 40,000 hours of telephone conversations were recorded, along with 6,000,000 hours of teletype traffic. Most of the useful information dealt with Soviet orders of battle and force dispositions--information that was invaluable in the days before reconnaissance satellites and other, more sophisticated means of collection became operational. Not until more than two years after the tunnel was exposed and shut down was the task of processing this immense volume of data completed.

Source

Tuesday, 10 July 2007

Extrasensory agents in CIA

Extrasensory agents helped the CIA arrest KGB spies and detect secret objects in the USSR

Seventy-three thousand pages of secret documents have recently been declassified in the United States. The information unveiled the activity of two special groups that worked with extrasensory individuals. The CIA had to acknowledge that it used remote viewers and other individuals possessing paranormal abilities for intelligence purposes.

The groups of extrasensory individuals apparently worked without having any links with each other. One of those groups was searching for information about spying on the territory of the USA (counterintelligence), another one was dealing with identification of nuclear and other secret objects in the country of an enemy (strategic intelligence).

The two groups achieved quite impressive results in their work. The Polish and East-German residents, as well as other agents from several “NATO-friendly” countries of Western Europe were destroyed owing to the efforts of the first group. Aldrich Ames, a KGB agent, was detected with special groups' help too.

American counterintelligence officers had a suspicion of having a spy within the CIA, although there was absolutely no information about him. A remote viewer involved in the detecting process gave the following description: “The man lives on the outskirts of Washington, owns a very expensive foreign car, he is married to a Latin American woman, most likely a Colombian, and he likes grey.” Six CIA agents matching the description were put under strict observation – Aldrich Ames was caught as a result of the further investigation.

Extrasensory individuals from the strategic intelligence unit helped the CIA find a Soviet nuclear test ground in Semipalatinsk and a Chinese test ground in Lop-Nor. American agents had information about certain objects of paramount importance in those areas. However, it was impossible for them to find out, what kind of object they were exactly – secret factories, military grounds or powerful centers to test and launch ballistic missiles.

”Psychic spy” Joseph McMoneagle also known as “remote viewing agent #001” was shown a spot on the map of the USSR, where the mysterious secret object was supposedly located, as CIA agents thought. McMoneagle put his finger on the map and described the image that he saw in his mind:

”It is a congregation of low stone and concrete buildings. A huge underground warehouse filled with lethal weapons…Not only missiles. There are other square and round items there. I see a very high column of smoke, bearing some semblance to a huge lifting crane, rising above the area (it was most likely the smoke of a nuclear blast). The people inhabiting that place are sick. Their hair is receding, their bones are putrefying. They deliver sick children, and they are still obsessed with some idea.”

It was quite an eloquent description for secret agents to understand, what kind of an object was located in Semipalatinsk (which is now a town in the republic of Kazakhstan). Then CIA Director Richard Helms moved the paranormal espionage from the category “Research” to the category “Practice.” Joseph McMoneagle's success as a remote viewer increased the funding of such unusual activities, not to mention the improved moral aspect. The US authorities spent about $2 million a year on a rather small group of 20 extrasensory individuals in the 1990s.

Other achievements of American psychic agents include: factories making weapons of mass destruction in third world countries, including Iraq (it is not ruled out that the information about WMD in Iraq sprang from remote viewers. Extrasensory intelligence officers also developed certain recommendations to recruit CIA agents and rendered some other services too.

The CIA administration has apparently come to conclusion that it was not profitable to spend time and money on paranormal activities against the background of the up-to-date technological development. The above-mentioned declassified materials were accompanied with a statement that the work of psychic groups was shut down within CIA's framework in 1997. Now the agency prefers to use spying satellites and “live bugs” - microchips, which can be implanted in flies, cockroaches and ants.

Journalists thanked the CIA administration to exposing such interesting materials, although they did not believe that the remote-viewing project had been closed. Reporters managed to find out that the paranormal project had been handed over to the Pentagon's intelligence, the directors of which declined all comments. An anonymous colonel of the US Air Force said that the American government would eliminate the project completely only if Russia abolished it first.

