Showing posts with label Special Operations. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Special Operations. Show all posts

Thursday, 1 November 2007

Russian Spetsnaz hand-to-hand combat system - Systema

Systema is a term derived from the original Russian Systema of Hand-to-Hand Combat. More recently, as this style has become exported to western nations, it has become synonymous with Systema or Russian System of Martial Arts.

Systema was developed by the early Cossacks, a highly trained paramilitary society, more than a thousand years ago, and historical record of this fighting style can be dated back to 948 A.D. For Centuries Russia had to repel invaders from the north, south, east and west, each of which brought to bear the peculiar martial skills, physical abilities and weapons of its culture. As a result, the need arose for a fighting style based on adaptability, instinct and ease of learning.

From ancient ages the martial art of Russian warriors deserved worldwide recognition. Even then the Russian close fight inspired fear in the enemies. Ancient Russians were strong in the close fight and won even when all military rules said they could not win. Russian Plastoon Cossacks showed their exclusive art of close fight in the First World War.After the revolution in Russia, emigrating Russian officers brought the Russian martial art to the West. It was the Russian Style that was the basis for training the US sea-soldiers. In Russia the martial art perfected for ages was hidden into secret special schools for training diversionists. The Russian Style is a part of the combat sambo (Russian self-defence without weapon) generated by Spiridono, Kadochnikov. However, the today’s Russian Style standard was created by (who trained at a diversion school) Vadim Starov (who systemised and generalised the knowledge). As a result they created a universal survival system based on the historical battle experience and up-to-date developments in technologies and sciences such as mechanics, physics, medicine, geography, psychology, pathology, etc. Eventually, the System became the life system and world outlook of Slavonic people.

The study and practice of this discipline involves a complete system of physical and spiritual health, relaxation, and courage in the face of all forms of adversity. But most of all, it involves a philosophy of life, peace and decency seldom seen. It disciplines its students to relax while striking, rather than focus to generate maximum power, allowing you to strike at unusual and unexpected angles, to smile in combat rather than adopt a fierce visage or announce your intentions with a blood curdling yell. There are no fixed training patterns or combinations of movements, all training is based on the reality that unexpected things happen in combat.

The purpose of this discipline is not merely to prepare for violence, but to gain a positive and strong mental state, to have a healthier and more limber body, to be more relaxed in a stressful society and to live a decent and peaceful life.

The Russian System of Hand-to-Hand Combat, developed from this need. When the Communists came to power after the October Revolution of 1917, the practice of these fighting skills was prohibited, except by the elite units of the Soviet Special Forces, known as Spetsnaz. These groups had unique training and capabilities for working on the highest risk missions within KGB, and other government agencies. It is only since 1991, with the end of the Communist era, that these martial traditions and styles have become available to the West.

Russia. A new millennium eve. A wild outburst of organised criminals, terrorism, separatism, third powers’ aggression in disguise of mercenaries, hot spot wars. This is the reality of our days. It’s grieving to confess that - in some battles against bandit units - up to ninety percent of Russian soldiers died from wounds made with cold steel. The analysis of the military actions of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Defence Ministry special teams showed that the close fight role constantly grows in both bandit unit aggression repulse and criminal group suppression. The close fight techniques serve a single aim: saving lives in the extreme conditions of a true Combat.

What is the Russian Style? What is it’s secret hidden in? The secrets of the style should be looked for in regular physics, mechanics, biology, anatomy and psychology manuals rather than in any mystic ciphered treatises. The enemy’s attacks are received softly, in the same plane, by turning the arm or weapon. You should use the enemy’s inertia, add your acceleration, shift his centre of gravity - and the enemy can’t withstand it. By the way -never use your force to oppose the attacking force. Do always feel thedistance. Keeping the contact at the point of touch as a weapon/enemy rotation axis centre allows you to control the enemy by using a system of levers rather than a brute force. Do it easily, spending just a quarter of your physical strength. Having his reserve strength, the close fighter can see and evaluate the whole situation. The close fighter is effective in any age, in any state of health. And - which is important - he can use anything he can reach: a submachine gun, knife, digging tool, even pen or pencil. Moreover, his arms are his weapons too.

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Friday, 21 September 2007

Soviet Spetsnaz Tactics

Before spetsnaz units can begin active operations behind the enemy's lines they have to get there. The Soviet high command has the choice of either sending spetsnaz troops behind the enemy's lines before the outbreak of war, or sending them there after war has broken out. In the first case the enemy may discover them, realise that war has already begun and possibly press the buttons to start a nuclear war — pre-empting the Soviet Union. But if spetsnaz troops are sent in after the outbreak of war, it may be too late. The enemy may already have activated its nuclear capability, and then there will be nothing to put out of action in the enemy's rear: the missiles will be on their way to Soviet territory. One potential solution to the dilemma is that the better, smaller part of spetsnaz -the professional athletes — arrives before all-out war starts, taking extreme measures not to be discovered, while the standard units penetrate behind enemy lines after war has started.


In every Soviet embassy there are two secret organisations — the KGB rezidentura and the GRU rezidentura. The embassy and the KGB rezidentura are guarded by officers of the KGB frontier troops, but in cases where the GRU rezidentura has a complement of more than ten officers, it has its own internal spetsnaz guard. Before the outbreak of a war, in some cases several months previously, the number of spetsnaz officers in a Soviet embassy may be substantially increased, to the point where practically all the auxiliary personnel in the embassy, performing the duties of guards, cleaners, radio-operators, cooks and mechanics, will be spetsnaz athletes. With them, as their 'wives', women athletes from spetsnaz may turn up in the embassy. Similar changes of staff may take place in the many other Soviet bodies — the consulate, the commercial representation, the offices of Aeroflot, Intourist, TASS, Novosti and so forth.

The advantages of this arrangement are obvious, but it is not without its dangers. The principal danger lies in the fact that these new terrorist groups are based right in the centre of the country's capital city, uncomfortably close to government offices and surveillance. But within days, possibly within hours, before the outbreak of war they can, with care, make contact with the spetsnaz agent network and start a real war in the very centre of the city, using hiding places already prepared.

Part of their support will come from other spetsnaz groups which have recently arrived in the country in the guise of tourists, teams of sportsmen and various delegations. And at the very last moment large groups of fighting men may suddenly appear out of Aeroflot planes, ships in port, trains and Soviet long-distance road transport ('Sovtransavto'). Simultaneously there may be a secret landing of spetsnaz troops from Soviet submarines and surface vessels, both naval and merchant. (Small fishing vessels make an excellent means of transport for spetsnaz. They naturally spend long periods in the coastal waters of foreign states and do not arouse suspicion, so spetsnaz groups can spend a long time aboard and can easily return home if they do not get an order to make a landing). At the critical moment, on receipt of a signal, they can make a landing on the coast using aqualungs and small boats. Spetsnaz groups arriving by Aeroflot can adopt much the same tactics. In a period of tension, a system of regular watches may be introduced. This means that among the passengers on every plane there will be a group of commandos. Having arrived at their intended airport and not having been given a signal, they can remain aboard the aircraft (An aircraft is considered to be part of the territory of the country to which it belongs, and the pilot's cabin and the interior of the plane are not subject to foreign supervision.) and go back on the next flight. Next day another group will make the trip, and so on. One day the signal will come, and the group will leave the plane and start fighting right in the country's main airport. Their main task is to capture the airport for the benefit of a fresh wave of spetsnaz troops or airborne units (VDV).

It is a well-known fact that the 'liberation' of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 began with the arrival at Prague airport of Soviet military transport planes with VDV troops on board. The airborne troops did not need parachutes; the planes simply landed at the airport. Before the troops disembarked there was a moment when both the aircraft and their passengers were completely defenceless. Was the Soviet high command not taking a risk? No, because the fact is that by the time the planes landed, Prague airport had already been largely paralysed by a group of 'tourists' who had arrived earlier.

Spetsnaz groups may turn up in the territory of an enemy from the territory of neutral states. Before the outbreak of war or during a war spetsnaz groups may penetrate secretly into the territory of neutral states and wait there for an agreed signal or until a previously agreed time. One of the advantages of this is that the enemy does not watch over his frontiers with neutral countries as carefully as he does over his frontiers with Communist countries. The arrival of a spetsnaz group from a neutral state may pass unnoticed both by the enemy and the neutral state.

But what happens if the group is discovered on neutral territory? The answer is simple: the group will go into action in the same way as in enemy territory — avoid being followed, kill any witnesses, use force and cunning to halt any pursuers. They will make every effort to ensure that nobody from the group gets into the hands of their pursuers and not to leave any evidence about to show that the group belongs to the armed forces of the USSR. If the group should be captured by the authorities of the neutral state, Soviet diplomacy has enormous experience and some well-tried counter-moves. It may admit its mistake, make an official apology and offer compensation for any damage caused; it may declare that the group lost its way and thought it was already in enemy territory; or it may accuse the neutral state of having deliberately seized a group of members of the Soviet armed forces on Soviet territory for provocative purposes, and demand explanations, apologies and compensation, accompanied by open threats.

Experience has shown that this last plan is the most reliable. The reader should not dismiss it lightly. Soviet official publications wrote at the beginning of December 1939 that war was being waged against Finland in order to establish a Communist regime there, and a Communist government of 'people's Finland' had already been formed. Thirty years later Soviet marshals were writing that it was not at all like that: the Soviet Union was simply acting in self-defence. The war against Finland, which was waged from the first to the last day on Finnish territory, is now described as 'repelling Finnish aggression' (Marshal K. A. Meretskov, Na Sluzhbe na rodu (In the Service of the People), 1968.) and even as 'fulfilling the plan for protecting our frontiers.' (Marshal A. M. Vasilevsky, Delo Vselgesnle (A Life's Work), 1968.)