Source

Inside look at espionage by former CIA and KGB agents

5:50 p.m., March 13, 2003--Fifteen years ago they would have been archenemies, but Wednesday evening, March 12, Paul J. Redmond, former chief of counterintelligence for the CIA, and Oleg Danilovich Kalugin, former major general of the Soviet KGB, took the stage together at UD’s Clayton Hall to reveal some of the most intriguing episodes of espionage history.

Far from the popularized James Bond spy stereotype, these men look like average Joes, and their personas reveal nothing of the sinister nature of their jobs. Redmond and Kalugin were the men behind the missions—the men who used counterintelligence to deeply infiltrate the deepest secrets of their respective enemy countries.

Redmond and Kalugin painted a picture of espionage during the 40 years of the United States and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics’ Cold War, as well as offering some insight into the future of counterintelligence work. Their speech, “Spy vs. Spy: Down and Dirty in the Espionage Trenches,” was part of UD’s Global Agenda Speaker Series, “Spies, Lies and Sneaky Guys.” Ralph Begleiter, Rosenberg Professor of Communication and Distinguished Journalist in Residence, moderated the event.

“The U.S. and the Soviet Union were locked in battle for supremacy,” Begleiter said. “The Soviet Union finally collapsed under their own political and economic failures. It was a war that ended without a shot being fired, but not without blood shed.

“The guests we have here tonight were secret agents. Each fought and survived the Cold War, carrying out clandestine operations around the world.”

Redmond and Kalugin were each given an opportunity to speak and then faced off in a friendly banter about topics raised by Begleiter. The guests then participated in a question-and-answer session with the audience.

Redmond’s speech focused on the American misconception that spies are not a large part of the workings of the U.S. government. He said it is an absolute certainty that spies infiltrate the U.S. government on a daily basis, a fact he termed “Redmond’s Law.”

“Counterintelligence is an effort to bring sanity to a world that’s very murky and full of spin,” he said. “ Intelligence can’t serve a country unless at least the truth is sought for.

“Americans never get the point that people are going to spy on us. It’s cultural—we don’t like spying so we don’t want to think about it. We don’t like secrets either,” Redmond said.

Before retirement, Redmond served in several top positions for the CIA in East Asia, Europe and Eastern Europe. He received the Distinguished Intelligence Medal in 1994, the Federal Order of Merit from the president of Germany in 1995 and the U.S. National Distinguished Service Medal in 1999. He also served as director of the CIA’s internal investigation of the Robert Hanssen spy case.

Redmond acknowledged the KGB’s deep penetration into the U.S. government during the Cold War. He said if the Soviets had not collapsed and a military war resulted, the United States would have lost.

“When you look at what would have happened if there was a war, it was terrifying,” he said. “We would have lost because the Soviets and the Hungarians had the lot.

“When you look at the Soviet shuttle, it’s ours. The holes for the bolts are in the same place right down to the last millimeter.”

Redmond stressed that spying is still a large part of U.S. operations, even though the Cold War ended in 1989. He said since 1995, 96 significant spy cases have been uncovered against the United States. Furthermore, more than 80 entities have attempted to spy or successfully spied on the United States, including Germany, France, Greece, China, Iraq, Russia, Ghana, Ecuador, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and El Salvador.

Kalugin’s speech centered on KGB methodology and ideology. He said during the Cold War, the Soviet government was focused on the United States as its number-one enemy. The KGB received solid support from the government, which asked no moral questions about the KGB’s actions and policies.

“We conducted a clandestine war with assassination if necessary,” he said. “Our mission was to do everything we could to have a war without the fighting. This was seen as amoral in America, but it was our ideology.”

Kalugin infiltrated the United States as a journalist, attending Columbia University in New York City as a Fulbright Scholar in 1958. From 1965-70, he served as deputy resident and acting chief of the residency at the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D.C., quickly becoming the youngest general in the history of the KGB. Eventually, he became the head of worldwide foreign counterintelligence, serving at the center of some of the most important espionage cases, including the Walker spy ring.

Finding that the KGB’s internal functions had little to do with the security of the state and everything to do with keeping corrupt Communist Party officials in power, Kalugin retired from the KGB in 1990 and became a public critic of the communist system. He currently teaches at the Centre for Counterintelligence and Security Studies.

Kalugin said one of his most effective spying techniques was pitting American citizens against their own government.

“We appealed to pacifists and told them, ‘You cannot have peace unless you stop the internal situation of the U.S.,’” he said. “We got environmentalists and told them, ‘Capitalists spend any amount of money even if it does destroy your precious nature.’ Well, at the time, the Soviet Union was the most polluted country in the world,” he joked.

Kalugin listed several astonishing facts from a classified KGB report, proving just how much the organization is committed to counterintelligence. He said that in 1981 the KGB reported that they had funded or supported 70 books, 66 feature and documentary films, more than 100 television stations, 4,865 articles in magazines or newspapers, 300 conferences or exhibitions and 170,000 lectures around the world.

“Friendship, companionship—that is fine,” Kalugin said, “but national interests remain. Counterintelligence will never cease to exist. The U.S. remains priority number one.”

The face-off after each guests’ speech was filled with friendly banter and a competitive edge. When Begleiter asked Kalugin if he knew Redmond during his counterintelligence work, he replied with a wink, “I came across his name in a list of CIA agents the KGB compiled of over 11,000 names but not very often.”

“Little did you know,” Redmond answered.

In a discussion of the terrorist attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, both men agreed that the Al Qaeda organization could have been penetrated before the attacks, and Kalugin questioned why the CIA did not take more aggressive action toward infiltrating it.

Kalugin said the KGB would have sent a Muslim agent or an individual posing as a Muslim into the network five to 10 years ago. Redmond responded by explaining the extreme difficulty of such a task, and the cultural differences that exist between KGB and CIA ideology.

“We are a country of making the next quarter’s numbers,” Redmond said. “We’re a country of fast food and automatic replays. Culturally, we don’t ever think in the long-run.”

The Global Agenda Speaker Series is a program of the University’s “America and the Global Community” initiative and is presented in association with the World Affairs Council of Wilmington.

Source

Monday, 9 July 2007

CIA code words - cryptonyms used by the Central Intelligence Agency of the United States.

Partial list of CIA digraphs, cryptonyms and probable definitions:

AE: Soviet Union
AM: Cuba
BE: Poland
CK: Soviet Union
DI: Czechoslovakia
DM: Yugoslavia
DN: South Korea
ES: Guatemala
GT: Soviet Union
IA: Angola
KU: Part of CIA
LI: Mexico
MH: Worldwide operation
MK: Projects sponsored by the CIA's Technical Services Division
OD: Other Department
PB: President Board
SD: Iran
SM: United Kingdom
TU: South Vietnam
ZR: Normally prefixes the cryptonym for an intelligence intercept program. Seems to go with Staff D ops, Staff D being the group that worked directly with the NSA. Staff D was where ZR/RIFLE, a Castro assassination plot, was buried.