The Soviet Union is always innocent: it only repels perfidious aggressors. On other people's territory.

The principal way of delivering the main body of spetsnaz to the enemy's rear after the outbreak of war is to drop them by parachute. In the course of his two years' service every spetsnaz soldier makes thirty-five to forty parachute jumps. Spetsnaz professionals and officers have much greater experience with parachutes; some have thousands of jumps to their credit.

The parachute is not just a weapon and a form of transport. It also acts as a filter which courageous soldiers will pass through, but weak and cowardly men will not. The Soviet Government spends enormous sums on the development of parachute jumping as a sport. This is the main base from which the airborne troops and spetsnaz are built up. On 1 January 1985 the FAI had recorded sixty-three world records in parachute jumping, of which forty-eight are held by Soviet sportsmen (which means the Soviet Army). The Soviet military athlete Yuri Baranov was the first man in the world to exceed 13,000 jumps. Among Soviet women the champion in the number of jumps is Aleksandra Shvachko — she has made 8,200 jumps. The parachute psychosis continues.

In peacetime military transport planes are used for making parachute drops. But this is done largely to prevent the fact of the existence of spetsnaz from spreading. In wartime military transports would be used for dropping spetsnaz groups only in exceptional circumstances. There are two reasons for this. In the first place, the whole fleet of military transport planes would be taken up with transporting the airborne forces (VDV), of which there are an enormous number. Apart from which, military aviation would have other difficult missions to perform, such as the transport of troops within the country from passive, less important sectors to the areas where the main fighting was taking place. Secondly, the majority of military transports are enormous aircraft, built for moving people and equipment on a large scale, which do not suit the purposes of spetsnaz. It needs small planes that do not present large targets and carry no more than twenty or thirty people. They must also be able to fly at very low level without much noise. In some cases even smaller aircraft that take eight to ten, or down to three or four parachutists, are needed.

However, the official term 'civil aviation', which is the source of most spetsnaz transport in wartime, is a substantial misnomer. The minister for civil aviation bears, quite officially, the rank of air chief marshal in the Air Force. His deputies bear the rank of generals. The whole of Aeroflot's flying personnel have the ranks of officers of the reserve. In the event of war Aeroflot simply merges with the Soviet Air Force, and the reserve officers then become regular officers with the same rank.

It has more than enough small aircraft for the business of transporting and supplying spetsnaz units. The best of them are the Yakovlev-42 and the Yakovlev-40, very manoeuvrable, reliable, low-noise planes capable of flying at very low altitudes. They have one very important construction feature — passengers embark and disembark through a hatch at the bottom and rear of the aircraft. If need be, the hatch cover can be removed altogether, giving the parachutists an exit as on a military transport plane, which makes it possible to drop them in complete safety. Another plane that has great possibilities for spetsnaz is the Antonov-72 — an exact copy of the American YC-14 of which the plans were stolen by GRU spies.

But how can spetsnaz parachutists use ordinary civil jet-propelled aircraft, which passengers enter and leave by side doors? The doors cannot be opened in flight. And if they were made to open inwards instead of outwards, it would be exceptionally dangerous for a parachutist to leave the plane, because the force of the current of air would press the man back against the body of the plane. He might be killed either from the force with which he bounced back against the plane, or through interference with the opening of his parachute.

The problem has been solved by a very simple device. The door is arranged to open inwards, and a wide tube made of strong, flexible, synthetic material is allowed to hang out. As he leaves the door the parachutist finds himself in a sort of three-metre long corridor which he slides down so that he comes away from the aircraft when he is slightly to one side and below the fuselage.

Variations on this device were first used on Ilyushin-76 military transport planes. The heavy equipment of the airborne troops was dropped out of the huge rear freight hatch, while at the same time the men were leaving the plane through flexible 'sleeves' at the side. The West has not given this simple but very clever invention its due. Its importance lies not only in the fact that the time taken to drop Soviet parachutists from transport planes has been substantially reduced, with the result that every drop is safer and that forces are much better concentrated on landing. What it also means is that practically any jet-propelled civil aircraft can now be used for dropping parachute troops.

The dropping of a spetsnaz unit can be carried out at any time of the day or night. Every time has its advantages and its problems. Night-time is the spetsnaz soldier's ally, when the appearance of a group of spetsnaz deep in the enemy's rear may not be noticed at all. Even if the enemy were aware of the group's arrival, it is never easy to organise a full-scale search at night, especially if the exact landing place is not known and may be somewhere inaccessible where there are forests and hills or mountains with few roads and no troops on the spot. But at night there are likely to be casualties among the parachutists as they land. The same problems of assembly and orientation which face the pursuit troops face the spetsnaz unit too.

During the day, obviously, there are fewer accidents on landing; but the landing will be seen. Deliberate daytime landings may sometimes be carried out for the simple reason that the enemy does not expect such brazen behaviour at such a time.

In many cases the drop will be carried out early in the morning while there are still stars in the sky and the sun has not risen. This is a very good time if large numbers of soldiers are being dropped who are expected to go straight into battle and carry out their mission by means of a really sudden attack. In that case the high command does its best to ensure that the groups have as much daylight as possible for active operations on the first, most important day of their mission.

But every spetsnaz soldier's favourite time for being dropped is at sunset. The flight is calculated so that the parachutists' drop is carried out in the last minutes before the onset of darkness. The landing then takes place in the twilight when it is still light enough to avoid landing on a church spire or a telegraph pole. In half an hour at the most darkness will conceal the men and they will have the whole night ahead of them to leave the landing area and cover their tracks.

On its own territory spetsnaz has a standard military structure: section, platoon, company, battalion, brigade; or section, platoon, company, regiment. This organisation simplifies the control, administration and battle training of spetsnaz. But this structure cannot be used on enemy territory.

The problem is, firstly, that every spetsnaz operation is individual and unlike any other; a plan is worked out for each operation, which is unlike any other. Each operation consequently requires forces organised, not in a standard fashion, but adapted to the particular plan.

Secondly, when it is on enemy territory, a spetsnaz unit is in direct communication with a major headquarters, at the very least the headquarters of an all-arm or tank army, and orders are received in many cases directly from a high-level HQ. A very long chain of command is simply not needed.

On operations a simple and flexible chain of command is used. The organisational unit on enemy territory is known officially as the reconnaissance group of spetsnaz (RGSN). A group is formed before the beginning of an operation and may contain from two to thirty men. It can operate independently or as part of a detachment (ROSN), which consists of between thirty and 300 or more men. The detachment contains groups of various sizes and for various purposes. The names 'detachment' and 'group' are used deliberately, to emphasise the temporary nature of the units. In the course of an operation groups can leave a detachment and join it again, and each group may in turn break up into several smaller groups or, conversely, come together with others into one big group. Several large groups can join up and form a detachment which can at any moment split up again. The whole process is usually planned before the operation begins. For example: the drop may take place in small groups, perhaps fifteen of them altogether. On the second day of the operation (D+1) eight of the groups will join up into one detachment for a joint raid, while the rest operate independently. On D+2 two groups are taken out of the detachment to form the basis of a new detachment and another six groups link up with the second detachment. On D+5 the first detachment splits up into groups and on D+6 the second group splits up, and so on. Before the beginning of the operation each group is informed where and when to meet up with the other groups and what to do in case the rendezvous is not kept.

Having landed in enemy territory spetsnaz may go straight into battle. Otherwise, it will hide the equipment it no longer needs -boats, parachutes, etc — by either burying them in the ground or sinking them in water. Very often it will then mine the drop area. The mines are laid where the unwanted equipment has been buried. The area is also treated with one of a number of substances which will confuse a dog's sense of smell. After that, the group (of whatever size) will break up into little sub-groups which depart quickly in different directions. A meeting of the sub-groups will take place later at a previously arranged spot or, if this proves problematic, at one of the several alternative places which have been agreed.

The drop area is usually the first place where casualties occur. However good the parachute training is, leg injuries and fractures are a frequent occurrence, and when the drop takes place in an unfamiliar place, in complete darkness, perhaps in fog, over a forest or mountains, they are inevitable. Even built-up areas provide their own hazards. Spetsnaz laws are simple and easy to understand. In a case of serious injury the commander cannot take the wounded man with him; doing so would greatly reduce the group's mobility and might lead to the mission having to be aborted. But the commander cannot, equally, leave the wounded man alone. Consequently a simple and logical decision is taken, to kill the wounded man. Spetsnaz has a very humane means of killing its wounded soldiers -a powerful drug known to the men as 'Blessed Death'. An injection with the drug stops the pain and quickly produces a state of blissful drowsiness. In the event that a commander decides, out of misguided humanity, to take the wounded man with him, and it looks as if this might jeopardise the mission, the deputy commander is under orders to dispatch both the wounded man and the commander. The commander is removed without recourse to drugs. It is recommended that he be seized from behind with a hand over his mouth and a knife blow to his throat. If the deputy does not deal with his commander in this situation, then not just the commander and his deputy, but the entire group may be regarded as traitors, with all the inevitable consequences.

As they leave the area of the drop the groups and sub-groups cover their tracks, using methods that have been well known for centuries: walking through water and over stones, walking in each other's footsteps, and so forth. The groups lay more mines behind them and spread more powder against dogs.

After leaving the drop zone and having made sure that they are not being followed, the commander gives orders for the organisation of a base and a reserve base, safe places concealed from the view of outsiders. Long before a war GRU officers, working abroad in the guise of diplomats, journalists, consuls and other representatives of the USSR, choose places suitable for establishing bases. The majority of GRU officers have been at some time very closely familiar with spetsnaz, or are themselves spetsnaz officers, or have worked in the Intelligence Directorate of a district or group of forces. They know what is needed for a base to be convenient and safe.

Bases can be of all sorts and kinds. The ideal base would be a hiding place beneath ground level, with a drainage system, running water, a supply of food, a radio set to pick up the local news and some simple means of transport. I have already described how spetsnaz agents, recruited locally, can establish the more elaborate bases which are used by the professional groups of athletes carrying out exceptionally important tasks. In the majority of cases the base will be somewhere like a cave, or an abandoned quarry, or an underground passage in a town, or just a secluded place among the undergrowth in a dense forest.

A spetsnaz group can leave at the base all the heavy equipment it does not need immediately. The existence of even the most rudimentary base enables it to operate without having to carry much with it in the way of equipment or supplies. The approaches to the base are always guarded and the access paths mined — the closest with ordinary mines and the more distant ones with warning mines which explode with much noise and a bright flash, alerting any people in the base of approaching danger.

When the group moves off to carry out its task, a few men normally remain behind to guard the base, choosing convenient observation points from which to keep an eye on it. In the event of its being discovered the guard leaves the location quietly and makes for the reserve base, leaving warnings of the danger to the rest of the group in an agreed place. The main group returning from its mission will visit the reserve base first and only then go to the main base. There is a double safeguard here: the group may meet the guards in the reserve base and so avoid falling into a trap; otherwise the group will see the warning signals left by the guards. The craters from exploded mines around the base may also serve as warnings of danger. If the worst comes to the worst, the guards can give warning of danger by radio.

A spetsnaz group may also have a moving base. Then it can operate at night, unhampered by heavy burdens, while the guards cart all the group's heavy equipment along by other routes. Each morning the group meets up with its mobile base. The group replenishes its supplies and then remains behind to rest or to set off on another operation, while the base moves to another place. The most unexpected places can be used by the mobile bases. I once saw a base which looked simply like a pile of grass that had been thrown down in the middle of a field. The soldiers' packs and equipment had been very carefully disguised, and the men guarding the base were a kilometre away, also in a field and camouflaged with grass. All around there were lots of convenient ravines overgrown with young trees and bushes. That was where the KGB and MVD units were looking for the spetsnaz base, and where the helicopters were circling overhead. It did not occur to anybody that a base could be right in the middle of an open field.

In some cases a spetsnaz group may capture a vehicle for transporting its mobile base. It might be an armoured personnel carrier, a truck or an ordinary car. And if a group is engaged in very intensive fighting involving frequent changes of location, then no base is organised. In the event of its being pursued the group can abandon all its heavy equipment, having first removed the safety pin from the remaining mines.

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From Viktor Suvorov, "Spetsnaz. The Story Behind the Soviet SAS" (Source)

Wednesday, 11 July 2007

The Berlin Tunnel

No single operation more typifies Berlin's importance as a strategic intelligence base then the construction of the Berlin Tunnel. Probably one of the most ambitious operations undertaken by the CIA in the 1950s, it succeeded despite the fact that the KGB knew about the operation even before construction of the tunnel had began!

The genesis of the tunnel operation lay in Berlin's location in Europe and its prewar status as the capital of a militarily and economically dominant Germany. The largest city on the Continent, Berlin lay at the center of a vast network of transportation and communications lines that extended from Western France to deep into Soviet Russia and Eastern Europe. This was still true in the 1950s; Soviet telephone and telegraph communications between Moscow, Warsaw, and Bucharest were routed through Berlin, for example. This became a factor of crucial importance beginning in 1951, when the Soviets began to shift from wireless communications to encrypted land lines for almost all military traffic. Land lines existed in two forms: overhead lines strung from telephone poles and underground cables. Both carried encrypted messages as well as nonsecure voice communications.

CIA officers examining this situation in 1952 concluded that underground cables offered the more valuable target, since they were buried and hence not subject to constant visual surveillance. If a tap could be placed covertly, it would be likely to remain in place for some time. Thus was born the idea of tunneling into the Soviet sector of Berlin to tap into Soviet military communications. The concept was tested in the spring of 1953, when an agent in the East Berlin telephone exchange patched an East Berlin telephone line into West Berlin late one night to sample what might be obtained. Even after midnight the communications traffic was sufficiently valuable that CIA Headquarters decided to go ahead with the operation.

During 1953, CIA continued to gather data and test the idea of tapping communications in East Berlin. By August 1953, detailed plans for the tunnel were completed and a proposal was drawn up for approval by DCI Allen Dulles. After much discussion, this was obtained on 20 January 1954.

Having learned the location of the underground cables used by the Soviets from an agent inside the East Berlin post office, the Altglienicke district was selected as the best site for a cable tap. Work began in February 1954, using the construction of an Air Force radar site and warehouse as a cover. The tunnel itself was completed a year later, at the end of February 1955, and the taps were in place and operating shortly thereafter.

Unfortunately, the whole operation was blown even before the DCI approved the project. On 22 October 1953, US intelligence officers briefed a British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) audience that included KGB mole George Blake. Blake reported the existence of the tunnel project during his next meeting with his case officer, Sergei Kondrashev, in London the following December. However, a full report was not sent to Moscow until 12 February 1954.

Although the KGB was aware of the potential importance of the tap, its first priority was to protect Blake. Knowledge of the tunnel's existence was very closely held within the KGB--neither the GRU (Soviet military intelligence) nor the East German Stasi was informed. Rather than immediately shutting down the tunnel, the Soviets thus implemented a general tightening up of security procedures. A small team was formed to secretly locate the tap, which they did by late 1955. Early in 1956 the Soviets developed a plan whereby the tap would be "accidentally" discovered without putting Blake at risk. On the night of 21-22 April 1956, a special signal corps team began to dig. By 0200 they had discovered the tap chamber. At 1230 the following day they opened a trapdoor leading from the tap chamber down a vertical shaft to the tunnel. By 1420 they had penetrated the tunnel in the full glare of a well-organized publicity coup.

The digging operation had been seen from an observation post atop the warehouse in West Berlin and the tunnel evacuated long before the Soviets entered the tap chamber. A microphone was left in place to record what was going on. The Soviet publicity coup backfired: rather than condemning the operation, the non-Soviet press hailed it as audacious and well-planned. Of course, at the time, no one knew the extent of Soviet foreknowledge.

Since KGB archives remain closed, we cannot be certain that the Soviets did not exploit their prior knowledge of the cable tap for their own purposes--to plant false information, for example. However, according to former DCI Richard Helms, the possibility that the Soviets used the tunnel for "disinformazia" (disinformation) was closely examined after Blake's exposure and arrest in 1961. Finally, it was concluded that the intelligence that had been collected was genuine.

The sheer volume of the "take" from the tunnel operation would tend to support that conclusion. In all, about 40,000 hours of telephone conversations were recorded, along with 6,000,000 hours of teletype traffic. Most of the useful information dealt with Soviet orders of battle and force dispositions--information that was invaluable in the days before reconnaissance satellites and other, more sophisticated means of collection became operational. Not until more than two years after the tunnel was exposed and shut down was the task of processing this immense volume of data completed.

Source

Tuesday, 10 July 2007

Soviet Use of Assassination and Kidnapping - part 4

Part 1

Part 2

Part 3

II. Radio Free Europe:

The New York Times reported on an attempt to poison the staff of RFE on November 21, 1959, by placing atropine in the salt shakers of the cafeteria used by RFE personnel. Atropine is a derivative of the deadly nightshade plant; it can cause paralysis of death if taken in sufficient quantity. The amount of poison in each salt shaker was said to be 2.36% by weight of the contents. White crystalline alkaloid is indistinguishable from salt.

III. Stein:

In March 1955, Lisa Stein, an interviewer with RIAS, the American propaganda radio station in West Germany ("Radio in American Sector"), was fed candy containing the highly dangerous poison scopolamine. (Scopolamine is used in the so-called "twilight sleep." Given in small doses it induces a kind of euphoria; in larger doses it is supposed to be a deadly poison.) It was intended that Frau Stein would become ill and would be abducted. The plan was that the agent-someone whom Frau Stein trusted and with whom she was meeting in a West Berlin cafe-would offer the poisoned candy toward the end of the meeting. The lady was expected to become ill while walking from the caf6 to her nearby residence. On becoming unconscious, she was to be picked up by a waiting car which would appear to be passing by chance. The plot was not carried to fruition, however, because Frau Stein did not become ill until she was near her apartment, at which point neighbors came to her aid and she was moved to a hospital. She was severely ill for 48 hours, after which an antidote was found. (Unclassified, from the testimony of Theodor Hans, formerly with U.S. Military Intelligence, Germany, September 21, 1960, before a Congressional investigating committee.)