Operations and Projects

ARTICHOKE: Anti-interrogation project. Precursor to MKULTRA.
AQUATONE: Lockheed U-2 Spy Plane Project
BLUEBIRD: mind control program
CHALICE: Lockheed U-2 Spy Plane Project
CHERRY: Covert assassination / destabilization operation during Vietnam war, targeting Prince (later King) Norodom Sihanouk and the government of Cambodia. Disbanded.
CONDOR: 1970s CIA interference in Latin American governments, some allege in the coup and assassination of Salvador Allende in Chile
CORONA: Satellite photo system.
DBACHILLES: 1995 effort to support a military coup in Iraq.
ECHELON: worldwide signals intelligence and analysis network run by the UKUSA Community.
GUSTO: Project to design a follow-on to the Lockheed U-2 Spy Plane
HTAUTOMAT: Photointerpretation center established for the Lockheed U-2 Spy Plane Project
HTLINGUAL: Mail interception operation.
IAFEATURE: Operation to support UNITA and FNLA during the Angolan civil war.
KEMPSTER: Project to reduce the radar cross section (RCS) of the inlets of the Lockheed A-12 Spy Plane
LINCOLN: Ongoing operation involving Basque separatist group ETA
LPMEDLEY: Surveillance of telegraphic information exiting or entering the United States
MHCHAOS: Surveillance of antiwar activists during the Vietnam War
MKDELTA: Stockpiling of lethal biological and chemical agents, subsequently became MKNAOMI
MKNAOMI: Stockpiling of lethal biological and chemical agents, successor to MKDELTA
MKULTRA: Mind control research. MKULTRA means MK (code for scientific projects) and ULTRA (top classification reference, re: ULTRA code breaking in WWII. Renamed MKSEARCH in 1964
MKSEARCH: MKULTRA after 1964, mind control research
MKOFTEN: Testing effects of biological and chemical agents, part of MKSEARCH
OAK: Operation to assassinate suspected South Vietnamese collaborators during Vietnam war
OXCART: Lockheed A-12 Spy Plane Project
PAPERCLIP: US recruiting of German scientists after the Second World War
PHOENIX: Vietnam covert intelligence/assassination operation.
PBFORTUNE: CIA project to supply forces opposed to Guatemala's President Arbenz with weapons, supplies, and funding; predecessor to PBSUCCESS.
PBHISTORY: Central Intelligence Agency project to gather and analyze documents from the Arbenz government in Guatemala that would incriminate Arbenz as a Communist.
PBSUCCESS: (Also PBS) Central Intelligence Agency covert operation to overthrow the Arbenz government in Guatemala.
RAINBOW: Project to reduce the radar cross section (RCS) of the Lockheed U-2 Spy Plane
SHERWOOD: CIA radio broadcast program in Nicaragua begun on May 1, 1954.
THERMOS: Unclassified codeword used in lieu of RAINBOW
TPAJAX: Joint US/UK operation to overthrow Mohammed Mossadeq, Prime Minister of Iran
TSS: Technical Services Staff
WASHTUB: Operation to plant Soviet arms in Nicaragua

Organizations

KUBARK: CIA Headquarters
KUCAGE: CIA Overseas Paramilitary / Propaganda Operations
KUCLUB: Office of Communications
KUDESK: Counterintelligence department
KUDOVE: Office of the director
KUFIRE: Intelligence
KUGOWN: Propaganda
KUHOOK: Negotiations/Logistics (unsure)
KUSODA: CIA Interrogators
ODACID: State Department / US Embassy
ODEARL: US Department of Defense
ODENVY: FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigation
ODOATH: US Navy
ODUNIT: US Air Force
ODYOKE: US Government
QKFLOWAGE: United States Information Agency
SKIMMER: The "Group" CIA cover organization supporting Castillo Armas.
SGUAT: CIA Station in Guatemala
SMOTH: British Secret Intelligence Service (also known as MI6)
SYNCARP: The "Junta," Castillo Armas' political organization headed by Cordova Cerna.
UNIFRUIT: United Fruit Company

Persons

AEFOXTROT: Yuri Ivanovich Nosenko, a Soviet defector
AELADLE: Anatoliy Golitsyn, a Soviet defector
AMLASH: Rolando Cubela Secades, a Cuban official involved in plot to kill Fidel Castro in 1963
AMQUACK: Che Guevara, Argentinian guerrilla leader
AMTHUG: Fidel Castro, president of Cuba
ESQUIRE: James Bamford, author of "The Puzzle Palace"
GPFLOOR: Lee Harvey Oswald, J.F. Kennedy's assassin
GPIDEAL: John F. Kennedy, US president
GRALLSPICE: Pyotr Semonovich Popov, Soviet defector
JMBLUG: John S. Peurifoy, U.S. Ambassador to Guatemala
KUMOTHER: James Jesus Angleton, head of the CIAs counter intelligence
PANCHO: Carlos Castillo Armas, President of Guatemala, also RUFUS
RUFUS: Carlos Castillo Armas, President of Guatemala, also PANCHO
SKILLET: Whiting Willauer, U.S. Ambassador to Honduras.
STANDEL: Jacobo Arbenz, President of Guatemala