IV. Other:

Another weapon used is described as a noiseless gas pistol, powered by a 300-volt battery, which fires a lethal, odorless, unidentified gas. The gas acts in two or three seconds, and is effective up to 15 or 20 meters. The pistol has three buttons: one for arming, one for firing, and the third for recharging the battery. (After 50 firings the battery may be recharged by plugging a transformer into normal house power source.) The piston is normally fired 20 times, very rapidly and automatically-" Bzzzd." (Although one squirt could kill, 20 squirts are emitted in order to saturate the area, inasmuch as the gun is fired at a silhouette, rather than at a point.) The gas shot by the pistol would penetrate the victim's clothing and enter the skin. There is allegedly no danger to the user.

Trends

Since World War II, and especially in the years since Stalin's death, assassination attempts abroad have become increasingly rare. Currently the emphasis in the executive action field is placed on sabotage and sabotage planning, rather than terrorism against individuals. The Soviets now apparently resort to murder only in the case of persons considered especially dangerous to the regime and who, for one reason or another, cannot be kidnapped. A kidnapped person is obviously more valuable inasmuch as the Soviets may be able to extract from him information of interest, as well as use him for propaganda purposes by making it appear that he defected to the Soviet side of his own fee will. This course was followed in the case of Dr. Trushnovich. It is also likely that the Soviets find it increasingly difficult to find persons willing to undertake murder assignments, while the same may not be true of abduction operations. It can further be conjectured that the Soviets are now more concerned about the adverse publicity generated by Soviet assassinations in general than they were in previous years.

In this connection, comments made by state security defectors Petr Deryabin and Yurv Rastvorov in 1954 about what the Soviets would or would not do are still of interest. Both believed that the Soviets would murder one of their officials on the verge of defecting if that were the only way of preventing the act. The same would apply to a Soviet official who had just defected, if thereby state secrets could be preserved, and if they believed that killing him would not bring about a more adverse situation in terms of politics and propaganda than already existed. Deryabin and Rastvorov doubted, however, that the Soviets would murder an official who had been in non-Communist hands long enough to have been exploited for intelligence and propaganda purposes. While both granted that in particular cases the Soviets might go to any extreme, they both believed, generally speaking, that the adverse propaganda resulting from such an act would negate its original purpose. On the other hand, Khokhlov, who might have been in a better position to know, has stated without qualification that the Soviets would continue to assassinate defectors in the future. The threat of Soviet executive action against defectors is also considered a real one by Reino Hayhanen, who defected from the KGB in 1957. A still more recent Soviet intelligence source also believes that standard Soviet practice is to mount a kidnapping or assassination operation "through all intelligence opportunities" against defectors from the Soviet intelligence services.

Deryabin and Rastvorov further agreed that the Soviets, without hesitation, would forcibly return to the USSR someone on the verge of defecting at a mission abroad. This was borne out by the aforementioned Strygin and Zelenovskiy cases. Deryabin and Rastvorov also believed that the same policy would apply to a Soviet official who had just defected, or one who had been in non-Communist hands long enough to have been exploited for intelligence and propaganda purposes, if the capability existed for returning him physically to the USSR.

Lastly, Deryabin believed that the assassination of an Allied official would be highly unlikely and probably unprofitable. He also doubted that the Soviets would attempt to kidnap any U.S. officials unless they were particularly knowledgeable. Such an incident would not be worth the trouble for an average official, but an important person conceivably would have sufficient information to make it worthwhile.

Source

Soviet Use of Assassination and Kidnapping - part 3

Part 1

Part 2

Techniques

Many known or suspected executive action cases in the post-war period have involved the use of poison rather than guns or explosives. It is conceivable that the Soviets tend to favor poisons because murders can be accomplished more surreptitiously in this manner and in some instances without leaving easily recognizable traces of foul play. Drugs are also used to incapacitate a person temporarily for abduction purposes, as reportedly happened in the Trushnovich case and in the kidnapping of another NTS member, Valeri P. Tremmel, from Linz, Austria in June 1954. There are, however, many unknown, uncontrollable factors in the use of poisons and drugs which limit and often preclude their usage. Probably the most important is the narrow span between a dose that will cause disability and one that will cause death. Dosages vary from one individual to another depending on weight, state of health, and how the poison enters the body. The type used obviously is determined by the result desired. It is no problem to cause death, but often difficult to control dosage successfully when the objective is to incapacitate an individual only temporarily.

There appears to be no consistency in the use of poisons by Soviet intelligence to cause disability or death, or in the repetitious use of any one drug. Chemicals which have been used in cases known or suspected to be Soviet-instigated include arsenic, potassium cyanide, scopolamine, and thallium. Other likely substances are atropine, barbiturates, chloral hydrate, paraldehyde and Warfarin. Combinations of two or more substances may also be used, which further complicates diagnosis and tracing.

One well-publicized poisoning case involved the defector Nikolay Khokhlov. Khokhlov suffered a sudden and severe illness while attending an anti-Communist meeting in Frankfurt, Germany in September 1957. A positive diagnosis was precluded by the initial treatment given him at a German hospital, but there was evidence of his having been poisoned by a thallium derivative of arsenic and/or other chemical agents, and a strong possibility that the poison had been administered at RIS instigation. Khokhlov himself believed, and allegedly had supporting medical opinion, that he had been poisoned by radio-activated thallium. He believed that the poison was of Russian origin because it was such a complicated substance that it was difficult to analyze and had been carefully prepared to leave virtually no trace. A unique mechanism for administering poison was described by a knowledgeable source as a pneumatically operated poison ice "atomizer" which leaves no wound or other evidence of the cause of death. The equipment and techniques used in the poisoning of Rebet and Bandera are treated below in some detail as examples of the most recent and sophisticated methods in use by the KGB.

Specific Cases

I. Stashinskiy:

In November 1961 a Soviet intelligence officer, Bogdan Stashinskiy, surrendered to the West German police, stating that he had, acting under official orders, assassinated two individuals during the previous few years: Lev Rebet, a Ukrainian emigrr6 writer, and Stepan Bandera, a leader of the Ukrainian Nationalist movement. In both cases, a similar type of weapon had been used: a gun which fired vaporized poison which killed almost instantly upon being inhaled. The properties of the killing agent were such that, until the defection of the assassin, both victims were officially believed to have died from heart attacks. In the case of Bandera, however, there was some unconfirmed suspicion of potassium cyanide poisoning, although there was insufficient evidence to prove it.

The Weapon: The weapon used to assassinate Rebet was a light-weight aluminum cylinder, 15 to 18 cm. long and approximately 3 cm in diameter, weighing about 200 grams. The cylinder was divided into three separate chambers, one of which contained liquid poison sealed hermetically into a plastic-type ampoule container under low pressure. (At normal temperatures the poison would evaporate, disappearing without trace in about two minutes.) The three components could be assembled by means of a thread which allowed one part to screw into the other. The first component was the poison ampoule portion, the front end of which had a fine metallic screen. The poison ampoule fitted solidly against the walls of the metal cylinder. The center component contained a piston and a piston arm which extended into the third or activating component. The latter contained a spring-mounted activating arm which, when drawn back, armed the weapon. The releasing arm was appended to the third component at an angle, and was attached to the activating arm by means of a releasing catch. A small safety arm permitted the weapon to be placed in the safety position. The third component also contained a few grams of powder.

The maximum effective range of the weapon was about one-half meter; at one and one-half meters the effect of the vapors would be questionable; and at two and one-half meters, the vapors would be totally ineffective. (The assassin was instructed to fire the weapon only inches from the face.)

The weapon was activated as follows: The activating arm was pulled back and the safety released. The weapon was then activated. It was held in the palm of the hand in such a fashion that it fired when the user pressed the releasing arm towards the activating arm. The releasing arm, when pressed, acted upon the releasing catch, permitting the spring-held activating arm to fly forward against the small charge of powder. The exploding powder (which made a noise approximating the sound of a loud handclap with the hands cupped) drove the piston arm forward, causing the piston to strike against the poison ampoule. The poison was thus driven out through the fine screen in the form of a liquid spray.

The weapon used for the second assassination was similar, except that it was double-barreled. Each barrel contained a charge of poison similar to that contained in the single-barreled weapon. The two barrels could be discharged separately, or together as a unit. Thus, in the event the first charge did not kill the victim, a second attempt could be made. The two barrels were welded together, and the weapon had two releasing arms, two releasing catches, two safeties, and two activating arms. The effect of the poison was the same.

Utilization of the Weapon: For maximum effective results it is recommended that the liquid poison be shot directly into the face of the victim, in order to introduce the vapors most quickly into the respiratory system. Since the vapors rise upward very rapidly, the poison is still effective when aimed at the chest; conceivably, this would give sufficient time to allow the victim time to scream.

Effects of the Poison: The effect of the poisonous vapors is such that the arteries which feed blood to the brain become paralyzed almost immediately. Absence of blood in the brain precipitates a normal paralysis of the brain or a heart attack, as a result of which the victim dies. The victim is clinically dead within one and one-half minutes after inhaling these poisonous vapors. After about five minutes the effect of the poison wears off entirely, permitting the arteries to return to their normal condition, leaving no trace of the killing agent which precipitated the paralysis or the heart attack.

Allegedly, no foreign matter can be discovered in the body or on the clothes of the victim, no matter how thorough an autopsy or examination. The liquid spray can be seen as it leaves the nose of the weapon, however, and droplets can also be seen on the face of the victim.

Stashinskiy claimed that before using the weapon on his first victim, he tested it on a dog. He fired the gun directly into the dog's face, holding his hand approximately one and one-half feet from its nose. Almost immediately after the liquid spray had hit its face, the dog rolled over, without making any sound whatever. It continued to writhe for almost three minutes, however. Stashinskiy was told that the poison affected a human much sooner, causing death within one and one-half minutes.

Safety Precautions for the User: Stashinskiy was told that neither the poisonous liquid nor the fatal fumes affected any portion of the body other than the respiratory system, and that, since it could not enter the body through the skin or the pores, one could safely place his hands into a pail of the poison. Inasmuch as the weapon was held at arm's length when fired and the liquid spray ejected forward in a conical pattern, the user, under normal conditions, is safe from the effects of the poisonous vapors. Nevertheless, as an extra precaution, Stashinskiy was provided with counteractive agents to use if he so desired.

Concealment Methods: For transportation, the weapon was transported hermetically sealed in a container, and inserted between sausages in a can which was itself hermetically sealed. It was suggested to Stashinskiy that he should carry the weapon to the site of the planned assassination wrapped in a light newspaper, in which he had torn a small hole to enable him to reach the safety quickly just before using the weapon.

Method of Attack: In the first assignment, Stashinskiy observed Rebet debarking from a streetcar at about 0930 hours. Observing that the victim was heading for his office, the assassin preceded him into the building and climbed the circular staircase to the first floor. On hearing Rebet's footsteps on the staircase, Stashinskiy turned and started walking down, keeping to the left, and carrying the weapon, wrapped in newspaper, in his right hand. The two met about halfway between the two floors. Firing directly into Rebet's face from a distance of approximately one-half meter, Stashinskiy continued walking downstairs without even breaking his pace. The victim lurched silently forward and fell on the staircase. While still in the building, Stashinskiy shook off the liquid drops from the weapon and put it in the breast pocket of his suit. (A laboratory examination of the suit later revealed nothing of significance.) Although he had no reason to believe that he had inhaled the poisonous fumes, he used the counteractive measures provided. He later disposed of the murder weapon in a shallow canal in the city.

In carrying out his second mission, Stashinskiy used a similar approach. Having previously abandoned an attempt to corner Bandera in the latter's garage, the assassin gained entry to the victim's apartment house by reproducing a key which he had observed being used in the front door lock. On the day of the assassination, having seen Bandera drive into his driveway, Stashinskiy let himself into the apartment building and waited. Bandera, carrying several packages of fruit and vegetables in his right hand, entered the front door with the aid of a key which was on a key ring together with other keys. As he was attempting to disengage the key from the lock, Stashinskiy moved away from the elevator, where he had been standing, toward the front door. The weapon was in his hand with the safety released. As he walked past the victim, who was still trying to extricate the key from the lock, the assassin took the door handle with his left hand, as if to assist Bandera, asking him "Doesn't it work?" By this time, Bandera had succeeded in pulling the key out of the lock. Almost at the instant he replied "Yes, it works," Stashinskiy fired both barrels simultaneously into his face at almost point-blank range. Seeing the victim lurch backward and to the side, the assassin walked out of the apartment building and closed the front door. Although he (lid not wait to see Bandera drop to the ground, Stashinskiy is certain that, contrary to press reports, the man did not scream or otherwise call for help. Stashinskiy later threw the murder weapon into the same canal in which he had discarded the first weapon.

Although the press reported that Bandera had been attacked physically before he was poisoned, Stashinskiy insisted that he had used no force, since it had not been necessary to do so. Some newspapers also reported that Bandera had died of potassium cyanide poisoning. Stashinskiy claimed that he was told, and believes, that the chemical was not potassium cyanide, since (1) he thinks that substance could not have been introduced into the body by the method employed, and (2) he believes the RIS would have no reason to deceive him on this matter, especially since he had to be provided with counteractive precautions. Stashinskiy claimed that one of his Soviet contacts was pleased to learn that the police suspected potassium cyanide, as this allegedly indicated that the true cause of the victim's death was not evident.

Continue reading - II. Radio Free Europe

Soviet Use of Assassination and Kidnapping - part 2

Part 1

Organization

The executive action component of the Soviet government is currently designated the 13th Department of the KGB intelligence directorate (First Chief Directorate). The earliest known predecessor of the 13th Department was the so-called "Directorate of Special Tasks" reportedly established within the NKVD in December 1936 for terror purposes. During World War II terror missions were performed by the NKGB Fourth Directorate, which was responsible for partisan activity behind German lines. In late 1945 or early 1946 this directorate was replaced by a unit of the MGB known as Spets Byuro #1, which was organized to retain Fourth Directorate personnel to support and direct partisan activities behind enemy lines in the event of a future war. In the summer of 1952, however, the long-range aspects of Spets Byuro #1 mission were abandoned, and emphasis was shifted to using all available agents for sabotage and other violent activities. Spets Byuro #1 was given a new, and at present still unknown, designation some time in 1953 and assigned to carry out "special action tasks," such as sabotage, political murders, and kidnappings. With the creation of the KGB in 1954, the executive action component was redesignated as the 13th Department. Although the jurisdiction of the department is global, its main target areas are the United States and members of Western treaty organizations. There is no evidence of the existence of any unit within the Soviet military intelligence component (the GRU) responsible for the type of executive action discussed in this paper, although the GRU reportedly can undertake such operations under certain circumstances.

The 13th Department is believed to be divided into sections (otdeleniye) or directions (napravleniye) by countries or groups of countries, such as, for example, the United States ("the principal enemy"), England, Latin America, etc. At Moscow headquarters the department has approximately 50 to 60 experienced employees, and was last known to be headed by a General Rodin, who under the alias Korovin had previously been the KGB resident in Great Britain. Secrecy about the work of this department is maintained through the careful selection and training of its personnel; the officers do not discuss their experience among others; department documents are not circulated.

In addition to headquarters personnel, the 13th Department has its own support officers in legal residencies in Western countries and in some satellite countries. Such support officers work under the instructions of the legal resident and the 13th Department. One of the more active groups is a unit in East Germany which numbers perhaps 20 to 30 persons. As of 1960 there was a group in China, but it probably no longer exists. Prior to 1955 there was also a group in Austria. In a country in which a support officer of the 13th Department is stationed, the legal resident and the headquarters department for that country are aware of the targets of the 13th Department in that country, although they are not aware of illegal agents who are in direct contact with the 13th Department.

Although the 13th Department is the KGB's executive action component, the Emigr6 (Ninth) Department directs all operations, including assassination operations, against Soviet emigr6s. The Emigr6 Department's assassination operations, however, are believed to be conducted jointly with the 13th Department and sometimes other KGB components-for example, the counterintelligence directorate (Second Chief Directorate).

The 13th Department also supports the Disinformation (12th) Department of the First Chief Directorate in the latter's covert propaganda campaigns aimed at the creation of confusion and panic in Western countries. An example is the campaign conducted, in 1959 and later, for the purpose of creating adverse world opinion toward West Germany. This campaign included setting fire to synagogues and painting swastika signs in public places, and attributing these acts to West Germans. Other operations in which both the 13th Department and the Disinformation Department are involved include attempts to remove the threat to Soviet interests posed by certain members of Western governments. Sometimes this entails arranging for the dismissal of such persons from public office, but in theory at least it could mean "eliminating" them physically.

Installations

The defector Khokhlov described two laboratories associated with the executive action department. One produced special weapons and explosive devices; the other developed poisons and drugs for "special tasks." The explosives laboratory was located near Kuchino, outside Moscow, and was responsible for the development and production of weapons, from drawing up blueprints to melting and pouring bullets in no case was assistance obtained from military ordnance or other outside agencies.

The laboratory for poisons was supposedly a large and super-secret installation. No agents were permitted access to it or even knew of its location. Khokhlov could provide no first-hand information on it. Other sources, however, have reported the existence of this type of laboratory dating back to the purges in the late 1930's. A report from one source in 1954 described an experimental laboratory within Spets Byuro #1 known as the "Chamber" (Kamera). This laboratory conducted experiments on prisoners and persons subject to execution to test the effectiveness of different powders, beverages, and liquors, and various types of injections, as well as research on the use of hypnotism to force prisoners to confess. Beside its staff, only certain high-level persons were permitted to enter its premises. Although its existence officially was kept a secret, it was generally suspected or known by many state security functionaries that a unit of this sort was maintained. The Soviet government allegedly abolished the "Kamera" in October 1953, according to an announcement made to selected state security and Party officials, attributing the establishment and operation of the laboratory solely to Beriya and his close associates. Whether or not this step actually was taken does not rule out the possibility, however, that the same type of unit continues to exist in some other form.

Training for executive action operations was conducted at a base in Moscow by a staff of instructors who specialized in such subjects as the use of small arms, jujitsu, code, wireless, driving, surveillance, and photography.

Although executive action operations outside the USSR are planned, directed, and sometimes carried out by state security staff personnel, a mission may also be performed by one or more agents recruited specifically for this prupose. Khokhlov himself, for instance, was categorically forbidden to assassinate Okolovich personally.

Two German agents, Hans Kukowitsch and Kurt Weber, were to carry out the deed under Khokhlov's supervision. This reflected Soviet theory that indigenous personnel would have better access to the target, and also had the advantage of avoiding direct Soviet attribution. It appears from the Stashinskiy case, however, that security considerations ruled out the involvement of non-Soviets in more recent operations.