Places

BOND: Puerto Barrios, Guatemala
DTFROGS: El Salvador
HTKEEPER: Mexico City
HTPLUME: Panama
JMMADD: CIA airbase near city of Retalhuleu, Guatemala
JMTIDE: CIA airbase in Puerto Cabezas, Nicaragua
JMTRAX: CIA covert airbase/training camp in Guatemala
JMWAVE: CIA station in Miami (which operated against Cuba)
KMFLUSH: Nicaragua
KMPAJAMA: Mexico
KMPLEBE: Peru
LCPANGS: Costa Rica
LIONIZER: Guatemalan refugee group in Mexico
PBPRIME: the United States of America
PBRUMEN: Cuba
SARANAC: Training site in Nicaragua
SCRANTON: Training base for radio operators near Nicaragua.
WSBURNT: Guatemala
WSHOOFS: Honduras

Other

BGGYPSY: Communist
ESCOBILLA: Guatemalan national
ESMERALDITE: labor informant affiliated with AFL-sponsored labor movement
ESSENCE: Guatemalan anti-Communist leader
FJHOPEFUL: military base
LCFLUTTER: Polygraph, sometimes supplanted by truth drugs: Sodium Amytal (amobarbital), Sodium Pentothal (thiopental), and Seconal (secobarbital) to induce regression in the subject.
LIENVOY: Wiretap or Intercept Program
RYBAT: Indicates that the information is very sensitive
SLINC: Telegram indicator for PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida.

Monday, 2 July 2007

National Security Agency - domestic activity

The NSA's mission, as set forth in Executive Order 12333, is to collect information that constitutes "foreign intelligence or counterintelligence" while not "acquiring information concerning the domestic activities of United States persons". The NSA has declared that it relies on the FBI to collect information on foreign intelligence activities within the borders of the USA, while confining its own activities within the USA to the embassies and missions of foreign nations.

The NSA's domestic surveillance activities are limited by the requirements imposed by the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution; however, these protections do not apply to non-U.S. persons located outside of U.S. borders, so the NSA's foreign surveillance efforts are subject to far fewer limitations under U.S. law. The specific requirements for domestic surveillance operations are contained in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA), which does not extend protection to non-U.S. citizens located outside of U.S. territory.

The activities described below, especially the publicly acknowledged and so-called 'Domestic Phone' tapping and Domestic Call Database programs, have prompted questions about the extent of the NSA's activities and concerns about privacy and the rule of law.

A wiretapping program named ThinThread was tested in the late 1990s, according to information obtained by the Baltimore Sun in 2006. This program may have contributed to the underlying technology used in later systems, but its safeguards on privacy were abandoned after the 9/11 attacks.

On December 16, 2005, the New York Times reported that, under White House pressure and with an executive order from President George W. Bush, the National Security Agency, in an attempt to thwart terrorism, had been conducting phone-taps on individuals in the U.S. calling persons outside the country, without obtaining warrants from a secret court as required by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA).

Proponents of the warrantless surveillance claim that the President has the authority to order such action, arguing that the President has powers under the Constitution that trump laws such as FISA. In addition, some argued that FISA was implicitly overridden by a subsequent statute, the Authorization for Use of Military Force, although most concede this argument is untenable after the Supreme Court's ruling in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld. The only judge to rule on the matter thus far, in the case ACLU v. NSA, concluded that such surveillance is illegal and unconstitutional; her decision is stayed pending appeal. Third party legal authorities agree that the surveillance is illegal or probably illegal, although there is more disagreement as to whether it is unconstitutional. See NSA warrantless surveillance controversy for details.

In the years after President Nixon resigned, there were several investigations of suspected misuse of CIA and NSA facilities. Senator Frank Church headed a Senate investigating committee called the Church Committee which uncovered previously unknown activity, such as a plot to assassinate Fidel Castro by the CIA, which had been ordered by President John F. Kennedy and Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy. During the investigation, it was also found that the NSA was actively tapping the phones of targeted American citizens. After the Church Committee hearings, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 became law, limiting circumstances under which domestic surveillance was allowed.