Even though some sources have made statements to the contrary, it appears that the agents (as opposed to staff employees like Stashinskiy) who perform executive action for the Soviets may be used for more than one mission of this nature. Khokhlov spoke of special executive action units known as "boyevaya gruppa" (literally, combat groups) which consisted of indigenous agents and/or Soviet illegal staff officers situated outside the borders of the USSR on the territory of hostile governments or in close proximity thereto. Such groups were armed and prepared to perform executive actions when required to do so, either in time of peace or war. A group of this type under the direction of the executive action department base at Karlshorst ostensibly was involved in the kidnaping of Dr. Alexander Trushnovich, an NTS leader in West Berlin, in April 1954, Khokhlov believed the abductors to have been recruited and organized by the East German security service at the request of the KGB chief at Karlshorst. The same type of group was mentioned in connection with the abduction of Dr. Linse; the actual abduction was reportedly performed by four German members of a "boyevaya gruppa" from East Germany. It is probable that such teams are a modern variation of the "mobile groups" described by a pre-war source as units dispatched from Moscow to foreign countries to assassinate Trotskyites and state security officers who refused to return to the USSR, as in the case of Reiss and possibly Krivitskv.

Soviet Use of Assassination and Kidnapping

A 1964 view of KGB methods

It has long been known that the Soviet state security service (currently the KGB) resorts to abduction and murder to combat what are considered to be actual or potential threats to the Soviet regime. These techniques, frequently designated as "executive action" and known within the KGB as "liquid affairs" (Mokryye Dela), can be and are employed abroad as well as within the borders of the USSR. They have been used against Soviet citizens, Soviet émigrés, and even foreign nationals. A list of those who have fallen victim to such action over the years would be a very long one and would include even the co-founder of the Soviet state, Leon Trotsky. Several well known Soviet assassination operations which have occurred since the rise of Khrushchev attest to the fact that the present leadership of the USSR still employs this method of dealing with its enemies.

The sudden disappearance or unexpected death of a person known to possess anti-Soviet convictions immediately raises the suspicion of Soviet involvement. Because it is often impossible to prove who is responsible for such incidents, Soviet intelligence is frequently blamed and is undoubtedly credited with successes it actually has not achieved. On the other hand, even in cases where the Soviet hand is obvious, investigation often produces only fragmentary information, due to the KGB ability to camouflage its trail. In addition, Soviet intelligence is doubtless involved in incidents that never become officially recognized as executive action, such as assassinations which are recorded as accidents, suicides, or natural deaths.

All of the factors cited above have helped to obscure Soviet practices in regard to assassinations and abductions outside the USSR. Certain observations can be made, however, which will help to put these practices into their proper perspective. These observations are set forth in the following paragraphs and are based on information produced by the investigation of known or suspected Soviet operations which have occurred since World War II, as well as from information supplied by defectors during this period.

Targets

The large numbers of former citizens of the USSR (and of Imperial Russia) living abroad in protest against the Soviet regime have been a continuing cause for concern to the Soviets since the early twenties. Reducing and keeping to a minimum the potential threat to the regime represented by these emigres is one of the functions of the state security service. Soviet intelligence seeks to neutralize, discredit and destroy anti-Soviet groups by luring emigres back to the USSR, by penetrating emigre organizations, and by kidnapping or murdering individual emigres considered to be particularly dangerous.

Emigre leaders who participate in anti-Soviet activities have been primary targets of Soviet abduction or assassination operations. Such operations are sometimes designed to demonstrate that the Soviet regime can strike its enemies anywhere in the world. The Soviets hope thereby to create fear, unrest, confusion, and dissension within emigre organizations, and at the same time deter other emigres from joining their ranks. The planned assassination in February 1954 of Georgiy S. Okolovich, leader of the NTS emigre organization, was to have been a particularly significant step toward achieving this goal, but the act was not carried out because of the defection of state security Captain Nikolay Khokhlov.

On the other hand, assassinations of some emigr6 leaders have been carried out so skillfully as to leave the impression that the victims died from natural causes. Details of some of the techniques used to achieve this were brought to light in 1961 when professional KGB assassin Bogdan Stashinskiy defected to the West and revealed that he had successfully performed two such missions. In 1957 he killed Ukrainian emigre writer Lev Rebet in Munich with a poison vapor gun which left the victim dead of an apparent heart attack. In 1959, the same type of weapon was used on Ukrainian emigre leader Stepan Bandera, although Bandera's death was never fully accepted as having been from natural causes. These cases are discussed in more detail later in this paper.

Executive action is also triggered by any signs of possible disloyalty on the part of Soviet officials abroad. The Soviets have gone to great lengths in the past to silence their intelligence officers who have defected, as evidenced by the assassination of former state security officer Ignace Reiss in 1937 and the unexplained "suicide" of former Soviet military intelligence officer Walter Krivitsky in 1941. In the post-war era, determination to prevent such defections was vividly demonstrated by the unsuccessful attempt to force the wife of Vladimir Petrov to return to the Soviet Union from Australia after his defection in April 1954. The practice of physical restraint applies with equal force to other Soviet officials who attempt to defect or are suspected of being on the verge of doing so. Examples were witnessed in Calcutta, India in January 1958 and Rangoon, Burma in May 1959. The respective victims, Aleksandr F. Zelenovskiy and Mikhail Strygin, were both portrayed by the Soviets as mental cases, were taken into custody by means of strong-arm tactics, and were forcibly removed to the USSR in a matter of days.

Foreign nationals are sometimes victims of Soviet executive action. The targets who fall into this category may be indigenous agents who have become suspect, or former citizens of satellite countries who have turned against the Soviet regime. In the latter case, actions against such individuals are usually carried out through the corresponding satellite intelligence service, aided and abetted by Soviet state security. The abductions of Dr. Walter Linse and Bohumil Lausman exemplify this type of operation. Linse had fled East Germany in 1947 and later became a leader of the "Society of Free jurists," an anti-Communist organization that the Soviets considered particularly dangerous. He was kidnaped from West Berlin in July 1952 by agents of the East German security service, with the full knowledge and approval of Soviet state security; he was later turned over to Soviet authorities in Karlshorst, East Berlin, and eventually sentenced to imprisonment in the USSR.* Lausman, prominent Czech anti-communist who fled to the West in 1949, disappeared from Vienna in 1953. It was later learned that he had been kidnapped by agents of Czech intelligence, with the official sanction of Moscow. The Soviet state security rezidentura in Vienna also had been directed to assist the operation by supplying a car for transportating Lausman to Prague and arranging for the vehicle to have free passage through the Soviet Zone of Austria.

Foreign political leaders are also potential targets of Soviet executive action operations and, according to recent information, the KGB's executive action component includes such persons among its targets. There is, however, no evidence proving that any Western leader has been the victim of Soviet executive action.

Continue reading - Organization

Inside look at espionage by former CIA and KGB agents

5:50 p.m., March 13, 2003--Fifteen years ago they would have been archenemies, but Wednesday evening, March 12, Paul J. Redmond, former chief of counterintelligence for the CIA, and Oleg Danilovich Kalugin, former major general of the Soviet KGB, took the stage together at UD’s Clayton Hall to reveal some of the most intriguing episodes of espionage history.

Far from the popularized James Bond spy stereotype, these men look like average Joes, and their personas reveal nothing of the sinister nature of their jobs. Redmond and Kalugin were the men behind the missions—the men who used counterintelligence to deeply infiltrate the deepest secrets of their respective enemy countries.

Redmond and Kalugin painted a picture of espionage during the 40 years of the United States and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics’ Cold War, as well as offering some insight into the future of counterintelligence work. Their speech, “Spy vs. Spy: Down and Dirty in the Espionage Trenches,” was part of UD’s Global Agenda Speaker Series, “Spies, Lies and Sneaky Guys.” Ralph Begleiter, Rosenberg Professor of Communication and Distinguished Journalist in Residence, moderated the event.

“The U.S. and the Soviet Union were locked in battle for supremacy,” Begleiter said. “The Soviet Union finally collapsed under their own political and economic failures. It was a war that ended without a shot being fired, but not without blood shed.

“The guests we have here tonight were secret agents. Each fought and survived the Cold War, carrying out clandestine operations around the world.”

Redmond and Kalugin were each given an opportunity to speak and then faced off in a friendly banter about topics raised by Begleiter. The guests then participated in a question-and-answer session with the audience.

Redmond’s speech focused on the American misconception that spies are not a large part of the workings of the U.S. government. He said it is an absolute certainty that spies infiltrate the U.S. government on a daily basis, a fact he termed “Redmond’s Law.”

“Counterintelligence is an effort to bring sanity to a world that’s very murky and full of spin,” he said. “ Intelligence can’t serve a country unless at least the truth is sought for.

“Americans never get the point that people are going to spy on us. It’s cultural—we don’t like spying so we don’t want to think about it. We don’t like secrets either,” Redmond said.

Before retirement, Redmond served in several top positions for the CIA in East Asia, Europe and Eastern Europe. He received the Distinguished Intelligence Medal in 1994, the Federal Order of Merit from the president of Germany in 1995 and the U.S. National Distinguished Service Medal in 1999. He also served as director of the CIA’s internal investigation of the Robert Hanssen spy case.

Redmond acknowledged the KGB’s deep penetration into the U.S. government during the Cold War. He said if the Soviets had not collapsed and a military war resulted, the United States would have lost.

“When you look at what would have happened if there was a war, it was terrifying,” he said. “We would have lost because the Soviets and the Hungarians had the lot.

“When you look at the Soviet shuttle, it’s ours. The holes for the bolts are in the same place right down to the last millimeter.”

Redmond stressed that spying is still a large part of U.S. operations, even though the Cold War ended in 1989. He said since 1995, 96 significant spy cases have been uncovered against the United States. Furthermore, more than 80 entities have attempted to spy or successfully spied on the United States, including Germany, France, Greece, China, Iraq, Russia, Ghana, Ecuador, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and El Salvador.

Kalugin’s speech centered on KGB methodology and ideology. He said during the Cold War, the Soviet government was focused on the United States as its number-one enemy. The KGB received solid support from the government, which asked no moral questions about the KGB’s actions and policies.

“We conducted a clandestine war with assassination if necessary,” he said. “Our mission was to do everything we could to have a war without the fighting. This was seen as amoral in America, but it was our ideology.”

Kalugin infiltrated the United States as a journalist, attending Columbia University in New York City as a Fulbright Scholar in 1958. From 1965-70, he served as deputy resident and acting chief of the residency at the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D.C., quickly becoming the youngest general in the history of the KGB. Eventually, he became the head of worldwide foreign counterintelligence, serving at the center of some of the most important espionage cases, including the Walker spy ring.

Finding that the KGB’s internal functions had little to do with the security of the state and everything to do with keeping corrupt Communist Party officials in power, Kalugin retired from the KGB in 1990 and became a public critic of the communist system. He currently teaches at the Centre for Counterintelligence and Security Studies.

Kalugin said one of his most effective spying techniques was pitting American citizens against their own government.

“We appealed to pacifists and told them, ‘You cannot have peace unless you stop the internal situation of the U.S.,’” he said. “We got environmentalists and told them, ‘Capitalists spend any amount of money even if it does destroy your precious nature.’ Well, at the time, the Soviet Union was the most polluted country in the world,” he joked.

Kalugin listed several astonishing facts from a classified KGB report, proving just how much the organization is committed to counterintelligence. He said that in 1981 the KGB reported that they had funded or supported 70 books, 66 feature and documentary films, more than 100 television stations, 4,865 articles in magazines or newspapers, 300 conferences or exhibitions and 170,000 lectures around the world.

“Friendship, companionship—that is fine,” Kalugin said, “but national interests remain. Counterintelligence will never cease to exist. The U.S. remains priority number one.”

The face-off after each guests’ speech was filled with friendly banter and a competitive edge. When Begleiter asked Kalugin if he knew Redmond during his counterintelligence work, he replied with a wink, “I came across his name in a list of CIA agents the KGB compiled of over 11,000 names but not very often.”

“Little did you know,” Redmond answered.

In a discussion of the terrorist attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, both men agreed that the Al Qaeda organization could have been penetrated before the attacks, and Kalugin questioned why the CIA did not take more aggressive action toward infiltrating it.

Kalugin said the KGB would have sent a Muslim agent or an individual posing as a Muslim into the network five to 10 years ago. Redmond responded by explaining the extreme difficulty of such a task, and the cultural differences that exist between KGB and CIA ideology.

“We are a country of making the next quarter’s numbers,” Redmond said. “We’re a country of fast food and automatic replays. Culturally, we don’t ever think in the long-run.”

The Global Agenda Speaker Series is a program of the University’s “America and the Global Community” initiative and is presented in association with the World Affairs Council of Wilmington.

Source

Monday, 9 July 2007

CIA code words - cryptonyms used by the Central Intelligence Agency of the United States.

Partial list of CIA digraphs, cryptonyms and probable definitions:

AE: Soviet Union
AM: Cuba
BE: Poland
CK: Soviet Union
DI: Czechoslovakia
DM: Yugoslavia
DN: South Korea
ES: Guatemala
GT: Soviet Union
IA: Angola
KU: Part of CIA
LI: Mexico
MH: Worldwide operation
MK: Projects sponsored by the CIA's Technical Services Division
OD: Other Department
PB: President Board
SD: Iran
SM: United Kingdom
TU: South Vietnam
ZR: Normally prefixes the cryptonym for an intelligence intercept program. Seems to go with Staff D ops, Staff D being the group that worked directly with the NSA. Staff D was where ZR/RIFLE, a Castro assassination plot, was buried.

Operations and Projects

ARTICHOKE: Anti-interrogation project. Precursor to MKULTRA.
AQUATONE: Lockheed U-2 Spy Plane Project
BLUEBIRD: mind control program
CHALICE: Lockheed U-2 Spy Plane Project
CHERRY: Covert assassination / destabilization operation during Vietnam war, targeting Prince (later King) Norodom Sihanouk and the government of Cambodia. Disbanded.
CONDOR: 1970s CIA interference in Latin American governments, some allege in the coup and assassination of Salvador Allende in Chile
CORONA: Satellite photo system.
DBACHILLES: 1995 effort to support a military coup in Iraq.
ECHELON: worldwide signals intelligence and analysis network run by the UKUSA Community.
GUSTO: Project to design a follow-on to the Lockheed U-2 Spy Plane
HTAUTOMAT: Photointerpretation center established for the Lockheed U-2 Spy Plane Project
HTLINGUAL: Mail interception operation.
IAFEATURE: Operation to support UNITA and FNLA during the Angolan civil war.
KEMPSTER: Project to reduce the radar cross section (RCS) of the inlets of the Lockheed A-12 Spy Plane
LINCOLN: Ongoing operation involving Basque separatist group ETA
LPMEDLEY: Surveillance of telegraphic information exiting or entering the United States
MHCHAOS: Surveillance of antiwar activists during the Vietnam War
MKDELTA: Stockpiling of lethal biological and chemical agents, subsequently became MKNAOMI
MKNAOMI: Stockpiling of lethal biological and chemical agents, successor to MKDELTA
MKULTRA: Mind control research. MKULTRA means MK (code for scientific projects) and ULTRA (top classification reference, re: ULTRA code breaking in WWII. Renamed MKSEARCH in 1964
MKSEARCH: MKULTRA after 1964, mind control research
MKOFTEN: Testing effects of biological and chemical agents, part of MKSEARCH
OAK: Operation to assassinate suspected South Vietnamese collaborators during Vietnam war
OXCART: Lockheed A-12 Spy Plane Project
PAPERCLIP: US recruiting of German scientists after the Second World War
PHOENIX: Vietnam covert intelligence/assassination operation.
PBFORTUNE: CIA project to supply forces opposed to Guatemala's President Arbenz with weapons, supplies, and funding; predecessor to PBSUCCESS.
PBHISTORY: Central Intelligence Agency project to gather and analyze documents from the Arbenz government in Guatemala that would incriminate Arbenz as a Communist.
PBSUCCESS: (Also PBS) Central Intelligence Agency covert operation to overthrow the Arbenz government in Guatemala.
RAINBOW: Project to reduce the radar cross section (RCS) of the Lockheed U-2 Spy Plane
SHERWOOD: CIA radio broadcast program in Nicaragua begun on May 1, 1954.
THERMOS: Unclassified codeword used in lieu of RAINBOW
TPAJAX: Joint US/UK operation to overthrow Mohammed Mossadeq, Prime Minister of Iran
TSS: Technical Services Staff
WASHTUB: Operation to plant Soviet arms in Nicaragua

Organizations

KUBARK: CIA Headquarters
KUCAGE: CIA Overseas Paramilitary / Propaganda Operations
KUCLUB: Office of Communications
KUDESK: Counterintelligence department
KUDOVE: Office of the director
KUFIRE: Intelligence
KUGOWN: Propaganda
KUHOOK: Negotiations/Logistics (unsure)
KUSODA: CIA Interrogators
ODACID: State Department / US Embassy
ODEARL: US Department of Defense
ODENVY: FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigation
ODOATH: US Navy
ODUNIT: US Air Force
ODYOKE: US Government
QKFLOWAGE: United States Information Agency
SKIMMER: The "Group" CIA cover organization supporting Castillo Armas.
SGUAT: CIA Station in Guatemala
SMOTH: British Secret Intelligence Service (also known as MI6)
SYNCARP: The "Junta," Castillo Armas' political organization headed by Cordova Cerna.
UNIFRUIT: United Fruit Company

Persons

AEFOXTROT: Yuri Ivanovich Nosenko, a Soviet defector
AELADLE: Anatoliy Golitsyn, a Soviet defector
AMLASH: Rolando Cubela Secades, a Cuban official involved in plot to kill Fidel Castro in 1963
AMQUACK: Che Guevara, Argentinian guerrilla leader
AMTHUG: Fidel Castro, president of Cuba
ESQUIRE: James Bamford, author of "The Puzzle Palace"
GPFLOOR: Lee Harvey Oswald, J.F. Kennedy's assassin
GPIDEAL: John F. Kennedy, US president
GRALLSPICE: Pyotr Semonovich Popov, Soviet defector
JMBLUG: John S. Peurifoy, U.S. Ambassador to Guatemala
KUMOTHER: James Jesus Angleton, head of the CIAs counter intelligence
PANCHO: Carlos Castillo Armas, President of Guatemala, also RUFUS
RUFUS: Carlos Castillo Armas, President of Guatemala, also PANCHO
SKILLET: Whiting Willauer, U.S. Ambassador to Honduras.
STANDEL: Jacobo Arbenz, President of Guatemala

Places

BOND: Puerto Barrios, Guatemala
DTFROGS: El Salvador
HTKEEPER: Mexico City
HTPLUME: Panama
JMMADD: CIA airbase near city of Retalhuleu, Guatemala
JMTIDE: CIA airbase in Puerto Cabezas, Nicaragua
JMTRAX: CIA covert airbase/training camp in Guatemala
JMWAVE: CIA station in Miami (which operated against Cuba)
KMFLUSH: Nicaragua
KMPAJAMA: Mexico
KMPLEBE: Peru
LCPANGS: Costa Rica
LIONIZER: Guatemalan refugee group in Mexico
PBPRIME: the United States of America
PBRUMEN: Cuba
SARANAC: Training site in Nicaragua
SCRANTON: Training base for radio operators near Nicaragua.
WSBURNT: Guatemala
WSHOOFS: Honduras

Other

BGGYPSY: Communist
ESCOBILLA: Guatemalan national
ESMERALDITE: labor informant affiliated with AFL-sponsored labor movement
ESSENCE: Guatemalan anti-Communist leader
FJHOPEFUL: military base
LCFLUTTER: Polygraph, sometimes supplanted by truth drugs: Sodium Amytal (amobarbital), Sodium Pentothal (thiopental), and Seconal (secobarbital) to induce regression in the subject.
LIENVOY: Wiretap or Intercept Program
RYBAT: Indicates that the information is very sensitive
SLINC: Telegram indicator for PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida.