National Security Agency - non-government cryptography

NSA has been involved in debates about public policy, both as a behind-the-scenes adviser to other departments, and directly during and after Vice Admiral Bobby Ray Inman's directorship.

The NSA was embroiled in controversy concerning its involvement in the creation of the Data Encryption Standard (DES), a standard and public block cipher used by the US government. During development by IBM in the 1970s, the NSA recommended changes to the algorithm. There was suspicion the agency had deliberately weakened the algorithm sufficiently to enable it to eavesdrop if required. The suspicions were that a critical component — the so-called S-boxes — had been altered to insert a "backdoor"; and that the key length had been reduced, making it easier for the NSA to discover the key using massive computing power.

However, the public reinvention of the technique known as differential cryptanalysis suggested that one of the changes (to the S-boxes) had actually been suggested to harden the algorithm against this — then publicly unknown — method of attack; differential cryptanalysis remained publicly unknown until it was independently reinvented and published some decades later. On the other hand the shortening of the cryptographic key from 128 bits, as recommended in IBM submission, to an effective key of only 56 bits in length, has been interpreted as an intentional weakening of the algorithm by the NSA, making possible an exhaustive search for the key by those with sufficient computer power and funding.

Because of concerns that widespread use of strong cryptography would hamper government use of wiretaps, the NSA proposed the concept of key escrow in 1993 and introduced the Clipper chip that would offer stronger protection than DES but would allow access to encrypted data by authorized law enforcement officials. The proposal was strongly opposed and went nowhere.

Possibly because of previous controversy, the involvement of NSA in the selection of a successor to DES, the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), was limited to hardware performance testing.

NSA was a major player in the debates of the 1990s regarding the export of cryptography. Cryptographic software and hardware had long been classed with fighter planes, tanks, cannons, and atomic bombs as controllable munitions. Restrictions on export were reduced but not eliminated in 1996.

The NSA/CSS has, at times, attempted to restrict the publication of academic research into cryptography; for example, the Khufu and Khafre block ciphers were voluntarily withheld in response to an NSA request to do so.

National Security Agency - role and history

Headquarters for the National Security Agency is at Fort George G. Meade, Maryland, approximately ten miles (16 km) northeast of Washington, D.C. NSA has its own exit off the Baltimore-Washington Parkway labeled "NSA Employees Only". The scale of the operations at the NSA is hard to determine from unclassified data, but one clue is the electricity usage of NSA's headquarters. NSA's budget for electricity exceeds US$31 million per year, making it the second largest electricity consumer in the entire state of Maryland.

Photos have shown there to be 18,000 parking spaces at the site, although most guesses have put the NSA's worldwide workforce at around double that number. In 2006, the Baltimore Sun reported that the NSA was at risk of electrical overload because of insufficient internal electrical infrastructure at Fort Meade to support the amount of equipment being installed. This problem was apparently recognized in the 1990s but not made a priority, and "now the agency's ability to keep its operations going is threatened". Its secure government communications work has involved NSA in numerous technology areas, including the design of specialized communications hardware and software, production of dedicated semiconductors (at the Ft. Meade chip fabrication plant), and advanced cryptography research. The agency contracts with the private sector in the fields of research and equipment.

The NSA has facilities besides its Ft. Meade headquarters, such as the Texas Cryptology Center in San Antonio, Texas.

The NSA is increasing its reliance on American industry for the purposes of domestic spying, through a project code-named Project GROUNDBREAKER. It is linked to the DOD doctrines called "Fight the net" and "Information Operations Roadmap". Ex-director Michael Hayden has said, "As the director, I was the one responsible to ensure that this program was limited in its scope and disciplined in its application". Two examples of relying on American industry for the purposes of domestic spying are the use of CALEA on US telecommunication companies, and NarusInsight. Under CALEA, all US telecommunication companies are forced to install hardware capable of monitoring data and voice by May 14, 2007. The act also forces US telecommunication companies to build national technology standards to support CALEA. NarusInsight is one type of spying hardware, capable of monitoring an OC-192 network line in real-time, and gives AT&T the power to monitor all 7,432,000 DSL lines it owns. According to Narus, after data capture its software can replay "streaming media (for example, VoIP), rendering of Web pages, examination of e-mails and the ability to analyze the payload/attachments of e-mail or file transfer protocols".