Wednesday, 4 July 2007

Operation "Agat" ("Agate")

In November an operation was carried out to exchange the soldiers of the ‘Zenith’ unit with specially trained border guards. A motorized company of border troops consisting of 208 combat soldiers, armed helicopters, 25 armored personnel carriers, 15 armored carriers, ten hand-held and four mounted grenade throwers were also secretly sent in. On 7 December two specialists from the Chief Directorate of Border Guards arrived to study the communication lines of Amin’s new residence. On 8 December the Residency was instructed to organize with precaution, the monitoring in Kabul and the provinces of ‘Buran’ broadcasts from Dushanbe beamed towards Afghanistan, and “to give your opinion of its possible use in the measures known to you.” Preparation for Operation ‘Agat’ went ahead at full speed.

The 8th Department of Directorate S of the FCD was asked to carry it out. Preparations were at the final stage. Colonel Lazarenko, the deputy head of the 8th Department of Directorate S was directly in charge. Major-General Kirpichenko, the head of Directorate S, and his deputy, Major General Krasovsky, the head of the 8th Department of Directorate S, were sent to Kabul to help Ivanov. On 12 December A.V. Petrov, the senior assistant of the 8th Department of the FCD, B.G.Chicherin, a senior operational officer, and members of other KGB directorates at the Center and the periphery flew to Kabul. On the same day ten members of Group A of the 7th Directorate of the KGB arrived in Kabul. They were joined on December 23 by another three and later by a whole group led by the head of the 7th Directorate, Lieutenant-General A.D. Beschastnov.

On 27 December the KGB began Operation ‘Agat’ [Agate] to storm the residence of the President of the DRA and the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the PDPA, H. Amin, to eliminate him and those close to him physically, to arrest his retinue and the government. Over 700 members of the KGB from the Center and the Periphery were dropped into Kabul to take part in “Operation Agat.” The troops were dressed in Afghan army uniforms. An explosion under a tree in the central square of the capital, where the explosive device had been placed beforehand, was the signal for the attack to begin. Over 100 of the KGB were killed in the attack on the palace. Such large losses forced Andropov to question the expediency of hanging portraits in mourning frames of heroes killed whilst carrying out their noble international mission in the halls and corridors as this would attract unnecessary attention.

At 10:30 a.m. on 28 December the last pocket of resistance was crushed. The house of the commander of the People's Guard, Jandad, which was not far from Amin’s residence, was seized. Jandad was captured and taken to the building of the special services. Amin’s elder brother, Abdullah, was captured in the village of Mazar-I Sharif and put in a special 'isolator' prison. Members of the government and the Revolutionary Council were arrested. Members of H. Amin’s family, his son, three daughters, daughter-in-law, the wife of the eldest son Abdurakhman and the wives of Asadullah Amin were put in Pol-I Charki prison. Two of Amin’s sons had been killed in the fighting. The arrested members of the government and the Revolutionary Council were taken to this same prison from the radio building.

Members of the KGB were promoted and received awards for “Operation ‘Agat’ [Agate].” Lazarenko was given the title of General although there was no provision for this in the establishment; Kirpichenko became Lieutenant-General and was soon appointed First Deputy Chief of the FCD; and Kozlov, a member of the 8th Department of Directorate S, was made a Hero of the Soviet Union.

Afghan officials had no idea what was happening on the night of 27 to 28 December. Minister of Communications M. Zarif, Minister of Higher and Secondary Education M. Suma, Minister of Water Resources and Energy M. Hashemi, the head of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the PDPA Khuma, and the Consul of the DRA in Quetta, Abdul Wahed, were all in house number 104 in the 3rd district of Kabul. Some of them thought that what was happening was 'a provocation by the USA', others that it was an attack by the Muslim Brothers. To the suggestion that it could be the work of the Parchamists, Zafir replied confidently: “They won't get anywhere. The Soviets wouldn't allow it.”

Source: Vasiliy Mitrokhin, The KGB in Afghanistan.

Tuesday, 3 July 2007

Operation "Raduga" ("Rainbow")

Operation 'Raduga' [Rainbow] was devised to take the three ministers illegally out of Afghanistan to the USSR. This involved a cover story about rotating personnel from the ‘Zenith’ unit which protected Soviet buildings. A detailed description of the fugitives was given to Moscow so that written portraits could be prepared.

On 18 September ten members of the unit flew from Moscow to the air base at Bagramin an Il-76. The plane carried two covered lorries. Part of the load was sent as diplomatic baggage. One of the lorries carried special containers. Also on the plane was an operational group from Directorate S of the FCD: V. S.Glotov, the leader of the group, M. Talybov, an interpreter, N.S. Zorin, a specialist on documents, V.I. Adrianov, from the 7th Directorate of the KGB, a make-up artist with the necessary accessories hurriedly brought in from Berlin, 3 wigs,products and equipment for doing hair and creams and liquids for changing the color of hair from black to auburn, light-brown and chestnut. An AN-12 accompanied the plane from Ferganato Bagram.

An operational group was established by the KGB Residency and Representation consisting of S.G. Bakhturin and B.N. Kabanov, who were informed of the nature of Operation‘Raduga’, and two officers from the KGB Representation, Yu.D. Ivanov and A.I Dadykin, who were to be used 'unconsciously' to guard and conduct the ‘Raduga’ party from Kabul to Bagram.They were to be assisted by four members of the Kabul ‘Zenith’ unit under the command of the commander of the unit, N.A. Surkov. L.P. Bogdanov was directly responsible for running the operation and the leader of the operation, B.S. Ivanov, was to be involved when necessary.

The plan for Operation ‘Raduga’ was as follows.

  1. The operational group would travel to Bagram, 60 kilometers from Kabul, before the arrival of the plane. There would be a car, the embassy bus driven by a Residency operational driver and a GAZ-69 lorry. The people and lorry would be unloaded from the plane. When the plane was unloaded, the vehicles would set off for Kabul, led by Kabanov. Ivanov and Dadykin would see the vehicles through the Bagram checkpoint.

  2. The car carrying the ‘Zenith’ group baggage would unload at the villa and then‘Raduga’ would be loaded. Prior to this the make-up artist would do the necessary work on Gulyabzoi, Watanjar and Sarwari and give them the required appearance. Before the actual loading of ‘Raduga’ into the lorry, Surkov did a rehearsal with a soldier from the ‘Zenith’ unit.The ‘Raduga’ container and the disguised luggage would be put into the car. Then the convoy led by Kabanov’s car, followed by the lorry with ‘Raduga,’ the bus carrying the departing soldiers from the unit and the GAZ-69 with a cover party would set off for Bagram along a route planned to avoid the heavily guarded central part of Kabul. Between Kabul and the first control point a car carrying the Soviet military adviser at the Bagram airbase would join the convoy to ensure that the cars passed unhindered through the control points on the route. Bakhturin and Dadykin were in charge of the convoy as it passed the Bagram checkpoint and drove across the aerodrome to the plane. The Soviet embassy had earlier requested the Afghan commander of theairbase through the military adviser to co-operate in allowing onto the base people leaving for the Union at the end of their tour of duty and their luggage.

  3. The car containing ‘Raduga’would be put on the plane without being unloaded. The members of the ‘Zenith’ group who were leaving would then board the plane.

  4. The ‘Zenith’ soldiers would carry Soviet passports withexit-entrance visas. The operational officers were provided with accreditation from the Prime Minister of the DRA and diplomatic passes. A timetable down to the last minute was drawn up for the route.

In view of Sarwari’s appearance, a container was prepared for him by the Residency with all essential equipment. Unavailable parts were obtained by the Center. It was equipped with four small mountain rescue oxygen tanks sufficient for six hours. Gulyabzoi and Watanjar were documented as soldiers from the Zenith unit and given Soviet passports.

After intense preparation and measures to distract attention Operation ‘Raduga’ was carried out on 19 September. The ministers were flown to Tashkent. Many people were awarded honors and congratulated by the Chairman of the KGB for their role in the operation.

Source: Vasiliy Mitrokhin, The KGB in Afghanistan

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