History




The origins of the National Security Agency can be traced to the May 20, 1949 creation of the Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA). This organization was originally established within the Department of Defense under the command of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The AFSA was to be responsible for directing the communications and electronic intelligence activities of the military intelligence units—the Army Security Agency, the Naval Security Group, and the Air Force Security Service. However, the agency had little power and lacked a centralized coordination mechanism. The creation of NSA resulted from a December 10, 1951, memo sent by CIA Director Walter Bedell Smith to James B. Lay, Executive Secretary of the National Security Council. The memo observed that "control over, and coordination of, the collection and processing of Communications Intelligence had proved ineffective" and recommended a survey of communications intelligence activities.

The proposal was approved on December 13, 1951, and the study authorized on December 28, 1951. The report was completed by June 13, 1952. Generally known as the "Brownell Committee Report," after committee chairman Herbert Brownell, it surveyed the history of U.S. communications intelligence activities and suggested the need for a much greater degree of coordination and direction at the national level. As the change in the security agency's name indicated, the role of the NSA was extended beyond the armed forces.

The creation of the NSA was authorized in a letter written by President Harry S. Truman in June of 1952. The agency was formally established through a revision of National Security Council Intelligence Directive (NSCID) 9 on October 24, 1952, and officially came into existence on November 4, 1952. President Truman's letter was itself classified and remained unknown to the public for more than a generation.

The heraldic insignia of NSA consists of a bald eagle facing its right, a symbol of peace, grasping a key in its talons, representing NSA's clutch on security as well as the mission to protect and gain access to secrets. The eagle is set on a background of blue and its breast features a blue shield supported by thirteen bands of red and white. The surrounding white circular border features "National Security Agency" around the top and "United States of America" underneath, with two five-pointed silver stars between the two phrases. The current NSA insignia has been in use since 1965, when then-DIRNSA, LTG Marshall S. Carter directed for the creation of a device to represent NSA.

National Security Agency - overview

The National Security Agency/Central Security Service (NSA/CSS) is the United States government's cryptologic organization that was officially established on November 4, 1952. Responsible for the collection and analysis of foreign communications, it coordinates, directs, and performs highly specialized activities to produce foreign signals intelligence information, which involves a significant amount of cryptanalysis. It is also responsible for protecting U.S. government communications and information systems from similar agencies elsewhere, which involves a significant amount of cryptography.

A component of the Department of Defense, the NSA has always been directed by a three-star flag officer. The NSA is a key component of the U.S. Intelligence Community, which is headed by the Director of National Intelligence.

Contrary to popular perception, the NSA does not engage in “wiretapping”; it collects signals intelligence, or “sigint.” In contrast to the image we have from movies and television of an FBI agent placing a listening device on a target’s phone line, the NSA intercepts entire streams of electronic communications containing millions of telephone calls and e-mails. It runs the intercepts through very powerful computers that screen them for particular names, telephone numbers, Internet addresses, and trigger words or phrases. Any communications containing flagged information are forwarded by the computer for further analysis.

The NSA's eavesdropping mission includes radio broadcasting, both from various organizations and individuals, the Internet, telephone calls, and other intercepted forms of communication. Its secure communications mission includes military, diplomatic, and all other sensitive, confidential or secret government communications. Despite having been described as the world's largest single employer of mathematicians, and the owner of the single largest group of supercomputers, it has tried to keep a low profile. For many years its existence was not even acknowledged by the U.S. government. It was often said, half-jokingly, that "NSA" stood for "No Such Agency", and also, as "Never Say Anything", primarily for its employees.

Because of its listening task, the NSA/CSS has been heavily involved in cryptanalytic research, continuing the work of its predecessor agencies which had been responsible for breaking many World War II codes and ciphers (see, for instance, Purple code, Venona, and JN-25).

Role and history

Controversy

Domestic activity

What are you interested in?

Digg this!